Diversification, the great free lunch of investing, is often taken for granted by investors. Bonds and equities have acted as effective portfolio diversifiers for much of the new millennium because of their different return and volatility patterns. Two of the three main assets in a typical portfolio, cash being the third, moved in opposite directions during financial crises such as 2001 and 2008.
Indeed, portfolio management has become accustomed to this trend and now treats it as an article of faith. But does this faith represent a dangerous cocktail of overconfidence and extrapolation?
The mantra that monetary policy is driving market returns is well rehearsed. Less obvious is the idea that policy is driving the relationship between bond and equity returns.
This year gave a flavour of things to come: a period of high turbulence in May and June as markets took on board the possibility the global liquidity flood was about to abate. Bonds fell sharply and equities stumbled as investors fretted about an end to the Federal Reserve’s emergency asset-buying. Price volatility rose in both mainstream asset classes. Using US equities and 10-year bonds as proxies, the correlation was negative from 2009 to the middle of this year and positive thereafter.
Shock absorbers
Next year could mark a turning point as policy makers exiting the triage phase of recovery from the Great Financial Crisis move away from a material reliance on monetary activism into the potentially more volatile territory of forward guidance.
What does this mean for fixed income? Suppose there is one dominant, price-insensitive buyer (the Fed). Now suppose this buyer has a progressively smaller wallet. All other things being equal, the volatility of prices rises as buyer and seller strive to match each other. Add in another group of (reasonably) price-insensitive buyers (China and the like) downsizing their spending due to slowing growth in foreign exchange reserves, and this risk expands.
Of course, there are shock absorbers. First, the developed world’s ageing populations and their agents (think insurers) have a structural bid for yield. Second, the Bank of Japan is expanding its monetary easing . Some of governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s largesse eventually will pass through Narita Airport as growing shortages of domestic bonds force local institutions to shake off some of their home bias. The conclusion? Do not expect a fixed income bloodbath in 2014 – but brace for more volatile returns.
How about equities? 2013 will probably be known as the Year of Equity. The problem: the numerator of the price to earnings ratio (price) has been driving returns in most markets this year, rather than the denominator (earnings). Higher pricing of the final claim on corporate cash flows – equity – has been aided by the tightest debt spreads on record, insatiable demand from yield-hungry investors, and the ability to refinance and extend fixed obligations at low cost. This works well for a while, but at some point earnings need to come through.
Theory has it the discount rate partially connects bonds (fixed coupons discounted by an interest rate) and equities (fluctuating cash flows discounted by this interest rate plus some variable risk premia). Here is the rub: arithmetically, the lower the real interest rate, the greater the volatility triggered by small changes. If the major driver of returns (policy) becomes more volatile, so do the assets that have benefited from that support.
QE tide turns
Clearly the unprecedented monetary stimulus tide will not last forever. When it dwindles, what will become an effective diversifier of portfolio risk? Bonds or equities? Not entirely; see the drawbacks described above. Cash? Perhaps, but if rates rise for longer-dated bonds and remain anchored by policy for short-dated issues, the diversification benefit of a near zero return is limited.
Challenging the assumptions of the past at a time of regime change is vital in financial markets. This means rethinking fixed income to seek out relative value between bonds, capitalising on rises in volatility and harvesting risk premia. In other words, taking an unconstrained approach. It means a focus on alternative strategies that do not start with the discount rate. Examples are infrastructure and real estate debt, opportunistic acquisition of long duration assets chased off bank balance sheets by regulation and market neutral long-short strategies.
Any reversal in the policy tide involves uncharted territory. A reversal in the 30-year downward trend of rates must, however, involve some different results. 2014 may very well become known as the year in which unwary investors ask: “Who stole my diversifier?”
Source: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0687562c-5e7f-11e3-8621-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2nwa2gnpW
Thursday, December 19, 2013
Thursday, November 21, 2013
France in Fed taper line of fire
When France’s weak economy and public finances are panned by international critics, its politicians have an easy riposte: just look at our bond yields.
Paris can borrow at lower costs than London, and the spread between French over German 10-year bonds has remained remarkably stable over the past year. Standard & Poor’s early morning announcement two weeks ago of another downgrade – this time to double A – failed to cause markets to choke on their croissants. Investing in French assets cannot be so awful.
Could that change as the US Federal Reserve starts to wind back its exceptional stimulus measures? Among investors I have spoken to recently, a school of thought is developing that it might.
During the global “taper turmoil” earlier this year – the weeks after May 22, when Ben Bernanke, Fed chairman, first hinted at his plans to taper, or scale back Fed asset purchases – eurozone bond markets remained surprisingly tranquil, even as emerging markets sold off sharply.
But while global policy makers and economists still struggle to understand the interlinkages between Fed actions and global markets, it seems implausible that Europe can escape unscathed when tapering becomes real, perhaps as early as December. After all, “global QE” – quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan as well as the Fed – drove European bond prices higher and yields lower; taper turmoil showed the potential for disruption when it goes into reverse.
Stabilising factors
If there will be European fallout, where will the effects be worst? Intuitively, the weaker eurozone “periphery” economies seem most at risk of a market correction as global QE ebbs, especially if fresh taper turmoil increases investors’ risk aversion.
In fact, countries such as Spain, Italy and Ireland have benefited from four stabilising factors this year.
First has been their transition – thanks to the European Central Bank acting as a backstop – from existential crises to something nearer normal economic conditions. Growth is low and unemployment alarmingly high, but the danger of imminent ejection from the euro has gone.
More video
Second, at least Irish and Spanish bonds have benefited as turnround stories, with tangible evidence of structural reforms improving competitiveness and growth prospects.
Third has been the “re-domestication” of Spanish and Italian bond markets – fickle foreign investors have fled.
Fourth, eurozone periphery countries have moved decisively from current account deficits to surpluses; they no longer rely on capital from overseas.
All four supporting factors will remain in place even as the Fed tapers. None, however, apply to France. Instead other reasons explain the impressive performance of France’s bond market this year – and why it might now be vulnerable.
Higher bond yields
When the Fed was ramping up its asset purchases and US Treasury yields were falling, global investors looking for higher returns were attracted by France’s large and liquid bond markets. Until June this year, French 10-year yields were higher than US equivalents.
France was considered part of the eurozone’s safe, northern core, which made it attractive to investors for whom German Bund yields were simply too low. The Swiss central bank was an avid buyer of French bonds, as were Japanese banks.
"Whatever the risks posed by Fed tapering, it is hard right now to see what might trigger another big sell off"
The case against France is that if the Fed slows its asset purchases and US Treasury yields rise, those inflows could start to reverse and French bonds would sell off – perhaps sharply.
Eric Chaney, chief economist at Axa, points out the very different debt profile between France and Germany. As a share of GDP, French public sector debt will soon be 20 percentage points higher than Germany’s. Without action to alter France’s debt dynamics, the spread between French and German bonds could widen by 50 or 100 basis points, warns Mr Chaney.
French politicians probably need not worry just yet. Investors shorting French bonds have often lost their berets.
When French yields have hit instability in the past, it has been because of obvious systemic risks – the exposure of its banks to the eurozone “periphery” economies in 2011, for example. Whatever the risks posed by Fed tapering, it is hard right now to see what might trigger another big sell off. As the eurozone crisis has lost intensity, eurozone bonds have performed more like “rates” markets, with yields linked to growth and inflation prospects, rather than default risks. France’s economy is contracting, which will curb any uptick in yields.
Still, as Fed tapering draws near, markets may make life less comfortable for French politicians – and limit their bond yield bragging possibilities.
Source: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d1742d9e-5149-11e3-b499-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2lIoVJMpj
Paris can borrow at lower costs than London, and the spread between French over German 10-year bonds has remained remarkably stable over the past year. Standard & Poor’s early morning announcement two weeks ago of another downgrade – this time to double A – failed to cause markets to choke on their croissants. Investing in French assets cannot be so awful.
Could that change as the US Federal Reserve starts to wind back its exceptional stimulus measures? Among investors I have spoken to recently, a school of thought is developing that it might.
During the global “taper turmoil” earlier this year – the weeks after May 22, when Ben Bernanke, Fed chairman, first hinted at his plans to taper, or scale back Fed asset purchases – eurozone bond markets remained surprisingly tranquil, even as emerging markets sold off sharply.
But while global policy makers and economists still struggle to understand the interlinkages between Fed actions and global markets, it seems implausible that Europe can escape unscathed when tapering becomes real, perhaps as early as December. After all, “global QE” – quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan as well as the Fed – drove European bond prices higher and yields lower; taper turmoil showed the potential for disruption when it goes into reverse.
Stabilising factors
If there will be European fallout, where will the effects be worst? Intuitively, the weaker eurozone “periphery” economies seem most at risk of a market correction as global QE ebbs, especially if fresh taper turmoil increases investors’ risk aversion.
In fact, countries such as Spain, Italy and Ireland have benefited from four stabilising factors this year.
First has been their transition – thanks to the European Central Bank acting as a backstop – from existential crises to something nearer normal economic conditions. Growth is low and unemployment alarmingly high, but the danger of imminent ejection from the euro has gone.
More video
Second, at least Irish and Spanish bonds have benefited as turnround stories, with tangible evidence of structural reforms improving competitiveness and growth prospects.
Third has been the “re-domestication” of Spanish and Italian bond markets – fickle foreign investors have fled.
Fourth, eurozone periphery countries have moved decisively from current account deficits to surpluses; they no longer rely on capital from overseas.
All four supporting factors will remain in place even as the Fed tapers. None, however, apply to France. Instead other reasons explain the impressive performance of France’s bond market this year – and why it might now be vulnerable.
Higher bond yields
When the Fed was ramping up its asset purchases and US Treasury yields were falling, global investors looking for higher returns were attracted by France’s large and liquid bond markets. Until June this year, French 10-year yields were higher than US equivalents.
France was considered part of the eurozone’s safe, northern core, which made it attractive to investors for whom German Bund yields were simply too low. The Swiss central bank was an avid buyer of French bonds, as were Japanese banks.
"Whatever the risks posed by Fed tapering, it is hard right now to see what might trigger another big sell off"
The case against France is that if the Fed slows its asset purchases and US Treasury yields rise, those inflows could start to reverse and French bonds would sell off – perhaps sharply.
Eric Chaney, chief economist at Axa, points out the very different debt profile between France and Germany. As a share of GDP, French public sector debt will soon be 20 percentage points higher than Germany’s. Without action to alter France’s debt dynamics, the spread between French and German bonds could widen by 50 or 100 basis points, warns Mr Chaney.
French politicians probably need not worry just yet. Investors shorting French bonds have often lost their berets.
When French yields have hit instability in the past, it has been because of obvious systemic risks – the exposure of its banks to the eurozone “periphery” economies in 2011, for example. Whatever the risks posed by Fed tapering, it is hard right now to see what might trigger another big sell off. As the eurozone crisis has lost intensity, eurozone bonds have performed more like “rates” markets, with yields linked to growth and inflation prospects, rather than default risks. France’s economy is contracting, which will curb any uptick in yields.
Still, as Fed tapering draws near, markets may make life less comfortable for French politicians – and limit their bond yield bragging possibilities.
Source: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d1742d9e-5149-11e3-b499-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2lIoVJMpj
Friday, September 27, 2013
Căng thẳng tỷ giá USD/VND ở… hậu trường
Đầu tuần này, ngân hàng HSBC tổ chức một buổi trao đổi chuyên môn về ngoại hối giữa cán bộ chuyên trách với một số phóng viên. Có những câu hỏi đưa ra tưởng như đơn giản nhưng lại phức tạp, phản ánh một phần thực tế hậu trường căng thẳng vừa qua…
Ông Phạm Hồng Hải, Phó tổng giám đốc nghiệp vụ ngân hàng toàn cầu, kinh doanh vốn và ngoại hối của HSBC Việt Nam, chia sẻ đại ý: với các ngân hàng nói chung, thị trường ngoại hối hay tỷ giá càng có nhiều biến động thì càng có nhiều cơ hội kinh doanh; nhưng nhìn lại, tỷ giá quá nhiều biến động sẽ khiến doanh nghiệp khó khăn và khi đó ngân hàng cũng bị ảnh hưởng.
Dư ngoại tệ, vẫn căng…
Nhìn lại, ông Hải, “người buôn tiền” có tiếng của HSBC Việt Nam nói: “Sau giai đoạn có nhiều biến động lớn, hai năm qua tỷ giá USD/VND được giữ khá ổn định. Ngân hàng Nhà nước đã phản ứng nhanh và linh hoạt hơn trước nhiều. Có những biến động được can thiệp và xử lý ngay trong ngày. Trước đây có nhiều thời điểm ở giá trần mà khó giao dịch, nay thì thuận lợi trong biên độ”.
Không quên điểm lại hai đợt sóng cuối tháng 6 và trong tháng 7 vừa qua, ông Hải nêu một yếu tố quan trọng, VND trong hệ thống dư nhiều. Ngược lại, câu hỏi chuyên gia này đặt ra lại tưởng như mâu thuẫn: vì sao tiền gửi USD cũng dư ở mức cao nhưng sao ngân hàng không bán ra khiến tỷ giá những lúc đó căng thẳng?
Dĩ nhiên, nguồn ngoại tệ tiền gửi khác bản chất với ngoại tệ thương mại. Quan trọng hơn, các ngân hàng bị giới hạn trạng thái ngoại tệ +/-20% vốn tự có. Họ ngồi nhìn lượng USD gửi vào dày lên mà không thể bán mạnh ra, một phần vì giới hạn đó, một phần cũng tiềm ẩn rủi ro giá lên…
Đó là một thực tế có trong tháng 6 và 7 vừa qua, gắn với hai đợt biến động khá mạnh của tỷ giá USD/VND và có hiện tượng giao dịch vượt trần.
Nhớ lại ở thời điểm đó, khi trao đổi với VnEconomy, lãnh đạo một ngân hàng lớn nói rằng, cứ xem một số ngân hàng dồn vốn đẩy giá USD lên để rồi sẽ phải trả giá thôi, bởi chính chính họ phát đi tín hiệu găm giữ ngoại tệ, mà khi doanh nghiệp kìm lại không bán ra thì sẽ gây bất lợi cho các cân đối và chi phí của ngân hàng.
Thực tế, dữ liệu VnEconomy tập hợp cho thấy, nếu như trong tháng 5/2013, huy động ngoại tệ của hệ thống chỉ chớm tăng 0,89% so với cuối năm 2012, thì trong tháng 6 đã vọt lên 4,71%, tháng 7 lên tới 7,15%.
Đáng chú ý là hiện tượng găm giữ ngoại tệ thể hiện rõ ở khối khách hàng doanh nghiệp, khi tăng đột biến từ 7,76% trong tháng 5 lên 13,34% trong tháng 6 và tiếp tục lên 16,96% trong tháng 7 so với cuối năm 2012. Riêng tiền gửi ngoại tệ của dân cư vẫn duy trì trạng thái giảm khá mạnh (tương ứng -8,27% trong tháng 5, -6,8% tháng 6 và -5,93% trong tháng 7), phản ánh hướng dịch chuyển và sự hấp dẫn hơn khi nắm giữ VND có từ trong năm 2012.
Trước diễn biến trên, Ngân hàng Nhà nước vào cuộc. Tỷ giá bình quân liên ngân hàng tăng thêm 1% vào ngày 28/6. Đồng thời, trần lãi suất huy động USD giảm xuống, đối với tiền gửi của doanh nghiệp giảm từ 0,5%/năm xuống chỉ còn 0,25%/năm.
Ngay sau những điều chỉnh trên, dòng tiền gửi ngoại tệ cho phản ứng đồng thuận. Tốc độ tăng tiền gửi ngoại tệ của khối doanh nghiệp đã giảm đáng kể, từ 16,96% trong tháng 7 lùi về 15,51% trong tháng 8. Bớt kỳ vọng tỷ giá sẽ tiếp tục tăng, Ngân hàng Nhà nước tái khẳng định cam kết giữ ổn định, họ đã bán ra, tạo cung thương mại và tỷ giá USD/VND sau đó ổn định cho đến nay.
Ngân hàng Nhà nước cũng đau đầu
Nhưng sự êm đềm của tỷ giá USD/VND trong hai năm qua, xen lẫn một vài con sóng ngắn, không đơn giản ở những can thiệp đó.
Vốn VND trong hệ thống dư nhiều, nhiều người trong cuộc thừa nhận vậy. Thêm nữa, tháng 6 và 7 vừa qua, một số lãnh đạo quản lý nguồn vốn ngân hàng cho hay, những sản phẩm cấu trúc cho vay VND theo lãi suất USD mà một số nhà băng triển khai thời lãi suất còn cao cuối 2012 lần lượt đáo hạn. Họ thu quân, đóng và nâng trạng thái ngoại tệ, bởi vốn VND dư thừa và lãi suất đã xuống thấp, việc chuyển đổi USD để lấy vốn VND cho vay không còn hấp dẫn nữa.
Ở tình hình chung, khi tiền đồng dư nhiều và lãi suất quá thấp, ngân hàng có nhu cầu ngắm đến USD như một hướng đầu tư, hay một số thông tin lúc đó xem là đầu cơ. Đầu cơ không hẳn luôn xấu, bởi họ làm trong khuôn khổ cho phép, gắn với “bản năng” của nhà buôn vốn. Song lực cầu ngoại tệ mạnh thêm và phản ánh ở tỷ giá.
Dữ liệu cho thấy, trong tháng 6 và đầu tháng 7, lãi suất VND trên liên ngân hàng rơi xuống cực thấp, chỉ từ 0,5% - 0,8%/năm, tức không còn nhiều phân biệt so với lãi suất USD.
Thêm một lần nữa, Ngân hàng Nhà nước vào cuộc can thiệp, khá kịp thời. Cùng với việc tái khẳng định cam kết ổn định tỷ giá, đáng chú ý là có thông tin sẽ không tăng cho đến hết năm 2013, nhà điều hành xắn tay xử lý chuyện dư tiền đồng trong hệ thống.
Ngay lập tức hoạt động phát hành tín phiếu được mở lại, liên tiếp nhiều phiên sau đó để hút tiền đồng trong lưu thông về, giảm bớt áp lực đối với tỷ giá. Dữ liệu thống kê cũng cho thấy đây là một trong những thời điểm lượng tiền hút về mạnh nhất kể từ đầu năm. Lãi suất tín phiếu lập tức là một yếu tố chính “kéo” lãi suất VND trên liên ngân hàng doãng ra so với lãi suất USD.
Nhưng, có nhiều lý do để Ngân hàng Nhà nước có thể căng thẳng và đau đầu trong tính toán ở hướng can thiệp trên.
Trước hết là áp lực chi phí ngân sách. Từ cuối năm 2011 cho đến đầu 2013, Ngân hàng Nhà nước đã mua vào khoảng 15 tỷ USD, đồng nghĩa có khoảng 300 nghìn tỷ đồng cung ứng. Có nhiều kênh để trung hòa, trong đó tín phiếu là chủ lực. Đợt tăng cường hút bằng tín phiếu xử lý đợt biến động trên hẳn gây thêm sức ép về chi phí.
Một tính toán tương đối cho thấy, từ đầu năm đến nay quy mô lượng tín phiếu thường xuyên lưu hành có từ 50 - 60 nghìn tỷ đồng. Lãi suất tín phiếu đầu năm đến nay cao thì khoảng 7,5% - 8,3%/năm, thấp khoảng 2,8 - 3%/năm, những tháng gần đây từ 4,5% - 5%/năm (tùy các kỳ hạn). Chi phí cho việc dùng tín phiếu để hút tiền về năm nay ước lượng cũng đến vài ngàn tỷ đồng - điều mà Ngân hàng Nhà nước hẳn phải căn ke kỹ.
Ở một kênh khác, với gần 60 tấn vàng đã bán qua đấu thầu, nhà điều hành cũng đã hút về trên dưới 60 nghìn tỷ đồng. Có vẻ như kênh này không mất phí mà còn lãi lớn, nhưng việc sử dụng ngoại tệ để nhập vàng cho đấu thầu rõ ràng cũng phải cân nhắc, bởi dự trữ ngoại tệ còn nhiều việc phải lo toan...
Vậy nên, hút tiền về có vẻ dễ, nhưng hút như thế nào, mức độ bao nhiêu cũng dễ đau đầu, bởi gắn với áp lực chi phí, các cân đối. Tình thế trở nên căng thẳng hơn khi khả năng lãi suất VND giảm tiếp đã cạn kiệt, hút vốn về để bớt áp lực cho tỷ giá nhưng lại dễ cản trở chủ trương - yêu cầu giảm lãi suất cho vay.
Thế nên, hậu trường của điều hành hay trong yêu cầu ứng xử với các cân đối không hẳn khá dễ chịu như tỷ giá USD/VND trên biểu niêm yết của các ngân hàng thời gian qua, hay được đơn giản hóa như một số quan điểm xuất hiện những ngày gần đây khi cho rằng tỷ giá yên ắng là nhờ “ăn may” do vĩ mô ổn định và lạm phát được kiềm chế.
Source: http://vneconomy.vn/2013092704407259P0C6/cang-thang-ty-gia-usdvnd-o-hau-truong.htm
Ông Phạm Hồng Hải, Phó tổng giám đốc nghiệp vụ ngân hàng toàn cầu, kinh doanh vốn và ngoại hối của HSBC Việt Nam, chia sẻ đại ý: với các ngân hàng nói chung, thị trường ngoại hối hay tỷ giá càng có nhiều biến động thì càng có nhiều cơ hội kinh doanh; nhưng nhìn lại, tỷ giá quá nhiều biến động sẽ khiến doanh nghiệp khó khăn và khi đó ngân hàng cũng bị ảnh hưởng.
Dư ngoại tệ, vẫn căng…
Nhìn lại, ông Hải, “người buôn tiền” có tiếng của HSBC Việt Nam nói: “Sau giai đoạn có nhiều biến động lớn, hai năm qua tỷ giá USD/VND được giữ khá ổn định. Ngân hàng Nhà nước đã phản ứng nhanh và linh hoạt hơn trước nhiều. Có những biến động được can thiệp và xử lý ngay trong ngày. Trước đây có nhiều thời điểm ở giá trần mà khó giao dịch, nay thì thuận lợi trong biên độ”.
Không quên điểm lại hai đợt sóng cuối tháng 6 và trong tháng 7 vừa qua, ông Hải nêu một yếu tố quan trọng, VND trong hệ thống dư nhiều. Ngược lại, câu hỏi chuyên gia này đặt ra lại tưởng như mâu thuẫn: vì sao tiền gửi USD cũng dư ở mức cao nhưng sao ngân hàng không bán ra khiến tỷ giá những lúc đó căng thẳng?
Dĩ nhiên, nguồn ngoại tệ tiền gửi khác bản chất với ngoại tệ thương mại. Quan trọng hơn, các ngân hàng bị giới hạn trạng thái ngoại tệ +/-20% vốn tự có. Họ ngồi nhìn lượng USD gửi vào dày lên mà không thể bán mạnh ra, một phần vì giới hạn đó, một phần cũng tiềm ẩn rủi ro giá lên…
Đó là một thực tế có trong tháng 6 và 7 vừa qua, gắn với hai đợt biến động khá mạnh của tỷ giá USD/VND và có hiện tượng giao dịch vượt trần.
Nhớ lại ở thời điểm đó, khi trao đổi với VnEconomy, lãnh đạo một ngân hàng lớn nói rằng, cứ xem một số ngân hàng dồn vốn đẩy giá USD lên để rồi sẽ phải trả giá thôi, bởi chính chính họ phát đi tín hiệu găm giữ ngoại tệ, mà khi doanh nghiệp kìm lại không bán ra thì sẽ gây bất lợi cho các cân đối và chi phí của ngân hàng.
Thực tế, dữ liệu VnEconomy tập hợp cho thấy, nếu như trong tháng 5/2013, huy động ngoại tệ của hệ thống chỉ chớm tăng 0,89% so với cuối năm 2012, thì trong tháng 6 đã vọt lên 4,71%, tháng 7 lên tới 7,15%.
Đáng chú ý là hiện tượng găm giữ ngoại tệ thể hiện rõ ở khối khách hàng doanh nghiệp, khi tăng đột biến từ 7,76% trong tháng 5 lên 13,34% trong tháng 6 và tiếp tục lên 16,96% trong tháng 7 so với cuối năm 2012. Riêng tiền gửi ngoại tệ của dân cư vẫn duy trì trạng thái giảm khá mạnh (tương ứng -8,27% trong tháng 5, -6,8% tháng 6 và -5,93% trong tháng 7), phản ánh hướng dịch chuyển và sự hấp dẫn hơn khi nắm giữ VND có từ trong năm 2012.
Trước diễn biến trên, Ngân hàng Nhà nước vào cuộc. Tỷ giá bình quân liên ngân hàng tăng thêm 1% vào ngày 28/6. Đồng thời, trần lãi suất huy động USD giảm xuống, đối với tiền gửi của doanh nghiệp giảm từ 0,5%/năm xuống chỉ còn 0,25%/năm.
Ngay sau những điều chỉnh trên, dòng tiền gửi ngoại tệ cho phản ứng đồng thuận. Tốc độ tăng tiền gửi ngoại tệ của khối doanh nghiệp đã giảm đáng kể, từ 16,96% trong tháng 7 lùi về 15,51% trong tháng 8. Bớt kỳ vọng tỷ giá sẽ tiếp tục tăng, Ngân hàng Nhà nước tái khẳng định cam kết giữ ổn định, họ đã bán ra, tạo cung thương mại và tỷ giá USD/VND sau đó ổn định cho đến nay.
Ngân hàng Nhà nước cũng đau đầu
Nhưng sự êm đềm của tỷ giá USD/VND trong hai năm qua, xen lẫn một vài con sóng ngắn, không đơn giản ở những can thiệp đó.
Vốn VND trong hệ thống dư nhiều, nhiều người trong cuộc thừa nhận vậy. Thêm nữa, tháng 6 và 7 vừa qua, một số lãnh đạo quản lý nguồn vốn ngân hàng cho hay, những sản phẩm cấu trúc cho vay VND theo lãi suất USD mà một số nhà băng triển khai thời lãi suất còn cao cuối 2012 lần lượt đáo hạn. Họ thu quân, đóng và nâng trạng thái ngoại tệ, bởi vốn VND dư thừa và lãi suất đã xuống thấp, việc chuyển đổi USD để lấy vốn VND cho vay không còn hấp dẫn nữa.
Ở tình hình chung, khi tiền đồng dư nhiều và lãi suất quá thấp, ngân hàng có nhu cầu ngắm đến USD như một hướng đầu tư, hay một số thông tin lúc đó xem là đầu cơ. Đầu cơ không hẳn luôn xấu, bởi họ làm trong khuôn khổ cho phép, gắn với “bản năng” của nhà buôn vốn. Song lực cầu ngoại tệ mạnh thêm và phản ánh ở tỷ giá.
Dữ liệu cho thấy, trong tháng 6 và đầu tháng 7, lãi suất VND trên liên ngân hàng rơi xuống cực thấp, chỉ từ 0,5% - 0,8%/năm, tức không còn nhiều phân biệt so với lãi suất USD.
Thêm một lần nữa, Ngân hàng Nhà nước vào cuộc can thiệp, khá kịp thời. Cùng với việc tái khẳng định cam kết ổn định tỷ giá, đáng chú ý là có thông tin sẽ không tăng cho đến hết năm 2013, nhà điều hành xắn tay xử lý chuyện dư tiền đồng trong hệ thống.
Ngay lập tức hoạt động phát hành tín phiếu được mở lại, liên tiếp nhiều phiên sau đó để hút tiền đồng trong lưu thông về, giảm bớt áp lực đối với tỷ giá. Dữ liệu thống kê cũng cho thấy đây là một trong những thời điểm lượng tiền hút về mạnh nhất kể từ đầu năm. Lãi suất tín phiếu lập tức là một yếu tố chính “kéo” lãi suất VND trên liên ngân hàng doãng ra so với lãi suất USD.
Nhưng, có nhiều lý do để Ngân hàng Nhà nước có thể căng thẳng và đau đầu trong tính toán ở hướng can thiệp trên.
Trước hết là áp lực chi phí ngân sách. Từ cuối năm 2011 cho đến đầu 2013, Ngân hàng Nhà nước đã mua vào khoảng 15 tỷ USD, đồng nghĩa có khoảng 300 nghìn tỷ đồng cung ứng. Có nhiều kênh để trung hòa, trong đó tín phiếu là chủ lực. Đợt tăng cường hút bằng tín phiếu xử lý đợt biến động trên hẳn gây thêm sức ép về chi phí.
Một tính toán tương đối cho thấy, từ đầu năm đến nay quy mô lượng tín phiếu thường xuyên lưu hành có từ 50 - 60 nghìn tỷ đồng. Lãi suất tín phiếu đầu năm đến nay cao thì khoảng 7,5% - 8,3%/năm, thấp khoảng 2,8 - 3%/năm, những tháng gần đây từ 4,5% - 5%/năm (tùy các kỳ hạn). Chi phí cho việc dùng tín phiếu để hút tiền về năm nay ước lượng cũng đến vài ngàn tỷ đồng - điều mà Ngân hàng Nhà nước hẳn phải căn ke kỹ.
Ở một kênh khác, với gần 60 tấn vàng đã bán qua đấu thầu, nhà điều hành cũng đã hút về trên dưới 60 nghìn tỷ đồng. Có vẻ như kênh này không mất phí mà còn lãi lớn, nhưng việc sử dụng ngoại tệ để nhập vàng cho đấu thầu rõ ràng cũng phải cân nhắc, bởi dự trữ ngoại tệ còn nhiều việc phải lo toan...
Vậy nên, hút tiền về có vẻ dễ, nhưng hút như thế nào, mức độ bao nhiêu cũng dễ đau đầu, bởi gắn với áp lực chi phí, các cân đối. Tình thế trở nên căng thẳng hơn khi khả năng lãi suất VND giảm tiếp đã cạn kiệt, hút vốn về để bớt áp lực cho tỷ giá nhưng lại dễ cản trở chủ trương - yêu cầu giảm lãi suất cho vay.
Thế nên, hậu trường của điều hành hay trong yêu cầu ứng xử với các cân đối không hẳn khá dễ chịu như tỷ giá USD/VND trên biểu niêm yết của các ngân hàng thời gian qua, hay được đơn giản hóa như một số quan điểm xuất hiện những ngày gần đây khi cho rằng tỷ giá yên ắng là nhờ “ăn may” do vĩ mô ổn định và lạm phát được kiềm chế.
Source: http://vneconomy.vn/2013092704407259P0C6/cang-thang-ty-gia-usdvnd-o-hau-truong.htm
Wednesday, September 11, 2013
Shopping: The emporium strikes back
“THE staff at Jessops would like to thank you for shopping with Amazon.” With that parting shot plastered to the front door of one of its shops, a company that had been selling cameras in Britain for 78 years shut down in January. The bitter note sums up the mood of many who work on high streets and in shopping centres (malls) across Europe and America. As sales migrate to Amazon and other online vendors, shop after shop is closing down, chain after chain is cutting back. Borders, a chain of American bookshops, is gone. So is Comet, a British white-goods and electronics retailer. Virgin Megastores have vanished from France, Tower Records from America. In just two weeks in June and July, five retail chains with a total turnover of £600m ($900m) failed in Britain.
Watching the destruction, it is tempting to conclude that shops are to shopping what typewriters are to writing: an old technology doomed by a better successor. Seattle-based Amazon, nearing its 19th birthday, has lower costs than the vast majority of bricks-and-mortar retailers. However many shops, of whatever remarkable hypersize, a company builds in the attempt to offer vast choice at low prices, the internet is vaster and cheaper. Prosperous Londoners and New Yorkers ask themselves when was the last time they went shopping; their shopping comes to them. “Retail guys are going to go out of business and e-commerce will become the place everyone buys,” pronounces Marc Andreessen, a celebrity venture capitalist. “You are not going to have a choice.”
Online commerce has grown at different rates in different countries, but everywhere it is gaining fast (see chart 1). In Britain, Germany and France 90% of the rather modest growth in retail sales expected between now and 2016 will be online, predicts AXA Real Estate, a property-management company.
Old dog, meet new tricks
This would hurt less if shoppers were spending more; smaller slices are more acceptable when they come from bigger pies. But in many rich countries, especially in Europe, consumers are still smarting from the bursting of the credit bubble and high unemployment. American consumers are perkier, but seem to be clinging to the bargain-hunting habits of the recession. Services have been consuming a bigger share of their wallets for decades, leaving less to spend on things (see chart 2). Ageing populations could shrink the pie further. Old people shop less.
When shoppers both know what they want and are willing to wait for it they will go online. And retail’s simple moneymaking ways of yesteryear—find a catchy concept, fuel growth by opening new shops and attracting more shoppers to existing ones, use your growing size to squeeze suppliers for better margins—have run out of steam. But that does not mean that there are no new options for bricks and mortar.
Shopping is about entertainment as well as acquisition. It allows people to build desires as well as fulfil them—if it did not, no one would ever window-shop. It encompasses exploration and frivolity, not just necessity. It can be immersive, too. While computer screens can bewitch the eye, a good shop has four more senses to ensorcell. No one makes the point better than Apple; in terms of sales per unit area its showrooms-slash-playrooms best all other American retailers.
And shops make money. Bricks-and-mortar retail may be losing ground to online shopping, but it remains more profitable. The physical world is also increasingly capable of taking the fight to its online competitors. Last year online sales of shop-based American retailers grew by 29%; those of online-only merchants grew by just 21%. Apart from Amazon—which has long spurned profits in favour of growth—most pure-play online retailers are losing market share, says Sucharita Mulpuru of Forrester Research. The bricks-and-mortar retrenchment will be painful, but the survivors may make shopping a less formulaic, more satisfying and possibly even more profitable experience, both offline and on.
Many brands still think shops are the best way to attract customers. Inditex of Spain, owner of the ubiquitous Zara fashion brand, opened 482 stores in 2012, bringing its total to 6,009 in 86 countries. Primark, a fast-growing vendor of nearly disposable clothing, sells nothing on its website, relying on its 242 shops for almost all its sales. The same can hold at the luxury end, too—few will buy a $10,000 necklace online, or entrust it to the post. Space on the snazziest streets in London, Paris and New York is in such demand that luxury retailers pay millions in “key money” to secure it, says Mark Burlton of Cushman & Wakefield, a property company.
Offline-only, though, is a shrinking category. Now that the initial shock of the online onslaught has worn off, most big retailers have joined it. They proclaim themselves to be “omnichannel” merchants, as adept as Amazon online but with the added excitement and convenience that comes with physical shops. Philip Clarke, chief executive of Tesco, Britain’s largest retailer, says that app development will come to be as important to his company as property development. Walmart, the world’s biggest retailer, has 1,500 employees in Silicon Valley trying to out-Amazon Amazon in areas such as logistics and making the most of social media.
Some online natives are going omnichannel, too. Pace Mr Andreessen, New York-based Warby Parker, which sells trendy spectacles at prices lower than those charged by famous brands, has opened 14 shops, one of them a school bus that tours the country. Some potential customers were wary of buying spectacles from an online-only merchant. “We thought bricks and mortar would bring gravitas to the brand,” says Neil Blumenthal, a co-founder. Its SoHo flagship resembles a library. Appointments with the in-store optometrist are displayed on a railway-station-style time board.
Currying favour
Britain may be one of the places where the future of retail is most easily seen. Online shopping has advanced further there than in other developed economies. The population is quite tightly packed, which makes delivery relatively cheap, and 70% have broadband internet access. It is one of the few places where online grocery shopping has taken off. Eventually, predicts Panmure Gordon, an investment bank, 20% of the food business will be online. For non-food items it will average 40%, but there will be a large range. For entertainment it may be 90%; for DIY supplies as little as 15%.
Footfall on British high streets has declined for seven years running. Citi Research, part of Citigroup, a bank, calculates that comparable sales at a representative selection of Britain’s clothing chains fell by 3-5% a year between 2009 and 2012. Shop rents are high and leases are long, which piles on the pressure. Vacancy rates have risen fivefold to 14% since 2008. A report by the Centre for Retail Research predicts that a fifth of Britain’s high-street shops will close over the next five years, eliminating more than 300,000 jobs.
Britain’s brick-burdened retailers may be heartened, though, by the example of Dixons Retail, owner of Britain’s biggest electronics and computer retailers, Currys and PC World, and of similar chains in other countries. Between 15% and 20% of sales at Dixons are online, depending on the season, and the proportion is rising. But Dixons thinks the advantages which online-only merchants get by doing away with shops and sales staff are undercut by the need to pay more than high-street shops do to acquire customers (largely by paying Google for clicks on adverts) and to spend a lot on shipping. So instead of doing away with shops and sales staff, Dixons is trying to get more out of them.
Shoppers may be tempted to treat electronics stores as showrooms for Amazon and its like, but at least they cross a retailer’s threshold at some point during their quest 90% of the time, notes Dixons’ boss, Sebastian James—and with rivals like Comet having closed down, that threshold is ever more likely to be Dixons’. This gives the company the means to procure better terms than online rivals do from its suppliers, which like the idea of customers actually seeing their wares in the flesh, shown off by flesh-and-blood people. Sometimes, as with a recent AEG washing machine and Samsung camera, Dixons enjoys a period of exclusivity.
Thus people’s tendency to use the shops as showrooms is turned, at least in part, to the company’s advantage. Other retailers are seeking to embrace the practice too. Best Buy, America’s biggest electronics retailer, used to cover up barcodes to stop shoppers from using their phones to compare prices. Today the retailer’s new boss, Hubert Joly, professes to “love showrooming” because it means that a prospective customer is on the premises.
Having people on the premises also helps Dixons to bundle sales—in particular, to sell high-margin accessories and services along with low-margin devices. Mr James says that computers in Dixons were 26% more expensive than on Amazon three years ago. Now the difference is pretty much zero. So the shops must make money by selling “the world that goes around the product”—like a computer bag or high quality cables.
These stratagems depend on having attractive stores and able shop assistants. Dixons has retrained its staff and changed their incentives. Individual sales commissions have been scrapped in favour of store-wide schemes linked to measures of customer satisfaction. To overcome managers’ reluctance to refer customers to the website, stores are now credited with all sales in their catchment area, regardless of whether a buyer entered the premises.
The omnichanneller’s dilemma
But though owning shops is basic to Dixons’ strategy, the number of shops is dropping, and will drop further. Dixons has cut its British network from 780 to 486; it aims to end up with just under 400. Jessops, which has been reopened after shedding more than 80% of its stores by Peter Jones, a flamboyant reality-television entrepreneur, is making a similar bet.
For many retailers, such reductions are an inescapable part of going omnichannel. “You’re putting in more capital to keep the sales you have,” says Colin McGranahan of Sanford C. Bernstein, a research firm. Investment which used to go mainly into new stores must now in part be redirected towards the technology and distribution that online sales require. And sales through new channels come in part at the expense of existing shops, the costs of which are largely fixed. That depresses the retailer’s profits and forces it to close shops.
Other sectors have some advantages over electronics and camera sales. It is not so easy for shoppers to use food and clothing shops—both of which are big parts of retail—as showrooms for online sales. You cannot squeeze a melon with a tablet computer; phones make poor fitting rooms.
For online-only retailers such products cause extra headaches. Clothes shoppers return a quarter or more of the garments they buy. Selling groceries online is laborious, with lots of low-value items stored at different temperatures that have to be assembled into all manner of unique orders and then delivered rapidly.
But online-only retailers keep inventing clever ways to overcome such disabilities. Amazon’s “subscribe and save” service delivers at regular intervals staple products like nappies and coffee. Fits.me sets up “virtual fitting rooms” for online clothiers, which let shoppers enter their measurements to see how garments would look on them. Citi Research expects British online clothing sales to double in the next six years. “There are no glass ceilings on any particular category,” says Robin Terrell, head of Tesco’s online business.
For Tesco, the world’s third-biggest retailer, the challenge of mastering online grocery while shoring up its traditional business is acute. The company outsells all other British grocers on the internet; but its market share has been slipping both online and off and a recent poll rated its shops lower in quality than those of any other British grocer. Like Carrefour, the French firm that is retail’s global number two, Tesco has pulled back from some attempts to expand internationally in order to win back lost ground at home.
Change in store
Around 40% of Tesco’s British floorspace is in hypermarkets which seem ill suited to new trends, based as they partly are on the idea of selling things that people would rather buy online, such as televisions, alongside food. The Institute of Grocery Distribution, an industry think-tank, sees sales in Britain’s big shops growing by just 6.4% between 2012 and 2017. The growth that is not found online is going to come from neighbourhood convenience shops, which the institute sees as growing by 28.5% over the same time. So that is where Tesco, like Carrefour and Walmart elsewhere, is heading. In April Tesco took an £804m write down on the value of its British property as it scaled back plans for future big supermarkets.
After a decade spent bringing its shops online Tesco now sees it as time to “bring the internet into stores”, says Mike McNamara, the company’s technology chief. The idea is that this will make shops both more productive and more popular. Tesco’s in-store cafés could have interactive tabletops, which, prompted by a customer’s cellphone, would suggest recipes based on his shopping list. Similar wizardry could tell staff which fruit and vegetables need replenishment. The hypermarkets will also sell more clothing and cosmetics, which have higher margins than electronics and seem a more natural fit with food.
Online sales are the fastest-growing part of Tesco’s business, but analysts doubt they bring much profit. “On a fully costed basis no one makes money” in online grocery, says Andrew Gwynn of Exane, an investment company. But online offers a real advantage in serving Tesco’s most loyal and profitable customers. Tesco has been hoovering up information through its Clubcard loyalty scheme for years; computers can take that further. “We are teetering on the brink of an era of mass personalisation,” says the retailer’s boss, Mr Clarke. Loyal customers are worth far more to Tesco than footloose ones.
Deep personalisation could have disruptive consequences. Retailers are beginning to see profit per household, rather than per square metre, as the thing they should target, according to the Boston Consulting Group. Safeway, an American supermarket, offers individualised pricing through its “just for u” loyalty scheme. Mr Clarke seems wary. Tesco “should be classless”, he says, meaning it should not discriminate among its customers. But the temptation will be there. Tesco still uses traditional yardsticks but “customer-level metrics” will challenge the way the company thinks, says Mr Terrell.
Many chains are going through similar change, looking again at every aspect of their logistics (a 95% accuracy rate is acceptable for shipments to grocery shops but anything short of 100% risks turning off a customer), their staff training, the number, size and location of their shops and what they offer the customer. Asda, a competitor to Tesco in Britain that is owned by Walmart, is transforming big supermarkets into “mini high streets”, bringing in Disney shops and shoe repairs (Tesco has bought Giraffe, a restaurant chain, for similar purposes). John Lewis, a British omnichannel role model, takes the view that targeting individual shoppers rather than single channels is the way to profitability. “Click and collect” services let shoppers pick up online purchases at a convenient store where they might also buy something else.
The future shopscape will be emptier, but more attractive. Shoppers can expect new rewards for simply showing up. Shopkick, a mobile-phone app, gives American shoppers points that earn them goodies like iTunes songs just for stepping across the threshold of a participating store. Inspired by Apple, shops promise “experience” and hope that sales will follow. Germany’s Kochhaus claims to be the first food store organised around recipes rather than grocery categories. The ingredients are strewn across tables, not stacked on shelves. Some shops will opt to sell nothing at all on the premises. Desigual, a Spanish fashion merchant, has shops in Barcelona and Paris that carry only samples. Shoppers are helped to assemble them into outfits that they then buy online.
Shopping centres are reallocating space from the classic form of retailing to leisure and entertainment. In Britain the non-retail share of shopping-centre revenue has risen from the 5% once seen as standard to 10-15% and could rise to 20% over the next five years, says the British Council of Shopping Centres. The same trend holds across much of Europe. In America nearly a quarter of the space in shopping centres is occupied by businesses other than shops and restaurants. Medical services may become principal attractions, says Michael Niemira of the International Council of Shopping Centres. Health care accounts for just 1% of space now but Mr Niemira and others expect it to “explode”.
Room for improvement
Nothing is settled. The bundles assembled by Dixons and its kind may be brutally unpicked by online competitors. A logistical arms race is heating up. Amazon, having given up its resistance to collecting state sales tax in America, is building fulfilment centres near cities to speed delivery. Bricks-and-mortar shops are striking back with services such as Shutl, which arranges fast home deliveries from store networks. And all retailers are competing increasingly with suppliers seeking new direct routes to market. Last year online sales by companies that make their own products grew faster than those of both shops and online-only retailers in America.
And new hybrids are emerging. Yihaodian, a Chinese company owned by Walmart, has used an app to let phone users visit 1,000 “virtual stores” accessible only at specific sites—many of which, rather cheekily, were on the doorsteps of rival retailers. Tesco’s Korean subsidiary, Homeplus, puts up images of products on posters in the subway; commuters can scan them to get the products delivered. Tangible and virtual retailing may meld in all sorts of unaccustomed ways. Even Amazon has flirted with the idea of opening physical stores. Consumers have reason to cheer the survival of the sexiest.
Friday, July 5, 2013
Khi Nhà nước khởi động lại thị trường
(TBKTSG) - Với việc hạ trần lãi suất huy động ngắn hạn sáu tháng trở xuống về 7%/năm, Ngân hàng Nhà nước (NHNN) đã chính thức xác nhận đáy của lãi suất hiện nay. Lãi suất cũng phát đi tín hiệu các công cụ điều hành tiền tệ đã được sử dụng gần hết để phục vụ cho mục tiêu ổn định vĩ mô, kiềm chế lạm phát. Bây giờ đến lúc chính sách tài khóa mà cụ thể là đầu tư công phải được phát huy để có thể đạt tăng trưởng 5,5% cho năm 2013.
Mắc kẹt tín dụng
Eximbank, ngân hàng từ trước đến nay vẫn được xem là một trong những tổ chức dẫn đầu về tăng trưởng tín dụng của khối cổ phần. Vậy mà từ đầu năm đến nay tín dụng chỉ dương ở mức 0,9%, thấp nhất kể từ năm 2000. Tổng giám đốc một ngân hàng khác có tăng trưởng tín dụng nhỉnh hơn, khẳng định: “Muốn đẩy được tín dụng chỉ còn cách hạ chuẩn cho vay. Làm thế chẳng khác nào chất cao thêm nợ xấu và vòng xoáy nợ xấu - tín dụng - nợ xấu sẽ không thể nào giãn ra được”.
Tiền đâu tăng đầu tư công?
NHNN cho biết đã đề xuất phương án phát hành thêm 100.000 tỉ đồng trái phiếu chính phủ cho mở rộng đầu tư công. Hiện các ngân hàng đang thừa tiền. Việc phát hành thêm này sẽ giúp tiền dịch chuyển, không bị ứ trong kho ngân hàng và nhất là có lợi cho ngân sách khi lợi tức trái phiếu đang ở mức 6-6,5%/năm tùy kỳ hạn. Những dự án, công trình được tài trợ bằng nguồn trái phiếu giá thành thấp sẽ giúp hạ giá sản phẩm đầu ra, cải thiện hiệu quả đầu tư. Trước mắt trái phiếu phát hành mới giải quyết ngay được khối nợ đọng xây dựng cơ bản 95.000 tỉ đồng. Trong lĩnh vực xây dựng, không ít doanh nghiệp, nhà thầu sẽ được thanh toán nợ đọng và họ có khả năng bắt đầu một vòng quay kinh doanh mới.
Ngoài ra, nguồn hụt thu ngân sách có thể bù đắp bằng cách tiếp tục bán bớt vốn nhà nước ở các công ty Nhà nước không cần nắm giữ cổ phần chi phối. Việc định giá doanh nghiệp ở những đơn vị chưa IPO sẽ mất thời gian, chưa kể xử lý công nợ trong khi cân đối ngân sách là việc không thể chậm trễ. Nhà nước đang sở hữu những doanh nghiệp niêm yết, giá trị vốn hóa được thị trường xác định hàng ngày, tại sao không đấu giá công khai, bán bớt vốn ở những công ty đó? Thậm chí Nhà nước có thể nới room (tỷ lệ sở hữu nước ngoài tại một doanh nghiệp) đơn vị niêm yết từ 49% lên trên 51%, hoặc 60-65% nhằm thu hút các tổ chức chiến lược nước ngoài nếu muốn mở rộng đối tượng người mua. Thí dụ nếu bán 10% vốn nhà nước ở Vinamilk, Nhà nước có thể thu được nửa tỉ đô la Mỹ. Thậm chí Nhà nước có thể có được hơn 1 tỉ đô la Mỹ tương đương 22.000 tỉ đồng trong trường hợp thoái 20% vốn ở công ty này. Nhà nước có cần độc quyền về sữa không? Chắn chắn là không.
Với Tổng công ty Khí (GAS), nếu bán đấu giá 10% vốn nhà nước, giảm sở hữu quốc doanh từ 96,8% xuống 88,8%, ngân sách có thể có 11.000 tỉ đồng. Con số này sẽ tăng gấp đôi khi đấu giá 20%. Chỉ cần bán bớt vốn ở Vinamilk và GAS, Nhà nước đã có 44.000 tỉ đồng, tức hai phần ba mức hụt thu ngân sách.
Một số lĩnh vực như dược phẩm, hàng tiêu dùng, dịch vụ dầu khí, logistics, cảng biển, cao su thiên nhiên... Nhà nước cũng không nhất thiết phải độc quyền. Hầu hết các công ty cao su đang được Nhà nước sở hữu trên 51%. Không ít doanh nghiệp sản xuất săm lốp, đệm mút cao su hay các thiết bị hàng tiêu dùng sử dụng nguyên liệu cao su sẵn sàng tham gia đấu giá, trở thành cổ đông để có nguồn cung cấp nguyên liệu đầu vào ổn định. Đó không phải là một sự điều tiết cung cầu hợp lý ngay tại thị trường nội địa sao?
Điều gì đang cản trở việc cải thiện nguồn thu ngân sách từ thoái vốn nhà nước để doanh nghiệp có trình độ quản trị cao hơn? Hơn nữa bán bớt vốn nhà nước là huy động nguồn lực nội - ngoại, nguồn lực trong dân mà không cần phải in thêm tiền, bơm thêm tiền nên không cần phải lo lắng về lạm phát. Phải chăng đó là tư duy độc quyền, là lối suy nghĩ Nhà nước phải hiện diện trong mọi lĩnh vực kinh tế kể cả ngành nghề không trọng yếu, trong khi hiệu quả và sức cạnh tranh của doanh nghiệp quốc doanh đang dần bị lấn lướt?
Phải công bằng thừa nhận rằng thời gian qua chính sách và điều hành tiền tệ đã đi trước chính sách tài khóa. Các chính sách miễn giảm thuế chưa mang lại hiệu quả tức thì và chưa có đủ độ nặng cần thiết để doanh nghiệp xóa đi tâm trạng chờ đợi, quan sát. Trong khi đó, lãi suất đã giảm, tỷ giá khá ổn định và lạm phát đang ở trong tầm kiểm soát.
Người dân và khối dân doanh vẫn chưa xuống tiền đầu tư làm ăn. Bất động sản đóng băng, chứng khoán phập phù, một bộ phận người dân vẫn mua vàng bất chấp giá thế giới tụt dốc vì chưa tin tưởng tiền đồng, thì Nhà nước phải đầu tư trước tiên để dẫn dắt và khởi động lại thị trường. Gia tăng đầu tư công là hành động thiết thực cho thấy tăng trưởng không phải là mục tiêu thứ yếu trong đòi hỏi bức thiết tái cơ cấu nền kinh tế.
Source: http://www.thesaigontimes.vn/Home/xahoi/sukien/98843/Khi-Nha-nuoc-khoi-dong-lai-thi-truong.html
Friday, May 17, 2013
Management consulting: To the brainy, the spoils
ELITE management consultancies shun the spotlight. They hardly advertise: everyone who might hire them already knows their names. The Manhattan office that houses McKinsey & Company does not trumpet the fact in its lobby. At Bain & Company’s recent partner meeting at a Maryland hotel, signs and name-tags carried a discreet logo, but no mention of Bain. The Boston Consulting Group (BCG), which announced growing revenues in a quiet press release in April, counts as the braggart of the bunch.
Consultants have a lot to smile about (see table). The leading three strategy consultancies have seen years of double-digit growth despite global economic gloom. In 2011, the last year for which Kennedy Information, a consulting-research group, has comparable revenue numbers, Bain grew by 17.3%, BCG by 14.5% and McKinsey by 12.4%. All three are opening new offices.
Big trends that befuddle clients mean big money for clever consultants. Barack Obama’s gazillion-page health reform has boosted health-care consulting; firms would rather pay up than read the blasted thing. The Dodd-Frank financial reform has done the same for financial-sector work. Energy and technology are hot, too.
Companies are reluctant to talk about their use of consultants, and consultancies are relentlessly tight-lipped. Bain is said to use code-names for clients even in internal discussions. Such secrecy makes this a hard industry to analyse.
It also lets stereotypes flourish. McKinseyites are said to be “vainies” (who come and lecture clients on the McKinsey way). BCG people are “brainies” (who spout academic theory). And the “Bainies” have a reputation for throwing bodies at delivering quick bottom-line results for clients.
In fact, the big three all learn from each other. All three now use their alumni networks to gather intelligence and generate business—something McKinsey is famous for. All three stake some of their fees on the success of their projects, a practice once associated with Bain. And all three show off their big ideas to the wider public, as BCG’s founder was once among the few to do.
Consulting is no licence to make easy money. Cynics sneer that clients spend millions on consultants only to give the boss an excuse to do what he planned to do anyway. But that would be implausibly wasteful in these days of tight budgets. Consultants today cannot just deliver a slideshow and pocket fat fees. Even the elite three now make most of their revenue from implementing ideas, from finding ways to improve clients’ internal processes and from other tasks not traditionally considered “strategy consulting”.
As the elite firms move down into implementation and operations, they are meeting big new rivals hoping to move up into the loftier realms of strategy. Over the weekend of May 4th-5th partners at Roland Berger, a mid-tier consultancy, met to discuss a possible buyer for their firm. The most likely candidates are thought to be PwC, Deloitte and Ernst & Young, three of the “Big Four” accounting firms (the other is KPMG).
The big accountancy firms now do more consulting than McKinsey, BCG and Bain. Much of this involves manpower-intensive tasks such as technology integration. But their strategy and operations practices are ambitious, too. In January Deloitte bought Monitor, a brainy strategy firm, out of bankruptcy. In 2011 PwC bought PTRM, a respected operations consultancy. All four have scooped up smaller firms too. A successful Big Four bid for Roland Berger would reopen an old question: can the Big Four crack the elite tier?
It is too early to know whether the brainboxes of Monitor will fit comfortably into the Deloitte juggernaut. When EDS, a computer-equipment and services provider, bought A.T. Kearney, a midsized strategy firm, cultures clashed calamitously. A.T. Kearney bought itself free in 2006.
Nonetheless, Mike Canning, the head of Deloitte’s strategy consulting in America, says the Monitor integration is going smoothly, and that clients are showing new interest in Deloitte. Is Deloitte competing with McKinsey, Bain and BCG for work? “Day in, day out, on a regular basis,” says Mr Canning. Dana McIlwain of PwC echoes that: “We are definitely competing today, and only more so in the future.”
Bob Bechek, Bain’s boss, puts it differently: competition with the Big Four is up “very slightly in the past few years, but I mean like a couple of percentage points”. He salutes the Big Four: they do what they do well and profitably. But he argues that the heavy-lift, repeatable work at which they excel is a different kind of business. Strategy consultants concoct novel solutions to unique problems, which is hard.
Rich Lesser, BCG’s boss, acknowledges the challenge from the Big Four, but is confident. Having new rivals is nothing new, he says. Tom Rodenhauser of Kennedy Information reckons that the Big Four “are cracking the C-suite, but they’re not first on the speed-dial for strategy work”.
The elite firms are keen not to seem complacent. While boasting about opening offices in Bogotá or Addis Ababa they acknowledge that emerging-world bosses are not blown away by flashy names. The consultants aim to win trust with quick projects that show bottom-line results, before looking to book longer engagements.
Clients in the rich world are changing, too. Fifteen years ago Indra Nooyi, then the head of strategy (now the boss) at PepsiCo, was a demanding client for consultants, having been one herself at BCG. She was a rarity at the time. No longer: the consultancies have seen many of their alumni go on to fill senior positions at big companies.
Some, such as McKinsey, make it easy for big firms to poach their people, by putting potential employers directly in touch with consultants who tick the right boxes for a vacancy. The idea is that this outplacement service makes McKinsey a more attractive place to work. It also keeps the talent churning, constantly refreshing the firm’s intellectual capital.
Clients are increasingly demanding specific expertise, not just raw brainpower. McKinsey and BCG, in particular, are hiring more scientists, doctors and mid-career industry types, and reducing the proportion of new MBAs in their ranks.
Vainie: “Vidi, vici”
The firms spend big sums on “thought leadership”: ie, papers, books and conferences. This is not all airy-fairy theory. McKinsey has invested heavily in proprietary data. Its boss, Dominic Barton, says: “With the push of a button we can identify the top 50 cities in the world where diapers will likely be sold over the next ten years.” The firm invests $400m a year on “knowledge development”, and Mr Barton touts its “university-like capabilities” to impart it to its consultants.
It is fashionable to complain that consultants “steal your watch and then tell you the time”, as one book put it. But customers clearly value what the consultants offer. Otherwise, the elite three and the Big Four would not be growing so fast.
Things are harder for the next tier, however. Old firms such as A.T. Kearney and Booz & Company (which considered but abandoned the idea of a merger in 2010) are seen by some potential clients as too small to bestride the globe but too big to be nimble. They will watch Roland Berger’s fate with interest.
Wednesday, March 6, 2013
Profitably parting ways: Getting more value from divestitures
Most divestitures start with a strategic
decision that a company is no longer the best owner of one of its
businesses. It’s a natural move for executives who see value in actively
managing their portfolio of business units—recognizing that to grow,
they sometimes have to shrink first—to deploy capital into a business
with higher returns, for example, or to reshape the company’s strategy.
Indeed, past McKinsey research has shown that companies that more
frequently reallocate capital generate higher returns than their peers.
But once a company decides to sell, problems can arise. Managers devote their attention to finding a buyer but seldom scope deals from a potential buyer’s point of view, even as they struggle to figure out exactly what should be included in the sale, apart from the productive assets that are its centerpiece. They often think about the separation process only secondarily, assuming they can separate a business and worry about stranded costs later. And they neglect the reality of internal competition for resources that can flare up between the managers who are staying and those who are leaving. Management and the board can get so caught up in the sale that the core business begins to suffer from neglect. All in all, divestiture turns out to be no panacea: sellers can take up to three years to recover from the experience (exhibit). Indeed, some companies are so wary of these pitfalls that they decide to muddle through with businesses of which they are not the natural owners—another unsatisfactory result, as research suggests that these sales can produce significant returns for both the parent company and the divested or spun-off business.
In our experience, even highly complex divestitures can work well,
provided companies follow proven practices, especially in three areas:
scoping the deal in detail, addressing the so-called stranded costs left
behind when the revenue-generating assets are sold, and managing the
expectations and concerns of employees.
These are not discrete goals—in fact, they are mutually reinforcing. Setting clear boundaries for the deal will enable managers to understand the implications of any subsequent adjustments to the scope and accordingly help them maximize value. Clear boundaries will also help the seller understand the costs that are likely to be stranded; knowing these early is essential, as they often require some time to wind down. And the process of defining the deal’s potential boundaries lets companies be more transparent with employees about the deal process, its progress, and where they’re likely to end up. Getting started on these activities quickly, in parallel with the search for a buyer, can unlock enormous value for buyer and seller alike.
To get around that problem, smart sellers define a number of different deal packages—of assets, people, and services—configured to attract interest from a broad spectrum of buyers. These packages not only broaden the field of potential buyers, often in ways that companies cannot envision at the outset, but also help the company cope with the tough questions that buyers inevitably have about what’s in scope, how to separate, the transitional services they can count on, and the financials of the business. Sellers that haven’t begun to define the deal will be unable to provide good answers—delaying the sales process and losing their competitive position, as well as leaving buyers to factor more risk into their valuation models and lowering the value they see in the deal.
When one European private-equity firm, for example, didn’t get all the answers it sought about a company it was negotiating to acquire, it raised the level of assumed risk in its valuation model, suppressing the value of the deal and lowering the price it was willing to pay. To prevent such problems, a US industrial company divesting a subsidiary conducted a detailed analysis of its true sales, general, and administrative costs and, by clearly defining which activities were attributable to the business being sold, found them to be tens of millions of dollars lower than current allocations. That exercise provided detailed information for potential buyers, increased the profit of the business being sold, and helped get a higher price for the deal.
Sellers can construct sale packages for a range of buyers. Each buyer is unique and will have more or less need for infrastructure, capabilities, and a geographic presence where the assets for sale are located. To prepare for the wide range of needs, most sellers will want to develop basic packages for at least three types of bidder: a strategic buyer with a local presence, a strategic buyer from another region, and a private-equity firm seeking a stand-alone entity. Bundles for strategic buyers with no local infrastructure and for private-equity buyers typically include more support services than those designed for local strategic investors, which may only want the operational and market-facing parts of the business.
These packages represent two ends of the spectrum; in between, there are many possible configurations of support services to package with the assets. And there may also be buyers interested in cherry-picking parts of the core business instead of taking all of it—which, while probably not ideal, should not be discounted out of hand. Sale packages include pro forma financial statements tailored to represent the package being offered to each buyer or class of buyer that highlight the true value of the business, separation and transition plans, and details on proposed management and talent assignments.
When a large industrial company was looking to divest one of its business units in the late 2000s, its managers’ first instinct was to sell to a large strategic buyer. But by conducting a form of due diligence on its prospective buyers (often known as a “reverse due diligence”)—including some private-equity firms—the company was able to understand all the potential synergies each would gain by buying the business. That enabled managers to design a specific value proposition for each potential buyer. Eventually, they were able to attract—and sell the business to—a much smaller player that hadn’t even come up in their initial scan for potential buyers. Even better, the company got a price 20 percent higher than first expected. In fact, all the bids exceeded expectations; the final list of bidders included a private-equity consortium and a few other unanticipated interests.
Sellers whose cost management is weak are all the more challenged by stranded costs and are often surprised by how much overhead they have. The divestiture typically reveals unsuspected layers of complexity or outright duplication within centralized functions.
We see three strong practices to reduce overhead. First, as we have discussed, defining the precise boundaries of potential deal packages early in the deal brings to light the full extent of the subsidiary’s sales, general, and administrative costs. The parent company can make a better attribution of resources to the parent and the subsidiary. That benefits both companies.
Second, successful sellers often use the momentum generated by the divestiture as a catalyst to reduce stranded costs—and to improve the performance of any bloated or inefficient corporate-center activities revealed by the divestiture. (This mirrors a similar effect of transformational acquisitions, in which buyers take advantage of the circumstances of an acquisition as a catalyst to restructure costs more broadly.
Companies can seize the impetus of the divestiture to reexamine their entire cost base using benchmarking analysis to highlight potential inefficiency or even zero-based budgeting to encourage a radical rethinking of the corporate infrastructure.
Rooting out stranded costs takes a separation manager with the foresight to rethink the parent company’s cost base and the authority to make it happen—the third good practice.
One industrial organization had divested a few units over the years, but it had not followed suit with its corporate functions, which were still sized for their earlier duties. When it came time to shape another big divestiture, representing about 10 percent of revenues, the company conducted a thorough search for the stranded costs that lay within individual support functions, as well as costs that cut across functions such as real estate. All told, these added up to hundreds of millions of dollars. That proved to be a catalyst for an even broader cost restructuring.
Companies of this size often face a special problem in rooting out stranded costs. For many large multinational companies organized by matrix, the only pragmatic method is for senior management to lead a cross-functional initiative to tackle cross-cutting opportunities such as shared-service and outsourcing operations, as well as the change programs required to support the cost transformations.
Some form of short announcement is essential. Once managers make an announcement, they should clearly define and communicate the selection process to keep employees motivated while they wait for news of their fate. That can, of course, be challenging in situations where the deal boundaries are unclear until late in the process. Ideally, the communication plan should be part of a compelling story that shows not only employees but also investors, analysts, and customers why the divestiture will leave both buyer and seller better off.
Once the word is out, other challenges begin. In almost every divestiture we’ve worked on, tension has arisen from the moment it becomes clear who is staying and who is going. Given the role the exiting managers will play in communicating the business’s value to potential buyers, delay in informing them is undesirable. But once they are informed, they immediately become another party at the negotiating table, bargaining for the talent, assets, and contracts they feel they’ll need to be successful and trying to avoid the ones they don’t want.
Failing to manage the tension between the two groups can be damaging. When a global industrial company divested a multibillion-dollar division, for example, it began to receive a lot of applications for transfers from the entity to be divested back into the parent company—so many, indeed, that the company was at risk of visibly depleting the divested company of talent and experienced leadership, potentially affecting its value. To discourage the transfers, it aligned the incentives of people in the departing unit to the characteristics of the sale. It decided to reward managers based on earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA)—a critical negotiating point with the private-equity firm that ultimately bought it. The emphasis on EBITDA motivated exiting managers to minimize the overhead they took with them; it also reduced transfer requests.
This approach did leave more overhead for parent-company managers to deal with, just as they too were striving to reduce overhead costs. But they made a conscious choice to accept this, believing that the right way to deal with broader cost issues was, as we discussed above, as part of a thorough change process in the wake of the divestiture. Parent-company managers often lack the incentives that would compel them to take care of the departing entity. If they do not feel responsible for the unit’s success, they may stop investing in value-creating projects, caring for employees and customers, or watching costs. In our experience, it is important to define and implement a set of performance measures and rewards aligned with value maximization, and to use these with all key people involved in the divestiture process. The most obvious rewards are monetary, but research shows that other incentives (such as recognition and promotions) can be equally if not more important determinants of performance.
Negotiations over talent are particularly sensitive. The first inclination of parent-company managers is to keep the best performers and send the rest with the divested business. That’s not practical, in the end, because regardless of the type of buyer, the divestor has a moral obligation—and in some places a legal one—to make sure the business is a going concern. Furthermore, sellers who intend to divest multiple businesses in the future do not want to be perceived by the market as selling bad businesses stripped of key talent, as this will of course affect their ability to make future deals. At the same time, the parent company must retain critical resources, and quite often, the exiting managers have the very skills they need. Thus, successful divestors will address the issue of talent early in the process and start building or acquiring the skills needed in both the parent organization and the business to be sold.
Much of the value of a divestiture depends on the effectiveness of the separation process. Defining the right deal, managing talent uncertainty, and rooting out stranded costs can make the difference between a deal that succeeds and one that destroys value. And skill in divestiture is comparatively rare; doing it well can help companies get a competitive edge.
Source: https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Profitably_parting_ways__Getting_more_value_from_divestitures_3061
But once a company decides to sell, problems can arise. Managers devote their attention to finding a buyer but seldom scope deals from a potential buyer’s point of view, even as they struggle to figure out exactly what should be included in the sale, apart from the productive assets that are its centerpiece. They often think about the separation process only secondarily, assuming they can separate a business and worry about stranded costs later. And they neglect the reality of internal competition for resources that can flare up between the managers who are staying and those who are leaving. Management and the board can get so caught up in the sale that the core business begins to suffer from neglect. All in all, divestiture turns out to be no panacea: sellers can take up to three years to recover from the experience (exhibit). Indeed, some companies are so wary of these pitfalls that they decide to muddle through with businesses of which they are not the natural owners—another unsatisfactory result, as research suggests that these sales can produce significant returns for both the parent company and the divested or spun-off business.
These are not discrete goals—in fact, they are mutually reinforcing. Setting clear boundaries for the deal will enable managers to understand the implications of any subsequent adjustments to the scope and accordingly help them maximize value. Clear boundaries will also help the seller understand the costs that are likely to be stranded; knowing these early is essential, as they often require some time to wind down. And the process of defining the deal’s potential boundaries lets companies be more transparent with employees about the deal process, its progress, and where they’re likely to end up. Getting started on these activities quickly, in parallel with the search for a buyer, can unlock enormous value for buyer and seller alike.
Taking the buyer’s point of view
Few companies adequately study the likely boundaries of a deal before they start searching for buyers, preferring to start with a simple high-level definition rather than dig into the details. Admittedly, it’s a bit impractical to define exact deal boundaries before the identity of the buyer and its preferences are known.To get around that problem, smart sellers define a number of different deal packages—of assets, people, and services—configured to attract interest from a broad spectrum of buyers. These packages not only broaden the field of potential buyers, often in ways that companies cannot envision at the outset, but also help the company cope with the tough questions that buyers inevitably have about what’s in scope, how to separate, the transitional services they can count on, and the financials of the business. Sellers that haven’t begun to define the deal will be unable to provide good answers—delaying the sales process and losing their competitive position, as well as leaving buyers to factor more risk into their valuation models and lowering the value they see in the deal.
When one European private-equity firm, for example, didn’t get all the answers it sought about a company it was negotiating to acquire, it raised the level of assumed risk in its valuation model, suppressing the value of the deal and lowering the price it was willing to pay. To prevent such problems, a US industrial company divesting a subsidiary conducted a detailed analysis of its true sales, general, and administrative costs and, by clearly defining which activities were attributable to the business being sold, found them to be tens of millions of dollars lower than current allocations. That exercise provided detailed information for potential buyers, increased the profit of the business being sold, and helped get a higher price for the deal.
Sellers can construct sale packages for a range of buyers. Each buyer is unique and will have more or less need for infrastructure, capabilities, and a geographic presence where the assets for sale are located. To prepare for the wide range of needs, most sellers will want to develop basic packages for at least three types of bidder: a strategic buyer with a local presence, a strategic buyer from another region, and a private-equity firm seeking a stand-alone entity. Bundles for strategic buyers with no local infrastructure and for private-equity buyers typically include more support services than those designed for local strategic investors, which may only want the operational and market-facing parts of the business.
These packages represent two ends of the spectrum; in between, there are many possible configurations of support services to package with the assets. And there may also be buyers interested in cherry-picking parts of the core business instead of taking all of it—which, while probably not ideal, should not be discounted out of hand. Sale packages include pro forma financial statements tailored to represent the package being offered to each buyer or class of buyer that highlight the true value of the business, separation and transition plans, and details on proposed management and talent assignments.
When a large industrial company was looking to divest one of its business units in the late 2000s, its managers’ first instinct was to sell to a large strategic buyer. But by conducting a form of due diligence on its prospective buyers (often known as a “reverse due diligence”)—including some private-equity firms—the company was able to understand all the potential synergies each would gain by buying the business. That enabled managers to design a specific value proposition for each potential buyer. Eventually, they were able to attract—and sell the business to—a much smaller player that hadn’t even come up in their initial scan for potential buyers. Even better, the company got a price 20 percent higher than first expected. In fact, all the bids exceeded expectations; the final list of bidders included a private-equity consortium and a few other unanticipated interests.
Rooting out stranded costs
One of the most challenging aspects of a major divestiture is that even sellers that control expenses well are inevitably left with some corporate costs associated with the business but not sold with it. Without the revenues to support them, these stranded costs are a direct threat to the bottom line. Stranded costs essentially can be any type of cost that does not automatically disappear with the transaction, from costs related to shared services, such as marketing and investor relations, to IT infrastructure. Some of these are fixed, such as the IT system, and cannot be readily reduced regardless of the size of the divestiture. Others are more variable and can contract, for example, with a lower head count—but they can still take years to unwind unless explicitly planned as part of the divestiture. As noted, sellers often take up to three years to recover from a divestiture.Sellers whose cost management is weak are all the more challenged by stranded costs and are often surprised by how much overhead they have. The divestiture typically reveals unsuspected layers of complexity or outright duplication within centralized functions.
We see three strong practices to reduce overhead. First, as we have discussed, defining the precise boundaries of potential deal packages early in the deal brings to light the full extent of the subsidiary’s sales, general, and administrative costs. The parent company can make a better attribution of resources to the parent and the subsidiary. That benefits both companies.
Second, successful sellers often use the momentum generated by the divestiture as a catalyst to reduce stranded costs—and to improve the performance of any bloated or inefficient corporate-center activities revealed by the divestiture. (This mirrors a similar effect of transformational acquisitions, in which buyers take advantage of the circumstances of an acquisition as a catalyst to restructure costs more broadly.
Companies can seize the impetus of the divestiture to reexamine their entire cost base using benchmarking analysis to highlight potential inefficiency or even zero-based budgeting to encourage a radical rethinking of the corporate infrastructure.
Rooting out stranded costs takes a separation manager with the foresight to rethink the parent company’s cost base and the authority to make it happen—the third good practice.
One industrial organization had divested a few units over the years, but it had not followed suit with its corporate functions, which were still sized for their earlier duties. When it came time to shape another big divestiture, representing about 10 percent of revenues, the company conducted a thorough search for the stranded costs that lay within individual support functions, as well as costs that cut across functions such as real estate. All told, these added up to hundreds of millions of dollars. That proved to be a catalyst for an even broader cost restructuring.
Companies of this size often face a special problem in rooting out stranded costs. For many large multinational companies organized by matrix, the only pragmatic method is for senior management to lead a cross-functional initiative to tackle cross-cutting opportunities such as shared-service and outsourcing operations, as well as the change programs required to support the cost transformations.
Managing employee expectations
The challenges of talent management in a divestiture start at the moment companies begin defining the boundaries of different sale packages and continue right through to the close of the deal. First and foremost, managers struggle to figure out what to say to the people involved. Most choose to say nothing at first, reflecting the genuine uncertainty about what will happen. Sometimes company leaders will choose to keep plans for the deal confidential up until signing— as one global CEO and seasoned divestiture veteran told us, “I just deny everything until the deal is signed. It’s easier that way.” This may be true, but it creates a communication challenge. Many employees inevitably will know about the deal because of the massive preparation work that is impossible to conceal. But if management officially denies the reports, it becomes very difficult to put in place communication plans and other measures to minimize the concerns that always arise in such situations—all employees want to know, “What happens to me?”Some form of short announcement is essential. Once managers make an announcement, they should clearly define and communicate the selection process to keep employees motivated while they wait for news of their fate. That can, of course, be challenging in situations where the deal boundaries are unclear until late in the process. Ideally, the communication plan should be part of a compelling story that shows not only employees but also investors, analysts, and customers why the divestiture will leave both buyer and seller better off.
Once the word is out, other challenges begin. In almost every divestiture we’ve worked on, tension has arisen from the moment it becomes clear who is staying and who is going. Given the role the exiting managers will play in communicating the business’s value to potential buyers, delay in informing them is undesirable. But once they are informed, they immediately become another party at the negotiating table, bargaining for the talent, assets, and contracts they feel they’ll need to be successful and trying to avoid the ones they don’t want.
Failing to manage the tension between the two groups can be damaging. When a global industrial company divested a multibillion-dollar division, for example, it began to receive a lot of applications for transfers from the entity to be divested back into the parent company—so many, indeed, that the company was at risk of visibly depleting the divested company of talent and experienced leadership, potentially affecting its value. To discourage the transfers, it aligned the incentives of people in the departing unit to the characteristics of the sale. It decided to reward managers based on earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA)—a critical negotiating point with the private-equity firm that ultimately bought it. The emphasis on EBITDA motivated exiting managers to minimize the overhead they took with them; it also reduced transfer requests.
This approach did leave more overhead for parent-company managers to deal with, just as they too were striving to reduce overhead costs. But they made a conscious choice to accept this, believing that the right way to deal with broader cost issues was, as we discussed above, as part of a thorough change process in the wake of the divestiture. Parent-company managers often lack the incentives that would compel them to take care of the departing entity. If they do not feel responsible for the unit’s success, they may stop investing in value-creating projects, caring for employees and customers, or watching costs. In our experience, it is important to define and implement a set of performance measures and rewards aligned with value maximization, and to use these with all key people involved in the divestiture process. The most obvious rewards are monetary, but research shows that other incentives (such as recognition and promotions) can be equally if not more important determinants of performance.
Negotiations over talent are particularly sensitive. The first inclination of parent-company managers is to keep the best performers and send the rest with the divested business. That’s not practical, in the end, because regardless of the type of buyer, the divestor has a moral obligation—and in some places a legal one—to make sure the business is a going concern. Furthermore, sellers who intend to divest multiple businesses in the future do not want to be perceived by the market as selling bad businesses stripped of key talent, as this will of course affect their ability to make future deals. At the same time, the parent company must retain critical resources, and quite often, the exiting managers have the very skills they need. Thus, successful divestors will address the issue of talent early in the process and start building or acquiring the skills needed in both the parent organization and the business to be sold.
Much of the value of a divestiture depends on the effectiveness of the separation process. Defining the right deal, managing talent uncertainty, and rooting out stranded costs can make the difference between a deal that succeeds and one that destroys value. And skill in divestiture is comparatively rare; doing it well can help companies get a competitive edge.
Source: https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Profitably_parting_ways__Getting_more_value_from_divestitures_3061
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