CVC’s Australian loss: An isolated carcass

HOMEOWNERS who don’t keep up with their mortgage payments are liable to see their property repossessed by the bank. The same fate can befall private-equity firms that used large amounts of debt to finance big takeovers in the boom years, and can no longer pay back the loans. Just ask CVC, a London-based private-equity firm, which this week lost control of Nine, an Australian television network it paid A$5.6 billion ($4.5 billion) to acquire in deals between 2006 and 2008.

The channel will end up in the hands of a clutch of private-equity firms and hedge funds specialising in distressed debt. In the past 12 months these “vulture” investors bought the bulk of A$3.3 billion of loans extended to Nine from its banks at a fraction of their face value. Led by Apollo Global Management and Oaktree Capital, two American funds, they muscled out CVC by threatening to place Nine into bankruptcy. CVC will lose all of its A$1.9 billion equity investment, in what is thought to be the biggest private-equity loss in Asia, and among the biggest ever.

Distressed investors are sometimes maligned, but this deal is an advertisement for their restorative powers. A struggling magazine division had depressed earnings, making Nine’s large debt pile even less sustainable. With the magazine business divested and the debt excised, the company is now profitable. Upon hearing of the agreement, the broadcaster’s chief executive proclaimed: “Nine’s back!” Its fortunes, if not CVC’s, look much improved.

The problem for the vultures is that other carcasses are proving harder to unpick. Europe is where their hopes are highest. A survey by PwC, a consultancy, found distressed-debt investors have raised €60 billion ($79 billion) to buy loans from European banks, mostly with a view to precipitating defaults at the underlying firms and then taking control. Private-equity giants such as Carlyle and TPG have redirected staff away from normal buy-outs towards these “loan-to-own” activities. Lawyers are poring over documents to find ways to seize control of indebted firms.

So far, however, distressed-debt investors have been disappointed. “There’s not been a deluge [in Europe], we had been hoping for a deluge,” was the recent verdict of Howard Marks, Oaktree’s chairman. That’s because low interest rates and cheap funding from the European Central Bank have reduced the pressure on banks to slim down their balance-sheets by selling assets. Only a few loan-to-own deals have happened this year—notably in the debt of Endemol, a distributor of lowbrow television shows, and Fitness First, a struggling chain of gyms.

In America a few firms have fallen into the vultures’ talons—examples include Charter Communications, a cable operator, and Aleris, an aluminium processor. But roaring capital markets have enabled even distressed companies to refinance their loans. Some have protected themselves from scavengers by buying back their own bank debt at distressed prices, making it harder for the likes of an Apollo or Oaktree to push them out. And the complexity of wresting control from one shareholder continues to make “loan-to-own” deals relatively rare: repeated headlines about potential bankruptcy can damage the company being tussled over, leaving all parties worse off. “It’s a full-contact sport,” says Ben Babcock at Morgan Stanley. No wonder it happened in Australia.

Source: http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21564876-rare-victory-vulture-investors

Vietnam Loses Glow as a Market Darling

Until a few years ago, Vietnam was one of the world's hottest emerging markets. Now it faces an urgent task: fix a beleaguered banking system or watch its economy continue to slip behind faster-growing neighbors.

Piles of bad loans following the financial crisis have dragged down growth in Vietnam and left banks weakened and reluctant to lend.

The government recently acknowledged that nonperforming loans—many made to inefficient state-owned companies—could be as high as 10% of the banking system, substantially higher than reported by individual banks. Fitch Ratings analysts think the number is as high as 15%.

A record number of firms are declaring bankruptcy, and in the sprawling urban areas encompassing Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, the landscape is littered with stalled construction projects as builders run out of cash or put on the brakes as demand for condominiums and office space dries up.

Vietnam fought off rumors in recent days that it was seeking an International Monetary Fund bailout for its banking system. An IMF spokeswoman said no requests for aid had been made. State Bank of Vietnam Deputy Gov. Le Minh Hung said in a statement on the government's website that the country had no intention of seeking a rescue.

However, the IMF and others have been advising Vietnam on how to implement a domestically financed bailout that would restore its banks to health. In its latest economic review the fund said that "quick and comprehensive action" was needed to solidify weak banks and put the economy on more solid ground.

Fears over Vietnam's banks intensified in August when one of the country's most prominent tycoons, Nguyen Duc Kien, was arrested for allegedly improperly lending money to real-estate projects. Efforts to reach Mr. Kien, who now runs a number of private investment funds and owns Hanoi's main professional soccer club, have been unsuccessful. Stocks dropped in the days following the arrest, and the Ho Chi Minh Stock Index is down 18% since the beginning of May.

Vietnam shares fell 2.2% Monday, led by selling in property-related stocks after state media reports suggested real-estate developers are trying to cut prices to boost sales of apartments.

Song Da Thang Long Joint Stock Co. is among the local developers that have struggled. In July it secured an additional loan of 300 billion dong, or around $14 million, from the state-owned Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam to help complete its sprawling, 13-tower U-Silk City development in Hanoi's suburbs. The project began in 2009 at the height of Vietnam's property boom but quickly fell victim to the subsequent property slump and soaring interest rates.



Some question whether this cash injection is enough to keep the project alive, and Song Da Thang Long's stock price has fallen about 60% in the past six months. Chairman Nguyen Tri Dung has said the firm is trying to arrange additional credit lines with other lenders. He couldn't be reached for comment.

Economists warn that Vietnam has entered a dangerous cycle where banks, saddled with bad debts, are unwilling to lend, making it harder for businesses to invest. That feeds into slower growth, which in turn makes it harder for companies to pay back loans, again harming the banks.

The result is that Vietnam's economy is likely to grow below its potential for years to come, unless stronger steps are taken to clean up the banks, economists say.

"I don't think there's any quick fix to a problem like this, as you see in the West. It takes time to work through a solution" to a banking crisis, says Gareth Leather, an economist at Capital Economics. He figures Vietnam's economy will grow at closer to a 5% rate in coming years than the 8% the country enjoyed through much of the previous decade. Although higher than growth rates in the West, 5% is considered slow for a developing Asian country like Vietnam and might not be fast enough to generate sufficient jobs to keep its growing population employed.

The government this month revised its forecast for 2012 growth down to 5.2% from 6% previously.

Vietnam's leaders have acknowledged that a fix is needed. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in March approved a three-year restructuring plan for the banking sector designed to strengthen the country's largest banks and encourage a series of mergers among smaller lenders, but officials appear uncertain about how to put the blueprint into effect.

Plans to launch a "bad bank" to buy up distressed assets have been discussed, but a foreign investor familiar with government discussions say implementing such a solution is being delayed by Hanoi's lack of expertise in managing a modern banking system.

People familiar with government plans say there are proposals to let foreign banks increase stakes in domestic banks from the current cap of 20% in some instances to as high as 49%. Another plan would allow majority stakes, but with a time limit of five years, after which the foreign banks would have to divest.

Government officials didn't respond to requests for comment.

It isn't clear if foreign banks will be interested in increasing their commitments without having the influence of being a permanent majority owner. There are more than a dozen foreign banks with stakes in domestic banks, including HSBC Holdings PLC, Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. and Société Générale.

Many of the foreign banks are dealing with troubles at home, and are said to be reluctant to double-down without assurances of more control over local partners. One foreign banker said at least some of the foreign banks are looking to exit Vietnam at the right price, rather than put more money in.

While the banking situation has deteriorated, Vietnam has tackled other problems by taming double-digit inflation and stabilizing its currency, in part through interest-rate increases. Vietnam has relatively little foreign debt and its trade deficit has shrunk this year.

Some think the government might be able to afford to run a bailout of its banks by itself. The government's debt-to-GDP ratio is about 44%, and the annual budget deficit has fallen to less than 4% of GDP last year from 9% in 2009, well below levels of financially strained economies in Europe.

But because of the large role the state plays in industry, the government has so-called contingent liabilities to back up debt in state-owned institutions. Fitch Ratings figures those liabilities equal an additional 10% of Vietnam's $125 billion GDP.

In the meantime, investors are waiting for more action to resolve the banking situation. Louis Nguyen, chief executive of Saigon Asset Management, which invests in a broad range of Vietnamese companies, said his firm tried to launch a fund last year in conjunction with a large Vietnamese bank to invest in problem loans.

But the fund was put on hold when he found the banks were unwilling to acknowledge problems on their books and sell loans at any sort of discount to their face value.

Source: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443779404577643220089349912.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

Hedge funds and deleveraging: Waiting to turn trash into treasure

“THIS is going to be the next great trade,” one American hedge-fund executive effused early this year. For more than two years funds have been salivating over the slew of assets that Europe’s banks will have to sell. Many have been opening offices in London and hiring to prepare for this “tidal wave” of opportunities.

Up for grabs will be distressed corporate loans, property debt and non-core businesses as European banks shrink their balance-sheets to meet stricter capital requirements. Huw Van Steenis of Morgan Stanley estimates that banks will have to downsize their balance-sheets by €1.5 trillion-2.5 trillion ($2 trillion-3.4 trillion) over the next 18 months. Funds have only about $150 billion to spend on distressed debt in Europe, he reckons, which means they should have their pick of assets.

For now the “next great trade” is not looking that good, mainly because there have been no fire sales. Most banks that are selling assets have priced them close to face value, providing little to entice buyers.

Even where sales are agreed, financing is scarce. In July Blackstone, a large alternative-asset manager, agreed to buy a £1.4 billion ($2.2 billion) real-estate loan portfolio from Royal Bank of Scotland, but has yet to raise an estimated £600m to pay for it. Worse still, many banks may not be able to sell assets cheaply even if they wanted to, because it would force them to take losses that would erode scarce capital.

“We’ve been lying in wait for this opportunity since 2008. But it will come piecemeal. It will take years and years and years,” says Joe Baratta, head of European private equity at Blackstone. Some predict that Europe could go the way of Japan’s glacial deleveraging and take a decade or more to clean up its banks. Politics play a role too. European politicians, no hedge-fund lovers, won’t want to see them buying up assets at truly distressed prices and profiting from Europe’s gloom. It may even be “politically impossible” for banks that got a government bail-out to write down assets significantly, says Jonathan Berger, the president of Stone Tower, a $20 billion alternative-asset firm.

What could turn things around? Some fund managers hope a plan to recapitalise Europe’s banks to the tune of €106 billion by next June will at last force disposals at banks. So too may the introduction of Basel 3 rules that will require banks to hold more high-quality capital. Marc Lasry, the boss of Avenue Capital, a distressed-debt hedge fund, wants to buy from these “forced sellers”, because they will offer lower prices.

Banks aren’t the only prey that funds are hunting. A wave of refinancing that will hit private-equity-owned firms over the next few years may prove profitable for distressed-debt funds. And plans by some European governments to privatise infrastructure assets may also be enticing.

In the meantime, inventive fund managers are figuring out other ways to do deals. Some, such as Highbridge, a large American hedge fund that is owned by JPMorgan, and KKR are scaling up their lending operations as banks cut back. They are able to charge high interest rates, because companies are desperate for cash.

Banks are being inventive too. Unable to sell assets, they have come up with a compromise of sorts, and have started agreeing to “synthetic risk transfer” arrangements with hedge funds. For example, BlueMountain Capital, an American hedge fund, has agreed to take on some risks on a credit-default swap portfolio from Crédit Agricole, a French bank. Another hedge fund, Cheyne Capital, has reached an arrangement with two big banks in Europe to take the first 4% or so of losses from a securitised portfolio of loans, in exchange for a very healthy return.

Funds’ investors may need convincing, given that “synthetic” became a dirty word after 2008. The deals can also be risky, says Galia Velimukhametova of GLG Partners, a European hedge fund. “You could lose 80-90% of your capital if things go very wrong, but make 10-15% if everything goes right,” she says.

Robert Koenigsberger of Gramercy, an emerging-market hedge fund focused on distressed investing, insists it is best to look elsewhere. “The best distressed opportunities created by Europe are now outside of Europe,” he says. He believes opportunities are particularly bright in emerging markets. Many of them are undervalued because investors are selling everywhere as a result of worries about the stability of the euro zone.

For those hedge funds set on playing Europe, the main dilemma they face is how long to wait before buying. Steve Schwarzman, the boss of Blackstone, insists that it is important to stay put. “It’s like dating someone,” he says. “You can say let’s wait two years. But she probably won’t be around then.”

Source: http://www.economist.com/node/21538739