Monday, March 26, 2012

UPS buys TNT Express: Strong deliverer

THE “conveyor belt” for global commerce is how Scott Davis, the boss of UPS, describes his company, the world’s biggest express-parcel shipper. On March 19th UPS announced that it would buy TNT Express, a Dutch competitor, for €5.16 billion ($6.8 billion). The deal adds TNT’s hefty regional network to UPS’s vast global one. The merged firm will be much larger than FedEx or DHL, its main rivals (though DHL is part of a larger group).

It is a good time to strike a deal. TNT Express, which split from TNT’s mail-delivery firm last year, has wobbled as the world economy has faltered. Its share price is depressed, but its prospects are not bad. As the world economy revives, package-toters with global networks should thrive.

The big three have the field to themselves. The huge capital costs of building a worldwide network of planes and trucks to ensure swift deliveries of parcels, documents and freight keeps smaller rivals at bay. And the more complete the network, the better customers are served. TNT Express’s business fills a gap in Europe, where UPS lacks a road-freight operation. It also has a struggling business in fast-growing Brazil that UPS reckons it can fix.

Strong growth looks set to resume. Express delivery is enabling smaller firms to run the long global supply chains favoured by big companies, helping everyone to save cash. UPS reckons technology and demography offer plenty more scope for shifting parcels.

First, technology. E-mail may have killed the letter, but online shopping is great for parcel-deliverers. Shifting things bought on the internet is 30% of UPS’s business in America. That jumps to 50% at Christmas and other peak times. And as people everywhere discover the joy of shopping from the sofa, the business has excellent growth prospects. Online shoppers don’t care whether goods come from a few streets away or must be shipped, more profitably, from another continent.

Second, demography. Greying populations seem an unlikely source of profits. Yet to contain spiralling health-care costs, older folk are increasingly receiving treatment at home rather than in hospital. UPS already has a good business ensuring that organs and skin grafts get to hospitals in good time. (Transplant patients prefer not to wait.) The next bonanza, it reckons, will be delivering drugs and medical devices to patients’ doors.

Source: http://www.economist.com/node/21551086

Inditex: Fashion forward

FLOGGING fashion is like selling fish, as Amancio Ortega, the founder of Inditex, likes to say. Fresh fish, like a freshly cut jacket in the latest colour, sells quickly and at a high price. Yesterday’s catch must be discounted and may not sell at all.

This simple insight has made Inditex one of the world’s two biggest clothes makers. (The other, H&M Hennes & Mauritz of Sweden, is about the same size.) From its base near the Spanish fishing port of La Coruña, Inditex’s main brand, Zara, has conquered Europe.

The Inditex model, celebrated in many a case study, goes like this. Other fashion firms have their clothes made in China. This is cheap, but managing a long supply chain is hard. By the time a boat has sailed halfway round the world, hemlines may have risen an inch and its cargo will be as popular as geriatric haddock.

Inditex, by contrast, sources just over half of its products from Spain, Portugal and Morocco. This costs more. But because its supply chain is short, Inditex can react quickly to new trends. Instead of betting on tomorrow’s hot look, Zara can wait to see what customers are actually buying—and make that. While others are stuck with unwanted stock, Inditex sells at full prices.

Sales have quadrupled to €13.8 billion ($19.1 billion) since the firm’s initial public offering in 2001. Inditex’s operating profits are high and have been more stable over time than its peers’. The firm now faces two challenges. Can it go global? And will its “fast-fashion” model be copied, or bettered, by others?

For now, Inditex is dependent on Europe: 70% of its sales in 2011 were there. Sales in Spain, which accounted for 25% of revenue, have stalled. Europe is stagnant and ageing. Inditex needs new markets.

Pablo Isla, who took over as chairman from Mr Ortega last summer, has big plans. “Going into China is like beginning again in Europe for us,” he says. Announcing its annual results on March 21st, Inditex said it opened 179 new stores in Asia in 2011, 156 of them in China.

A global brand needs a prominent shop window. On March 15th Inditex opened a huge outlet on Fifth Avenue in Manhattan, having bought the store for $324m last year. (Even after adjusting for inflation, that is more than the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, in which America bought all or part of 15 states.) The aim is not merely to sell to New Yorkers, but to convince shoppers everywhere that Zara is hip.

Inditex’s formula has not worked everywhere. Zara has struggled in America, for instance. It sells trendy cuts and slim fits. Outside the biggest cities, Americans have long preferred classic, roomier clothes (though this may be changing). Chinese office ladies like Zara’s slim fits more, says Fraser Ramzan of Nomura, a bank. Iria Campos, a Zara designer, says Chinese women choose pastels to flatter their pale skin rather than the stronger colours Europeans prefer; but otherwise they have surprisingly similar tastes.

Still, China will not be easy. Zara’s clothes are far pricier than local rivals’, whereas in Europe they are relatively cheap. And because of the distance from La Coruña, Zara must charge more in absolute terms as well. So it has to convince Chinese shoppers that it is luxurious enough to justify the price tag. Its Chinese stores are packed, but its success is more fragile in China than in Europe, says Luca Solca of CA Cheuvreux Research in Paris. It must watch the quality of its products.

And expect hurdles. Last year China’s consumer watchdog attacked Zara for poor quality. The firm denies that it was singled out for political reasons. But the Chinese government typically targets foreign firms first. Last week McDonald’s and Carrefour were pilloried for minor lapses.

At some point, Inditex may have to adapt its business model for Asia. As its Chinese sales grow, it will make sense to have both logistics and design in China, says Mr Solca. Last year rumours flew that Inditex might buy Giordano, a Hong Kong-based version of Gap, an American clothes chain. Both companies denied it.

Inditex currently has a dozen or so designers in Shanghai and around 250 at home in La Coruña. That will surely change. Creatively, Europe is “rather dead”, says José Luis Pavia Cervera, a former executive at Inditex who now works for C&A, a mid-market retailer. In the future, China will set the trends, he reckons.

Several of Inditex’s rivals are struggling. In February the Benetton family moved to de-list their fashion group to revamp its business model. Benetton went international in the 1980s but overexpanded and lost direction. Its shocking ads (the Pope kissing an imam, etc) no longer thrill. America’s Gap, another retailer with global ambitions, is ailing. Both brands have lost market share to Inditex and H&M.

The genius of Mr Ortega’s model, says a former Inditex executive, is that it picks up on every season’s trends and is never associated with any one style, which could fall out of fashion. Alone among its peers, it does not advertise. Instead, it relies on chic locations and shop-window displays. Rivals, however, argue that Zara is in fact associated with something: a gilded age of throwaway fashion. Now that tight belts are in, women may hesitate to buy a top and wear it only twice.

Inditex is trying to develop new brands. Bershka, the most successful, was launched in 1998 and has sales of €1.3 billion. But the firm remains dependent on Zara, which generated 65% of sales in 2011.

Kings of La Coruña

The change at the top appears to have gone smoothly. Mr Isla was Mr Ortega’s deputy and hand-picked successor. The 75-year-old Mr Ortega remains powerful, however: he still owns 59% of Inditex. He started work in a clothing shop in La Coruña at 13, and has always directed the design, manufacturing and selling side of the business, while delegating other parts, such as finance and IT. The firm has developed a “schism” between the product side and finance, according to “Zara and Her Sisters”, a recent book by Enrique Badía.

Mr Isla’s background is different. A lawyer, he was chairman of Altadis, a tobacco group, before joining Inditex in 2005. Even now that he is the boss, says a former colleague, Mr Isla “has little to do with the product side of the business”. Mr Ortega is still in charge of that, apparently.

Insiders praise Mr Isla. He has curbed costs. During 2010-11 the firm rolled out a global online-commerce platform for Zara. Were it not for Mr Isla, Inditex would probably not have broken with its bricks-and- mortar tradition so boldly. The company does not release figures, but the online store is said to be thriving.

Nevertheless, insiders worry about the day Mr Ortega really retires. Inditex will need a new muse, some say. Mr Isla retorts that product teams make product decisions, and that Mr Ortega’s handover of the chairmanship represented “the complete professionalisation of the company”.

Why has no one copied Inditex’s business model? One executive at Gap is said to have answered: “I would love to organise our business like Inditex, but I would have to knock the company down and rebuild it from scratch.” The gulf between Inditex and its rivals is bound to shrink, however. Isabel Cavill of Planet Retail, a consultancy, notes that retailers such as Gap and George, a brand owned by Britain’s Asda, are seeking to move production away from Asia and closer to home.

As Benetton addresses its problems, it will adopt elements of Inditex’s model, such as the way it frequently updates its collections, says an executive close to the company. Plenty of competitors are poaching the Spanish firm’s people to learn its secrets. “My main task at C&A is to replicate Inditex’s obsessive focus on its products and its shops,” says Mr Pavia, who has hired people from Inditex to help him. Nothing lasts forever in the world of fashion. Fortunes, like hemlines, can go down as well as up.

Source: http://www.economist.com/node/21551063

Wednesday, March 21, 2012

Những 'con cá mập' và cuộc chiến bán lẻ ở Việt Nam

Cuộc chiến bán lẻ đến hồi gay cấn khi chỉ trong nửa đầu tháng 3/2012, ba "con cá mập" lớn của nước ngoài, gồm: Takashimaya, Aeon và Temasek công bố các dự án đầu tư vào Việt Nam.

Như vậy, tính đến tháng 3/2012, đã có khoảng 20 tập đoàn bán lẻ hàng đầu của các nước đầu tư vào Việt Nam. Trong khi đó, tình hình kinh doanh của các nhà bán lẻ trong nước lại chưa hẳn đã xuôi chèo mát mái.

Ngoại xốc tới

Đầu tháng 3/2012, một "cá mập" trong làng bán lẻ thế giới - Takashimaya Singapore - cam kết thuê khoảng 15.000 mét vuông sàn bán lẻ tại 5 tầng của giai đoạn 2 dự án Saigon Centre. Lý do vào thị trường Việt Nam, theo bà Yoko Yasuda, Giám đốc điều hành Takashimaya Singapore, là thị trường bán lẻ Việt Nam đang bước vào một giai đoạn phát triển sôi động với nhóm người tiêu dùng có thu nhập trung bình ngày càng tăng.

Một nhà bán lẻ tên tuổi khác, Tập đoàn Aeon Nhật Bản, cũng chính thức tham gia hoạt động tại thị trường Việt Nam qua việc khai trương Công ty trách nhiệm hữu hạn Aeon Việt Nam vào ngày 2/3/2012. Dự kiến, tháng 9 tới, công ty này sẽ xây dựng Trung tâm thương mại Aeon - Tân Phú Celadon tại quận Tân Phú với vốn đầu tư khoảng 100 triệu USD. Ông Motoya Okada, Giám đốc điều hành của Aeon Group nhận định, Việt Nam đang thu hút nhiều nhà đầu tư nước ngoài và sẽ là một trong những trọng tâm phát triển của châu Á. Phân khúc khách hàng mà tập đoàn hướng tới là tầng lớp người dân có thu nhập trung bình. Dự kiến đến năm 2020, Aeon sẽ xây dựng khoảng 20 trung tâm bán lẻ nữa tại các vùng miền của Việt Nam. Còn Malaysia có dự án "đại siêu thị" (shopping mall) Platinum Plaza, do Tập đoàn WCT đầu tư với tổng vốn 600 triệu USD tại Bình Chánh.

Đáng lưu ý, nhiều nhà bán lẻ nước ngoài lựa chọn con đường hợp tác với doanh nghiệp trong nước. Bà Nguyễn Thị Tranh, Tổng giám đốc Công ty cổ phần Đầu tư Phát triển Saigon Co-op (SCID) cho biết, dự án khu trung tâm thương mại phức hợp có qui mô lớn nhất Việt Nam với diện tích rộng hơn 4ha vừa khởi công tại phường Tân Phong, Q7, TP.HCM là do SCID hợp tác với công ty đầu tư Mapletree (thành viên của Tập đoàn Temasek Holding) thực hiện nhằm khai thác nhu cầu mua sắm, ăn uống, nghỉ ngơi, giải trí của người dân TP.HCM cũng như người nước ngoài đang sinh sống tại thành phố này.

Tương tự, E-Mart - Tập đoàn bán lẻ lớn của Hàn Quốc - cũng đã vào Việt Nam thông qua việc thiết lập một liên doanh với Tập đoàn U&I của Việt Nam có trụ sở tại Bình Dương. Liên doanh E-Mart Việt Nam có vốn đầu tư ban đầu 80 triệu USD và có kế hoạch mở chuỗi 52 siêu thị đến năm 2020. Nhà bán lẻ Mitsukoshi Isetan Holdings (Nhật Bản) cũng đang tìm hiểu về việc phát triển chi nhánh ở Việt Nam. Nhìn lại thị trường bán lẻ, có thể thấy Việt Nam đã có hàng loạt siêu thị của các đại gia bán lẻ như: Big C, Metro Cash & Carry, Giant, Lottemart, Familymart, Daiso, Circle- K, Guardian…

Khai thác triệt để thị trường

E-Mart - nhà kinh doanh bán lẻ tổng hợp có thế mạnh về các mặt hàng thực phẩm và nông thủy sản tươi sống - ngay trong hợp tác ký kết ban đầu với đối tác trong nước, đã có kế hoạch đưa các mặt hàng tại Việt Nam vào hệ thống hơn 150 E-Mart ở các nước khác.

Tập đoàn Aeon khi vào Việt Nam cũng nhắm đến việc tạo điều kiện cho doanh nghiệp Nhật vào Việt Nam và thúc đẩy việc xuất khẩu hàng hóa của Việt Nam vào Nhật Bản. Ngay khi ra mắt thị trường Việt Nam, ông Nishitohge Yasuo, Tổng giám đốc Aeon Việt Nam đã cho biết, hơn 1/3 số mặt hàng trong 130 cửa hàng bán lẻ sẽ dành cho các thương hiệu của Nhật Bản. Việc khai thác đa chiều này đã được các tập đoàn nước ngoài vào Việt Nam trước đó thực hiện dưới nhiều hình thức. Tháng 9/2011, Metro Cash & Carry đã tổ chức Tuần lễ sản phẩm Đức để xây thương hiệu cho doanh nghiệp Đức tại Việt Nam. Trong năm 2011, Big C đã xuất khẩu khoảng 21 triệu USD các sản phẩm của Việt Nam ra nước ngoài, tăng khoảng 20% so với năm 2010. Trong đó, tăng mạnh nhất là các mặt hàng thực phẩm chế biến từ cá basa, tôm, gạo, cà phê, hoặc chế biến sẵn như tương ớt, mít sấy… với tổng cộng 165 sản phẩm của 19 nhà cung cấp, đạt kim ngạch 10 triệu USD. Kế đến là nhóm hàng vải sợi với khoảng 400 kiểu từ 11 nhà cung cấp, đạt 8 triệu USD. Và cuối cùng là hàng bách hóa với các sản phẩm hàng gia dụng, thủ công mỹ nghệ, trang trí nội thất…

Hệ thống Lotte Mart Hàn Quốc cũng đang khai thác thị trường theo hướng này. Cụ thể tại các siêu thị Hàn Quốc ở Q.7 và Q.11, TP.HCM, sản phẩm của doanh nghiệp Hàn Quốc luôn được chiếm vị trí ưu tiên trên quầy kệ. Cũng thông qua Lotte Mart, nhiều mặt hàng gia vị, thực phẩm chế biến, gia dụng, đồ dùng nhà bếp… của Hàn Quốc có cơ hội tiếp cận với người tiêu dùng và cũng từ đó tìm đường phân phối rộng hơn ra mạng lưới bán lẻ bên ngoài.

Ở chiều ngược lại, siêu thị Lotte Mart đã đưa hàng Việt Nam vào 97 siêu thị ở Hàn Quốc, chiếm khoảng 15% trong cơ cấu hàng nhập khẩu bày bán tại các siêu thị Lotte Mart Hàn Quốc. Dự kiến Lotte Mart sẽ tiếp tục đưa hàng Việt Nam sang 94 siêu thị tại Trung Quốc và 28 siêu thị tại Indonesia.

Những cuộc chia tay ngậm ngùi

Tuy nhiên, trong khi những nhà bán lẻ quốc tế đang hăng hái đổ bộ vào thị trường Việt Nam thì cũng có những siêu thị bán lẻ âm thầm đóng cửa. Cuối tháng 2/2012, Fivimart quận 7 đã đóng cửa siêu thị của mình, gây bất ngờ đối với một số nhà cung cấp. Nhưng đối với nhiều người trong giới kinh doanh bán lẻ, đây là điều sớm muộn cũng phải xảy ra, bởi trước đó hệ thống này đã lần lượt đóng cửa năm siêu thị của mình tại thị trường miền Nam. Nhiều người cho rằng, thất bại của Fivimart ở phía Nam có thể mang yếu tố vùng miền, vì hiện Fivimart tương đối thành công tại thị trường phía Bắc với 13 siêu thị. Tuy nhiên, một chuyên gia trong lĩnh vực bán lẻ cho rằng, mô hình hoạt động của siêu thị này mới là nguyên nhân chính. Fivimart đã lựa chọn phân khúc khách hàng có thu nhập trung bình khá và cao cấp nên phần nào hạn chế khách mua sắm. Đa số hàng hóa bày bán tại siêu thị là hàng nhập khẩu, phục vụ nhu cầu tiêu dùng cao cấp, tiện lợi hơn là thiết yếu. Trong khi phần lớn người dân tìm đến siêu thị hiện nay là để mua các mặt hàng thiết yếu, sau đó mới đến sắm sửa hàng cao cấp hơn. Thời gian gần đây, Fivimart phải chia sẻ thị phần với các siêu thị lân cận như: Lottemart, Citimart… trong khi chi phí thuê mặt bằng, nhân sự, kho bãi… tăng cao. Việc điều hành từ xa (Ban Giám đốc ở phía Bắc) cũng hạn chế phần nào tính cạnh tranh của siêu thị.

Co.op Mart với 56 siêu thị trải dài trên 32 tỉnh thành năm qua cũng đã phải đóng cửa 3 siêu thị. Ông Nguyễn Thành Nhân, Phó Tổng giám đốc Saigon Co.op cho biết, nguyên nhân chủ yếu là do bị lấy lại mặt bằng, nhưng cũng một phần do hoạt động không hiệu quả. Hiện nay cả ba siêu thị này đang làm thủ tục giải thể, tiến hành quyết toán thuế và các vấn đề liên quan. Ông Nhân cho hay, trước khi mở một điểm mới, siêu thị có hẳn một bộ phận khảo sát địa bàn, thu nhập thông tin thị trường, thói quen tiêu dùng của người dân… để từ đó có chiến lược cung ứng mặt hàng phù hợp, tuy nhiên cũng có trường hợp không thành công vì yếu tố khách quan…

Trước đó không lâu, siêu thị Hà Nội trên đường Phan Đăng Lưu (Q.Phú Nhuận) cũng phải nói lời chia tay với thị trường, còn siêu thị Satra Bàu Cát phải chuyển nhượng cho một nhà bán lẻ khác. Năm 2011 cũng chứng kiến không ít siêu thị mini ngậm ngùi đóng cửa, trả mặt bằng vì không chịu nổi chi phí, kinh doanh lỗ lã, đặc biệt là các siêu thị mở trong khu chung cư, tòa nhà cao tầng.

"Khéo co thì ấm"

Trong biểu đồ miêu tả các giai đoạn phát triển thị trường bán lẻ tại một quốc gia của Công ty A.T Keaney, thị trường bán lẻ Việt Nam hiện nằm trong giai đoạn phát triển "thịnh vượng". Ở "thời kỳ vàng" này, người tiêu dùng đang tìm kiếm, làm quen với những mô hình mua sắm mới và háo hức khám phá các nhãn hàng quốc tế. Các khu vực bán lẻ đang dần hình thành và quỹ mặt bằng để cho thuê bán lẻ còn dồi dào. Ông Trần Thanh Nhàn, Phó Tổng giám đốc Vinatexmart, rất lạc quan với tốc độ phát triển bình quân 67%/năm như hiện nay. Vinatexmart đang đẩy mạnh đàm phán thuê mặt bằng tại nhiều tỉnh, thành phố trên cả nước, nhắm vào phân khúc thu nhập thấp và trung bình. Tuy nhiên, trong bối cảnh quỹ đất thành phố ngày càng hẹp, rất khó tìm được một mặt bằng rộng hàng ngàn mét vuông, nên xu hướng phát triển sẽ đa dạng, không chỉ mở siêu thị lớn mà còn phát triển chuỗi cửa hàng tiện lợi, diện tích vừa phải. Còn ông Ngô Văn Hải, Phó Tổng giám đốc hệ thống Citimart cho rằng, yếu tố quyết định sự sống còn của một điểm bán hàng chính là vị trí và giá thuê. "Đầu tư siêu thị lớn cần nhiều vốn, thời gian thu hồi lâu, trong khi một siêu thị quy mô từ 800-1.000m2 vừa có thể đi sâu vào khu vực dân cư, chi phí cũng thấp", ông Hải chia sẻ. Citimart cũng đi theo mô hình thuê lại những mặt bằng có sẵn diện tích từ vài trăm đến trên 1.000m2 trong những chung cư, tòa nhà lớn. Hiện tại Citimart đã phát triển khoảng 30 điểm bán. Cuối tháng 3/2012, Citimart sẽ tiếp nhận lại mặt bằng từ siêu thị Welcome thuộc tập đoàn Dairy Farm (Singapore) để phát triển mạng lưới của mình.

Xuất phát từ nhận định người tiêu dùng Việt Nam thường vào siêu thị chọn mua hàng thiết yếu, giá rẻ sau đó mới chuyển sang sắm sửa vật dụng khác, siêu thị Co.opMart Cần Giờ vừa được khai trương có diện tích khu tự chọn không quá 500m2, phục vụ dân cư thu nhập thấp nên hàng hóa chủ yếu là hàng thiết yếu, gia dụng. Để tiết kiệm chi phí quản lý, các siêu thị nhỏ của Co.opMart hiện nay được ghép chung với siêu thị lớn cùng tuyến để chia sẻ nhân sự, nguồn hàng hóa, hỗ trợ dịch vụ hậu cần… "Muốn kinh doanh siêu thị hiệu quả phải đầu tư phát triển thành chuỗi, vì vậy mục tiêu quan trọng của các siêu thị bao giờ cũng là mở thêm bao nhiêu điểm bán trong năm tới. Nhưng đối với mô hình chuỗi thì phải đảm bảo ít nhất hai yếu tố: vốn và phương pháp quản trị tốt", ông Nguyễn Thành Nhân, Phó Tổng giám đốc Saigon Co.op đúc kết lại.
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Source: http://vietstock.vn/ChannelID/761/Tin-tuc/217949-nhung-con-ca-map-va-cuoc-chien-ban-le-o-viet-nam.aspx

Tuesday, March 20, 2012

Better B2B selling

It's a familiar lament: executives at business-to-business (B2B) companies say that their largest customers have never been more demanding.1 But whereas some companies are simply caving in to price pressure, others are trying to create and capture more value through sales approaches such as enterprise selling,2 key-account management, or solutions selling.3 Regardless of the label, each involves forging highly collaborative relationships, with selected customers, that can yield exciting results.
  • In the mid-1990s, Alcoa's Wheel and Forged Products division began devoting more energy and attention to developing custom products for several auto manufacturers. The result was more distinctive (and often proprietary) forged aluminum wheels for vehicles such as the Special Edition Jeep Grand Cherokee, Ford Super Duty truck, and GMC Hummer. Eventually, Alcoa extended its collaboration with original-equipment manufacturers (OEMs) beyond the development of new products, to include rollout, marketing, and postsales service. During the past ten years, Alcoa has expanded its share of this market to 35 percent, from 5.
  • About six years ago, Sonoco, a packaging supplier, intensified efforts to help the snack food maker Lance determine the ideal packaging for its product lines. One improvement involved the use of flexographic printed packaging film in Lance's single and multiserving Home Pack snacks for brands such as Toastchee and Captain's Wafers. Efforts like these drastically reduced Lance's packaging costs, and the company made Sonoco its "Supplier of the Year" in 2002. In an industry where most players were growing slowly or shrinking, Sonoco generated annual revenue growth of 7 percent and margin growth of 18 percent from 2001 to 2004—thanks in part to this collaboration and others like it.

Clearly then, collaborative selling can yield tailored products (Alcoa's wheels) or bundles of products and services (Sonoco's packaging and conversion). In other cases, collaboration has generated more elaborate, customized products that integrate proprietary intellectual property or expertise to solve a customer's problem. These examples also suggest, however, that intense collaboration is a complex, time-consuming endeavor. Many would-be collaborative sellers fail to master that complexity. In some cases, the buyer and the supplier aren't able to identify unique sources of value. In others, suppliers don't achieve the necessary coordination (across business units, geographies, or functions such as product development, engineering, marketing, and legal affairs) that is vital to collaboration. And some companies find moderately successful efforts so resource intensive that they don't yield a good return. As a result, roughly half of all collaborative sellers enjoy only modest benefits from their efforts, and a quarter actually lose money in those relationships, according to a recent McKinsey survey of more than 200 sales executives at Fortune 1000 companies.

For the leading sellers in our survey, however, collaborative initiatives increased revenues and profits by more than 20 percent, on average. These leaders start with a rich understanding of the customer's economics and engage the appropriate customer personnel (from product developers to purchasing agents) in joint strategy sessions to uncover mutually beneficial opportunities. They also scrutinize internal organizational issues—meticulously choosing collaboration managers, who often come from outside the sales department; thoroughly training account teams in the field; engaging senior executives in targeted ways; and fine-tuning incentives. Finally, the leading companies recognize that collaborative selling is a costly business and approach it with a hard-nosed, investment-oriented mentality by carefully selecting trial customers and by periodically reevaluating relationships, much as pharmaceutical companies stage-gate their R&D investments.

Identifying value

The experience of one large consumer goods company highlights the difficulty of identifying collaborative opportunities that are beneficial for both parties. The company established customer councils that comprised all the salespeople around the world for each of several major customers. Although the councils met regularly, data on customer volume, revenues, prices, and profitability weren't made available to all members. Even when major customers provided an opportunity by seeking global or regional pricing deals, the councils lacked the knowledge and customer relationships to do anything but put out fires with price concessions. Successful collaborators avoid such pitfalls by thoroughly engaging the customer to comprehend its business and learn how to make improvements.

Understand the customer's economics

Contrast the consumer goods company's approach with that of Alcoa or BASF. At Alcoa, teams hold weekly meetings during critical points in the customer's sales cycle and develop strategies based on a deep understanding of its economics. Scrutinizing the value chains of customers is an important starting point. In one well-known case, BASF's efforts to identify new sources of value for its automotive OEM customers ultimately led it to run their paint shops (Exhibit 1).

Developing economic insight into specific elements of the value chain requires detailed industry knowledge. Frequently, suppliers find that industry specialization, coupled with time on the road, is the most efficient way for their sales teams and relationship managers to gain expertise. There is no substitute for visiting other players in the industry, attending trade shows, and finding out which areas of a customer's operation could, if improved, yield the largest and fastest payoff.

In a best-practice example, one consumer durable-goods manufacturer engages in thorough end-consumer research, including efforts to understand the preferences and buying patterns of shoppers at its important retail customers. The supplier can thus collaborate with customers to conduct long-term category planning, manage changes in the mix of products, tailor marketing campaigns, and improve in-store sales and service execution.

Engage the customer

Armed with this knowledge, sales teams are now ready to engage with customer personnel. They have to perform the difficult task of generating insights into a customer's business that go beyond existing products—and beyond anything the customer would uncover on its own. Joint strategy sessions are frequently the tricky part. Alcoa, for example, creates teams of its own and the customer's personnel (including supply chain experts, operations managers, and R&D engineers who can validate the potential economic impact of collaborative initiatives). The teams meet on the customer's home turf.

In cases where the supplier and the customer are looking for company-wide opportunities, it is important for teams to include personnel from a number of geographies and business units. At the extreme, customer engagement—and the teams supporting it—will occur at the intersection of several industries at once. For example, in the late 1990s Sealed Air improved upon a proprietary vacuum-packaging process after detailed consultation with poultry processors and grocery retailers. The new solution drove down damage rates and waste materials for packaged products, enabling grocers to boost profits on poultry products by 75 percent, even when prices to the end consumer remain unchanged. This solution, along with other collaborative innovations, contributed to Sealed Air's 24 percent increase in sales since 2000.

Some customers, touting their highly centralized decision-making process and ability to facilitate effective collaboration, question the need for a team approach. In our experience, though, a customer's organization is rarely as centralized as it thinks it is, so the supplier should be explicit when choosing team members. To capture the full potential of a collaborative relationship, a company might need to start by convincing a senior customer leader who deals with consumers and also has functional responsibilities (particularly sales, marketing, or product development) that a diverse team is required.

Organizing for success

Both before and after initial contact with a customer, a supplier's internal organizational issues can create steep barriers to success. Business units—defined by geography or product—focus on their own accountability and frequently have few processes and little patience for collaborative efforts that are good for the whole but may harm their own income statements. The consequences range from inaction to the proverbial accident in the customer's parking lot—that is, when salespeople from different business units of the same supplier bump into each other on sales calls or try to pitch different products or services to the same customer. These actions undermine the "one-face" continuity that customers expect from collaborative relationships (Exhibition 2)

Consider one large services company's effort to engage a customer with global operations. Things went awry when the customer's business unit leaders retained procurement authority, thereby making it very difficult for the supplier to work collaboratively across business units to find opportunities. After investing 12 months of substantial effort, the supplier captured just 5 percent of the potential opportunity, and the customer characterized the relationship as a "two out of ten."

Effective collaboration depends on a highly skilled customer relationship manager (or collaboration manager) who can break down barriers and align the various players. Well-trained cross-functional teams, assistance from senior management, and incentives that will get everyone working together are also vital for success.

Choose the right relationship manager

While collaboration managers certainly need to be able to handle customers, they must be much more than heavy-hitting salespeople. Because substantial portions of the supplier's total revenues can be affected by a collaboration, for example, candidates must be strong business managers—a trait not necessarily possessed by some high-performing salespeople. In addition, collaboration managers must command the respect of their own senior leaders as well as the customer's. Potential managers should meet these important criteria: do they have personal networks across functions, business units, and regions that will help them marshal resources for a customer on an ad hoc basis? And can they hold strategic business discussions with the relevant senior executives in the customer's organization?

Leading collaborative sellers filled twice as many of these roles with people from outside the sales organization than less effective companies did, according to our research. Some companies relied heavily on external talent. In these cases, it is often wise to hire people to fill the gaps in knowledge about a customer's industry, since such expertise is particularly difficult to develop internally. The goal can be met by recruiting outside experts for roles that will allow them to build internal credibility before taking on full relationship-management responsibilities—and by phasing in the corresponding number of customers targeted for collaborative relationships.

Develop the account team

The collaboration manager won't succeed without a strong supporting cast. Members of a typical account team have deep product knowledge; engineering expertise; pricing skills for speedy, advantageous deal making; negotiating and legal skills to simplify the writing of contracts across business units; and service experience to facilitate postsales support. Ensuring that a team has the necessary pre- and postsales expertise means pulling in a large number of people, often more than 10 and sometimes as many as 50.

To be effective, leaders must be able to work well together and with customers. Many sales managers try to define ideal collaborative processes and communicate them to teams, only to be disappointed by the results. By contrast, one packaging company developed collaborative-selling skills through a "forum and fieldwork" approach. Each account team attended half-day training sessions, or forums, that introduced new skills (such as financial analysis or detailed strategic planning), tools (such as an approach for calculating and communicating the total benefits delivered to a customer by comparing the supplier's offering with the customer's next-best alternative), and processes (such as negotiation tactics to influence the purchaser). The forums also gave teams time to plan how to use these new tools and techniques with their important customers. Following the workshops, the teams had one- to four-week periods of fieldwork. One team began, for example, by assembling an integrated view that included the customer's current competitive situation, its total spending on categories related to the supplier's products and services, and a list of purchasing decision makers. Teams shared the fieldwork results at the next forum, an approach that promoted repetition and reinforcement, linked the teams' new skills with real accounts rather than hypothetical exercises, and created healthy peer pressure.

Involve senior executives

Oral commitments from senior leaders are sometimes the starting point for focusing entire organizations on collaborative efforts. What's more, at a number of successful collaborative sellers, one or more senior leaders oversee key customer relationships.

  • At Bosch, each of the top 11 executives is linked to a major OEM customer.
  • Alcoa maintains virtual teams for its collaborative customer relationships. The teams operate under the auspices of the business units' senior leaders, who play an active account-management role. Furthermore, in 2003 Alcoa created the role of chief customer officer, a position with oversight of all its business units.
  • IBM introduced a separate group, led by a senior executive, that focuses on important customers.
  • When Jeff Immelt, the current chairman and CEO of GE, was at GE Plastics, he scheduled weekly calls with each sales executive to review account plans and deal with any problems. He also made a point of visiting one major customer each week. Immelt's involvement sent a signal to customers that they mattered and to internal teams that collaborative efforts were important. It also kept him closely connected with the day-to-day challenges of sales teams and helped remove any barriers to their progress.

A second vital role for senior management is holding people accountable for collaboration goals—a role that the collaboration manager may not have the authority to play. In particular, the senior leadership should push sales teams to establish and meet targets for growth, balance the range of products offered, and ensure smooth transitions through the milestones (such as the introduction of a new product, service, or solution) in a customer relationship that cuts across business units.

Establish incentives

In addition, many profitable collaborations can adversely affect the balance sheets of individual business units, so it is frequently necessary to use internal accounting mechanisms to compensate business units or operating companies. Nokia, for example, uses a detailed transfer-pricing system to ensure that business units and individuals working toward joint customer goals receive the proper recognition. Systems like Nokia's are complicated to implement because of the potential for disagreement about fair transfer-pricing levels, so these crediting mechanisms are most likely to succeed when accompanied by measures to improve understanding and interaction between parts of an organization. Rotating leaders among large account teams, business units, and geographies helps the sales force develop an enterprise-wide perspective, for example. Holding regular cross-team meetings highlights points of friction before they can cause counterproductive behavior.

Such efforts pay off. Our survey of sales executives showed that top-quartile companies were one-and-a-half times more likely to view incentive systems as a core element of their collaborative efforts than were companies delivering stagnant or negative results. In fact, one in four respondents from the poorer performers considered incentives "barely" or "not at all" important to the successful management of a collaborative sales initiative.

Investing wisely

Aligning the organization and identifying unique sources of value require a lot of time, talent, and financial resources. Even if suppliers do everything else right, they run the risk of earning poor returns on collaborative investments if they don't work with the right customers, measure results carefully, and modify their approach accordingly. Common mistakes include paying attention to squeaky wheels rather than investing in relationships based on a solid understanding of relative customer value, continuing investments when they are unlikely to be profitable, and failing to maintain a pipeline of collaborative initiatives.

Although collaborative relationships are not ideal for all large accounts, many suppliers segment their customers and select collaborative targets according to the revenue each account currently generates. A better approach is to consider additional factors—such as potential revenues, profitability, a customer's willingness to partner, the importance of the supplier's products or services to the customer's business, the supplier's ability to serve the customer's needs, and changes in the customer's circumstances (such as rapid expansion, a merger or acquisition, or a shift in competitive dynamics)—that might create collaborative opportunities. It's not unusual for half the customers at the top of a size-based ranking to fall out of a more nuanced segmentation. And even for attractive customers, suppliers should husband scarce resources by clearly delineating different types of transactions. IBM Global Services, for example, builds tailored offerings with selected customers while simultaneously selling standard products to them.

Once collaborative efforts are under way, it's important to track the value created for both sides. A detailed understanding of a relationship's profitability helps a supplier know how to handle customers seeking discounts. And regular progress reviews with individual customers reinforce each relationship's value and create excellent opportunities for suppliers to cross-sell and to expand the scope of the partnership. The focus should be on such measures as sales and profits as well as on activities or intermediate outcomes—such as the number of proposals in the pipeline or the depth of relationships with a customer's senior management—that indicate whether the collaborative effort is on track (Exhibit 3).

The consumer durable-goods manufacturer we described earlier combines its detailed end-consumer research with predictive, industry-wide economic analyses and input from retailers and wholesale distributors to track the impact of its efforts on each collaborative customer's key consumer segments. Within a year of adopting this approach and acting on its results, the manufacturer's annual net profits increased by more than 10 percent—twice the previous growth rate and significantly higher than the industry average.

A robust set of metrics also helps companies evaluate their investments on an ongoing basis. Given the magnitude of the resources involved, it's important to use stage gating during the sales cycle and to review serious collaborations every 18 to 24 months to determine whether they still make sense. Stage gating involves tracking the development of customer relationships from initial networking to one-off negotiations to full-fledged partnerships. Each stage requires different types and amounts of resources, and customers shouldn't remain at any one stage indefinitely. Without stage gating, collaborative selling can become very expensive; with it, suppliers have a better sense of which relationships to end and when to identify new sources of value for current customers. Collaborative efforts that aren't regularly renewed eventually wither and die.

As large customers get more demanding, B2B companies need not resign themselves to taking a beating on price. Collaborative selling can help companies create and capture more value—but only if they improve their approach to customers, the organization, and collaborative investments.

Source: https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Marketing/Sales_Distribution/Better_B2B_selling_1626