End of QE will test diversification faith

Diversification, the great free lunch of investing, is often taken for granted by investors. Bonds and equities have acted as effective portfolio diversifiers for much of the new millennium because of their different return and volatility patterns. Two of the three main assets in a typical portfolio, cash being the third, moved in opposite directions during financial crises such as 2001 and 2008.

Indeed, portfolio management has become accustomed to this trend and now treats it as an article of faith. But does this faith represent a dangerous cocktail of overconfidence and extrapolation?

The mantra that monetary policy is driving market returns is well rehearsed. Less obvious is the idea that policy is driving the relationship between bond and equity returns.

This year gave a flavour of things to come: a period of high turbulence in May and June as markets took on board the possibility the global liquidity flood was about to abate. Bonds fell sharply and equities stumbled as investors fretted about an end to the Federal Reserve’s emergency asset-buying. Price volatility rose in both mainstream asset classes. Using US equities and 10-year bonds as proxies, the correlation was negative from 2009 to the middle of this year and positive thereafter.

Shock absorbers

Next year could mark a turning point as policy makers exiting the triage phase of recovery from the Great Financial Crisis move away from a material reliance on monetary activism into the potentially more volatile territory of forward guidance.

What does this mean for fixed income? Suppose there is one dominant, price-insensitive buyer (the Fed). Now suppose this buyer has a progressively smaller wallet. All other things being equal, the volatility of prices rises as buyer and seller strive to match each other. Add in another group of (reasonably) price-insensitive buyers (China and the like) downsizing their spending due to slowing growth in foreign exchange reserves, and this risk expands.

Of course, there are shock absorbers. First, the developed world’s ageing populations and their agents (think insurers) have a structural bid for yield. Second, the Bank of Japan is expanding its monetary easing . Some of governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s largesse eventually will pass through Narita Airport as growing shortages of domestic bonds force local institutions to shake off some of their home bias. The conclusion? Do not expect a fixed income bloodbath in 2014 – but brace for more volatile returns.

How about equities? 2013 will probably be known as the Year of Equity. The problem: the numerator of the price to earnings ratio (price) has been driving returns in most markets this year, rather than the denominator (earnings). Higher pricing of the final claim on corporate cash flows – equity – has been aided by the tightest debt spreads on record, insatiable demand from yield-hungry investors, and the ability to refinance and extend fixed obligations at low cost. This works well for a while, but at some point earnings need to come through.

Theory has it the discount rate partially connects bonds (fixed coupons discounted by an interest rate) and equities (fluctuating cash flows discounted by this interest rate plus some variable risk premia). Here is the rub: arithmetically, the lower the real interest rate, the greater the volatility triggered by small changes. If the major driver of returns (policy) becomes more volatile, so do the assets that have benefited from that support.

QE tide turns

Clearly the unprecedented monetary stimulus tide will not last forever. When it dwindles, what will become an effective diversifier of portfolio risk? Bonds or equities? Not entirely; see the drawbacks described above. Cash? Perhaps, but if rates rise for longer-dated bonds and remain anchored by policy for short-dated issues, the diversification benefit of a near zero return is limited.

Challenging the assumptions of the past at a time of regime change is vital in financial markets. This means rethinking fixed income to seek out relative value between bonds, capitalising on rises in volatility and harvesting risk premia. In other words, taking an unconstrained approach. It means a focus on alternative strategies that do not start with the discount rate. Examples are infrastructure and real estate debt, opportunistic acquisition of long duration assets chased off bank balance sheets by regulation and market neutral long-short strategies.

Any reversal in the policy tide involves uncharted territory. A reversal in the 30-year downward trend of rates must, however, involve some different results. 2014 may very well become known as the year in which unwary investors ask: “Who stole my diversifier?”

Source: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0687562c-5e7f-11e3-8621-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2nwa2gnpW

Buttonwood: Pausing for breath

IT IS known as the “reflation trade”. The theory is that rich-world central banks will do whatever it takes to revive their economies, even if that means tolerating a period of above-target inflation. As a result, investors feel an incentive to buy “real assets”, those linked to nominal economic growth (notably equities) or to rising prices (commodities).

From October 4th to March 1st, the MSCI World equity index rose by 21.4% and the S&P GSCI commodity index rose by 23.8%, vigorous rallies by any standard. Bullish sentiment was driven by a sense that quantitative easing (QE), the creation of money to buy assets like government bonds, had become a competitive sport.

America and Britain had been in the vanguard but in September the Swiss central bank pledged to create sufficient money to peg the franc against the euro; and in February the Bank of Japan added {Yen}10 trillion ($128 billion) to its asset-purchase programme and unveiled a target inflation rate of 1%. For its part the European Central Bank has lent more than €1 trillion ($1.3 trillion) in three–year loans to banks, in what is widely seen as a case of QE by the back door.

But the reflation trade took a bit of a dent on February 29th when Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve’s chairman, gave no hint of a third round of QE in testimony to Congress. Admittedly, there was a bullish underpinning to Mr Bernanke’s speech: a better performance by the American economy means there is less need for further action. Nevertheless, the Fed is seen as “pump-primer in chief” by many in the markets. Gold fell by $100 an ounce after Mr Bernanke’s statement.

A setback was probably inevitable after such a strong rally. A bigger question, however, is whether the rationale behind the reflation trade makes any sense.

Central banks have undoubtedly expanded their balance-sheets during the crisis. Back in 2008 the monetary base of the euro zone (in effect notes and coins plus reserves held at the region’s central banks) was around 10% of GDP; the equivalent figures for the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England were in the 4-6% range. Now the monetary base in all three places is between 16% and 18% of GDP.

However, expansion of the monetary base does not necessarily lead to growth in broad money, which measures the supply of credit to businesses and consumers and which ultimately drives inflation. Money-supply growth still looks sluggish in Britain, Japan and the euro zone (see chart). Only in America does it look robust.

The problem is that many banks remain unwilling to extend credit given the need, among other things, to shore up their capital. Figures show that total euro-zone lending to households and non-financial firms has declined in recent months, despite the ECB’s actions. Dhaval Joshi of BCA Research says that “banks have destroyed money just as fast as the ECB has created it.” Jennifer McKeown of Capital Economics concludes from the data that “bank lending remains extremely weak, suggesting that a lack of credit will continue to hold back economic activity.”

In short, the reflation trade may be based on a false premise. The rally may well have been driven by a lifting of the intense economic gloom that enveloped the markets in the autumn of 2011 and a sense that the European authorities had removed the immediate threat of a banking collapse, while simultaneously halting the rapid rise in Italian and Spanish government-bond yields. But now that investors have paused for breath, they can see that the economic outlook is still pretty murky. On March 5th, for example, China lowered its growth target to 7.5% (see later story); survey data on activity in the euro area’s services sector were also weaker than expected.

Furthermore, the markets are starting to lose a key source of support. As the global economy emerged from recession in 2009, profit margins surged thanks to falls in borrowing costs and weak wage growth. But European profits are down by 7% compared with the previous year, according to HSBC. Even in America, which is doing rather better, Bank of America Merrill Lynch is expecting corporate profits for S&P 500 companies to grow by just 6.4% in 2012, down from 14.8% last year.

It all looks remarkably like 2011, when an early-year rally also ran out of steam. So long as the yields on other assets like bonds and cash are so low, it is hard for stockmarkets to collapse. But those yields are so low because central banks are frightened about the economic outlook. That makes it very hard for a bull run to be sustained.

Source: http://www.economist.com/node/21549966

Central banks Crazy aunt on the loose

THERE was a time when the Federal Reserve wouldn’t say whether it had changed interest rates. Soon it will say where it thinks rates will be years from now. Beginning with its policy meeting on January 24th-25th, Fed officials will disclose when they expect to start raising their short-term interest-rate target, which is at near-zero now, and what they expect its path to be over the coming years. Behind such radical transparency is a grim fact: at the start of a fourth successive year of extraordinarily low short-term rates and a still-moribund economy, the Fed is desperate for new ways to stimulate demand.

It is not alone. Of the rich world’s four major central banks, Britain’s and Japan’s already have their policy rates stuck near zero and the fourth, the European Central Bank (ECB), is likely to get there this year. Meanwhile, the balance-sheets of all four institutions have ballooned as they expand the volume and range of assets and loans they hold (see charts).

Central banks have never been comfortable with unconventional monetary policies such as verbal interest-rate commitments and quantitative easing (QE), the purchase of assets by printing money. Alan Blinder, a Princeton economist and former Fed official, has likened them to a family that lets its crazy aunt out of the closet only on special occasions. QE is “best kept in the locker marked ‘For Emergency Use Only’”, is how Charlie Bean, the Bank of England’s deputy governor, put it in 2010.

The unconventional, however, is now conventional. In a presentation to this year’s annual meeting of the American Economic Association, Mr Blinder will argue that the circumstances—low inflation and low nominal interest rates, persistent excess capacity, and fiscal policy paralysed by large debts—that have forced central banks to operate through unconventional policy will be a recurring feature of the economic landscape. “We can’t stuff the crazy aunt back in the closet,” he says.

How long could she stay out? In Japan, interest rates have been near zero almost continuously since 1999. Since then the Bank of Japan has bought government and corporate bonds, commercial paper, exchange-traded funds and real-estate investment trusts. Last year it offered targeted loans to spur long-term investment and rebuild areas damaged by the earthquake and tsunami. Such measures have prevented a deeper recession but not deflation or stagnant employment.

That outcome is not yet likely in Western countries. But 2012 will nonetheless require more unconventional policy. The Fed’s decision to include interest rates in its quarterly projections of key economic indicators, announced this week, emulates central banks in New Zealand, Norway and Sweden. But whereas this trio sought transparency for its own sake, the Fed’s main motivation is practical. It has been saying since August that it would hold rates near zero at least until mid-2013. Its new projections should persuade investors to expect no tightening before 2014, thereby nudging down long-term rates.

Whether the stimulative impact will be sufficient is another matter. In November Fed officials thought the economy would grow between 2.5% and 2.9% in 2012. The private sector projects growth of just 2%. The Fed may yet be proven right, given the upbeat tone of recent data. But if it is not, it will probably launch another round of QE, on top of its two previous rounds and “Operation Twist,” under which it swapped short-term for long-term bonds.

A similar sort of dynamic is at work in Britain, where the Bank of England’s most recent forecast was for growth of 1.2% in 2012. As in America, private-sector forecasts are gloomier as recession in Europe and austerity at home bite. The bank is likely soon to resume QE.

Most eyes are on the ECB. It has bought government bonds reluctantly and lent to banks enthusiastically, and portrayed both actions as ways of restoring liquidity to the financial system so that monetary policy can work, not as monetary policy itself. Yet now that it is lending huge sums to euro-zone banks for up to three years, this distinction is becoming meaningless. The idea is for banks to use this money to buy peripheral government debt; to lend more to households and business; or to reduce the amount of debt that they must refinance. In all instances that would raise the price and lower the yields on government or private debt, which is how QE is supposed to work. Asked recently if the ECB was conducting QE, Mario Draghi, the bank’s president, sidestepped the question: “Each jurisdiction has not only its own rules, but also its own vocabulary.”

The ECB could yet explicitly embrace QE if it saw inflation falling short of its goal of just below 2%. Elga Bartsch of Morgan Stanley thinks that could happen this year. The ECB already expects inflation of only 1.5% in 2013 and that number could drop as the bank brings its growth projections into line with the gloomier private consensus. Ms Bartsch thinks the ECB will cut its policy rate to 0.5% from 1% now in the first half of the year, about as low as it can go for technical reasons. Asset purchases would be the next logical step.

The question is: which assets? Mr Blinder notes QE can work by narrowing the spread between long-term and short-term rates or between private and government rates. The first is best conducted by purchasing government debt, the second by purchasing private debt. The Bank of England has stuck firmly to the first route, leaving it to the Treasury to extend credit to the private sector. The Fed has done a bit of both by purchasing federally-backed mortgage bonds as well as Treasuries, but avoided purchases of private assets because of legal and political constraints.

The ECB is in the opposite position to the Fed: circumscribed in its ability to fund governments but at liberty to buy private debt. Although expanded purchases of peripheral government bonds would be more effective, Ms Bartsch therefore reckons the bank is likely first to conduct QE through expanded purchases of private debt such as bank and corporate bonds (assuming its three-year loans to banks prove ineffective at expanding credit). It could also purchase bonds of all euro-zone governments, in the process relieving pressure on struggling peripheral sovereigns.

Whatever central bankers do, they cannot repair problems best fixed by politicians, such as America’s incoherent fiscal policy or Europe’s fractured institutions. Asked about the ECB’s aggressive new lending to banks, Masaaki Shirakawa, the governor of the Bank of Japan, said it could “buy time”. But he warned it could backfire if politicians fritter away whatever time the central bank has bought. Unfortunately, that risk is never low.

Source: http://www.economist.com/node/21542416

Bond Buying Proves Poisonous for Pensions

Today's economic medicine carries harmful side effects.

Bond buying, known as quantitative easing, or QE, may have boosted growth and lowered corporate borrowing costs, according to a Bank of England analysis. But it is playing havoc with pension funds. Deficits have ballooned by £74 billion ($116 billion) as a direct result of the BOE's bond-buying program, estimates Pension Corp., an insurer.

The problem for pension funds is QE's design, not its rationale. The BOE's gilt purchases drive up prices and push yields down, a particular problem now that the scale of the BOE's bond buying is forcing it to buy longer-dated gilts of over 25 years in maturity, popular with pension funds. While quantitative easing boosts the value of pension assets, it lowers investment returns and increases estimates of future liabilities. Because typical defined-benefit plans are only 70% funded and face liabilities several years longer than their assets, that leads to wider deficits.

The BOE had hoped the bond-buying program would encourage pension funds to sell gilts and buy stocks and corporate bonds. Instead, many pension plans are doing the opposite: derisking and buying more gilts in the hope of closing shortfalls sooner. That isn't only exacerbating deficits but accelerating a move out of stocks, reducing a major source of long-term risk capital.

Some cash-strapped firms facing demands to plug QE-related deficits are petitioning the U.K. regulator to allow them more than 10 years to make up shortfalls. Another approach might be to discount liabilities at a higher rate than government or double-A corporate-bond yields. The Treasury uses a rate of 3% above consumer inflation for public-sector pensions.

But many trustees say the best response would be for the BOE to stop buying long-dated gilts and buy bank bonds instead. Not only would this ease bank funding difficulties, and thereby improve the supply of business loans, it would allow gilt yields to rise.

So far, the BOE has ruled this out, fearing credit risk and accusations it is subsidizing banks. But given the scale of the crisis, it may be time to take a less doctrinaire approach.

Source: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203686204577116573609854972.html?mod=WSJ_Heard_LEFTSecondNews

Clearing the usual suspects

Clearing the usual suspects

NO ONE likes paying more to fuel their car. The fluctuations in the oil price caused by political turmoil in the Middle East are hard enough to bear. But the idea that speculators are driving commodity prices beyond their “true” level seems particularly galling.

To many, that oil went from $65 a barrel in June 2007 to $145 in July 2008, and back down to $31 in December of the same year, is proof the price was not being set by supply and demand. Academics who have proclaimed on the issue come down on both sides of the argument. A recent report* from the OECD analyses the literature, applies its own statistical tests and finds investors not guilty.

Technically speaking, the report does not deal with the influence of speculators on commodity markets but with the role of index-tracking funds. But the spectacular growth of these funds (from $90 billion at the start of 2006 to almost $200 billion at the end of 2007) coincided with the boom in raw-materials prices, so it is hardly surprising they have been fingered as suspects.

The big buyers were pension funds and endowments. They became convinced, after the bear market of 2000-02, that they were overcommitted to shares. So they started to diversify into “alternative” asset classes that were not correlated with equities yet offered the prospect of hefty returns. Commodities fitted the bill.

Surely this lumbering herd must have had an effect on prices? There are some sound theoretical reasons why they might not. For a start the index funds buy futures—a contract to buy or sell an asset at a future date—not the physical good. They are not cornering the commodity, as the Hunt brothers from Texas attempted to do with silver in the late 1970s.

Higher futures prices could have sent a signal to commodity producers, who then decided to hoard their stocks rather than sell them in the cash market. The shortage might then have pushed spot prices higher. The evidence, however, is that inventories were falling, not rising.

An even more telling argument is that commodities without futures markets (apples, edible beans) or futures markets where index funds did not get involved (milk, rice) also saw price rises during 2006-08. Nor was there any correlation between the size of index funds in particular commodities and the price rise for those raw materials.

After analysing data on both prices and individual holdings from America’s Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the OECD study found that there was “no convincing evidence that positions held by index traders…impact market returns”; indeed, the OECD reckons that larger positions led to lower market volatility (although data issues mean the finding is more convincing for agricultural products than for energy markets).

So if the funds are innocent, who was guilty? The report does not give an answer but some economists have made the attempt, variously citing demand from China and other developing nations, the diversion of crop use from food to fuel oil, and production constraints.

These explanations may seem to strain plausibility, given that the oil price fell by 79% within five months. The Chinese did not suddenly cut their oil consumption by four-fifths. But if supply and demand are in close balance (as they were in the oil market), even very small changes in either component can lead to large price shifts.

In his book, “The Logic of Life: Uncovering the New Economics of Everything”, Tim Harford postulates a “marriage supermarket” in which men and women who agree to wed can present themselves at the checkout and share $100. Given equal numbers of men and women, say 20 apiece, one would expect couples to split the $100 down the middle. But assume there are 20 women and just 19 men. If the women are determined to get married, this shortage of males will cause a bidding war. None will want to be left in the aisles so they will agree to cut their share of the pot. In theory, the lack of just one male will mean the men get to keep $99.99 of the proceeds, leaving the women with one cent.

Similarly, in boom conditions commodity consumers will be so desperate to get their hands on raw materials that they will drive prices up to absurd levels, at least for a short time. When demand falters, or new supply shows up, the price bubble can evaporate as quickly as it arose, without a speculator in sight.

Source: http://www.economist.com/node/16432870

Giá lương thực thế giới và lạm phát ở Việt Nam

(TBKTSG) - Nhiều người cho rằng chính sách kích cầu của Mỹ là nguyên nhân của sự tăng giá đột biến hàng hóa trong thời gian qua. Chính điều này tạo nên áp lực lạm phát ở các nước mới nổi, trong đó có Việt Nam. Giả thuyết này mặc dù dễ thuyết phục tuy nhiên lại vấp phải khá nhiều vấn đề trong suy luận và số liệu thực tiễn.

Tại sao giá lương thực thế giới tăng?

Cần chú ý là gói kích cầu “nới lỏng định lượng 1” được thực hiện từ tháng 1-2009 đến tháng 3-2010. Việc tăng giá các mặt hàng lương thực xảy ra muộn hơn rất nhiều so với các mặt hàng công nghiệp khác. Theo chỉ số giá của IMF, có thể thấy giá cả hàng hóa công nghiệp tăng nhanh ngay sau khi sản lượng công nghiệp của thế giới chạm đáy vào tháng 2-2009. Còn giá lương thực trong cả năm 2009 gần như không có biến động mạnh (hình 1). Tuy nhiên, giá lương thực bắt đầu tăng nhanh vào tháng 8-2010 ngay sau khi thời tiết xấu ảnh hưởng lớn đến các vụ mùa ở Nga, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, và một số nước khác.

Điểm thứ hai là tổng cung so với tổng cầu của thế giới về lương thực. Giá lương thực thế giới đạt đỉnh vào tháng 4-2011. Theo số liệu thống kê và dự báo vào tháng 4 của USDA (Bộ Nông nghiệp Mỹ) về tổng sản lượng ngũ cốc của thế giới, điều thấy rõ nhất là thế giới đã bị một năm mất mùa khá trầm trọng. Tổng sản lượng ngũ cốc giảm gần 3%, nếu tính luôn cả lượng tăng dân số thế giới thì sản lượng ngũ cốc trên đầu người giảm gần 5%.

Vấn đề là tại sao sản lượng giảm chỉ có 5% mà giá cả của một số lương thực lại tăng gần 100%? Một phần có thể được giải thích do nhu cầu về lương thực tăng nhanh hơn tốc độ tăng của dân số. Ví dụ, Trung Quốc đã trở thành một nước nhập siêu rất lớn về ngũ cốc để thỏa mãn nhu cầu về thức ăn gia súc. Nhưng điểm quan trọng là độ co giãn của cầu ở các mặt hàng ngũ cốc rất thấp (demand inelasticity). Có nghĩa là, giá phải tăng rất mạnh thì nhu cầu mới giảm được. Theo USDA, hệ số co giãn cầu của các mặt hàng ngũ cốc tại Mỹ là 0,04. Điều này có nghĩa giá cần phải tăng 25% (1/0,04) để nhu cầu giảm 1%.

Ở một khía cạnh nào đó, các gói kích cầu có thể làm trầm trọng thêm việc tăng giá của các mặt hàng lương thực. Nhưng nguyên nhân chính của việc tăng giá lương thực thế giới trong thời gian qua là sự mất mùa trong năm 2010.

Một vài dự báo về giá lương thực thế giới

Dự báo về thu hoạch vụ mùa 2011-2012 tốt hơn rất nhiều so với vụ mùa 2010-2011. Theo báo cáo của FAO (Tổ chức Lương nông thế giới) và USDA vào tháng 7, tổng sản lượng ngũ cốc trong vụ mùa 2011-2012 sẽ tăng khoảng 2,5-2,9% so với vụ mùa 2010-2011. Chính điều này đã làm cho giá ngũ cốc giảm trong ba tháng vừa qua. Giá bắp và lúa mì đã giảm nhẹ từ 6-10% kể từ tháng 4 sau một giai đoạn tăng nóng gần 100%.

Lượng hàng dự trữ của các loại ngũ cốc đã không còn giảm mạnh và có khả năng tăng trở lại. Đặc biệt là dự trữ gạo vẫn tiếp tục tăng trong vụ mùa 2011-2012 sau khi sản lượng đạt kỷ lục vào vụ mùa 2010-2011.

Nếu không có vấn đề lớn về biến động thời tiết trong thời gian tới, bất chấp gói kích cầu lần 3, sẽ không có sự tăng giá đột biến ở các mặt hàng ngũ cốc như năm 2010 và đầu năm 2011.

Lạm phát do cơ cấu thị trường?

Một câu hỏi được đặt ra là, tại sao các nước lân cận có một số điểm tương đồng với kinh tế Việt Nam như Thái Lan, Ấn Độ, Trung Quốc, giá thực phẩm cũng tăng cao nhưng với tỷ lệ thấp hơn so với Việt Nam? Mặc dù Việt Nam là nước xuất siêu lương thực nhưng chỉ số giá lương thực tăng cao hơn gấp 2-3 lần các nước lân cận. Điều này cho thấy ảnh hưởng của giá thế giới chỉ tác động phần nhỏ đến giá cả Việt Nam.

Giá lương thực thực phẩm có thể biến động mạnh do ảnh hưởng của thời tiết và dịch bệnh, chứ không chỉ do ảnh hưởng từ chính sách tiền tệ và tài khóa. Điều này cũng lý giải việc ở hầu hết các nước, nhất là những nước có nhóm giá lương thực thực phẩm chiếm quyền số cao trong rổ hàng hóa tính CPI, khi tính lạm phát cơ bản thì chỉ số giá lương thực thực phẩm được loại ra. Vì vậy có thể nói, yếu tố tiền tệ và tài khóa ở Việt Nam không phải là nguyên nhân làm cho giá lương thực thực phẩm của Việt Nam tăng cao hơn các nước trên.

Chúng ta phân chia các nước ra làm hai loại: các nước phải nhập khẩu gạo và các nước xuất gạo. Việt Nam là một trong những nước xuất khẩu gạo lớn nhất thế giới và cũng là nước xuất khẩu gạo duy nhất có giá gạo tăng gần 37%, hơn gấp đôi tỷ lệ tăng giá thế giới trong cùng giai đoạn (hình 2). Việc tiền đồng mất giá khoảng 7,2% vào tháng 2 có thể giải thích được một phần sự chênh lệch trên. Nhưng độ chênh lệch vẫn quá lớn trong bối cảnh lạm phát vào cuối năm 2010 đã lên rất cao.

Tuy nhiên, lạm phát của Việt Nam có thể bắt nguồn từ một nguyên nhân sâu xa hơn, từ khâu phân phối khi chênh lệch giữa giá thu mua và giá bán lẻ ngày càng lớn. Một ví dụ có thể thấy rõ là thị trường thịt. Tính đến tuần đầu của tháng 7, giá thịt heo thăn bán lẻ tại Hà Nội đã tăng khoảng 82% so với đầu năm, trong khi giá mua heo hơi ở Hà Nội chỉ tăng khoảng 51%. Điều này cho thấy lạm phát một phần rất lớn đến từ cơ cấu thị trường. Giá bán lẻ tăng liên tục từ đầu năm bất chấp giá thu mua có nhiều giai đoạn chững lại hay giảm, cho thấy cơ cấu thị trường kém hiệu quả.

Một vấn đề quan trọng nhưng lại rất ít được chú ý là cơ cấu thị trường, đặc biệt của thị trường lương thực thực phẩm, ảnh hưởng rất lớn đến lạm phát. Cơ cấu thị trường ở đây bao gồm cơ chế giám sát điều hành, cơ cấu về quy mô chăn nuôi, hệ thống thu mua phân phối, hệ thống hàng tồn kho cũng như vận chuyển, các tầng lớp trung gian… Sự yếu kém của cấu trúc thị trường thường chỉ biểu hiện mạnh khi kỳ vọng lạm phát cao. Có thể nói kỳ vọng lạm phát cao cùng với sự yếu kém của cấu trúc thị trường là nguyên nhân chính dẫn đến mức tăng bất thường của giá lương thực thực phẩm ở nước ta.

Chính điều này luôn làm cho lạm phát của chúng ta một khi đã lên thì lên rất mạnh và nhanh. Rõ ràng bài toán lạm phát đã không được quan tâm và hiểu một cách đúng mức.

Có lẽ chúng ta đã đặt kỳ vọng quá lớn và không đúng vào khả năng kiểm soát lạm phát của chính sách tiền tệ. Việc kiểm soát lạm phát ở Việt Nam đòi hỏi sự phối hợp đồng bộ các chính sách và một chiến lược dài hơi để kiểm soát lạm phát trong trung và dài hạn, không nên chỉ tập trung nguồn lực vào kiểm soát lạm phát ngắn hạn. Một trong những việc cần làm để kiểm soát lạm phát trong trung và dài hạn là một chiến lược đầu tư vừa nguồn vốn vừa tri thức vào lĩnh vực nông nghiệp.

Source: http://www.thesaigontimes.vn/Home/diendan/sotay/59504/