Showing posts with label tax revenue. Show all posts
Showing posts with label tax revenue. Show all posts

Thursday, February 16, 2012

Watch out as sovereigns eye company cash piles

Much has been written about how the developed world must tackle its structural budget deficits. But the link that remains to be properly recognised is that the counterparts to those ‘unsustainable’ public-sector budget deficits are equally ‘unsustainable’ corporate-sector surpluses.

The conventional wisdom believes that the current sovereign debt crisis is the result of governments having been too profligate. But it is not that governments have been spending ‘too much’ that is the problem; it is that corporates have been spending ‘too little’. Moreover, because this corporate saving is the main counterpart to the government’s borrowing, until companies start to spend again, the burden of fiscal adjustment will have to fall on cutbacks in public services and higher personal taxation. It is time to shift the debate away from talking about the fiscal position, and focus instead on whether it is a shift in corporate behaviour that is responsible for the fiscal mess in the developed world.

It is very unusual for the corporate sectors to run sustained financial surpluses. Look back at the UK and the US for more than half a century and the corporate sector has tended to be a net borrower, not a net saver.

What has prompted the recent move into financial surplus has been the decision by companies to step away from investment. Investment-to-gross domestic product ratios in the developed world are now close to the lowest levels seen in 60 years. Corporates appear to have decided to run themselves for cash, and not for growth. It is this profound shift in corporate behaviour that policymakers and politicians have been slow to spot. Until this behaviour changes – or is changed – it will be very hard to improve the fiscal arithmetic.

Now this could be a simple cyclical issue. Corporates – like investors – were seduced into believing that the great moderation was the new normal… only to find themselves thrown into a world of unprecedented uncertainty by the credit crunch. Faced with such a loss of visibility and a shortage of external finance, chief executives had no option but to put fixed investment on hold, and de-lever in order to reduce their dependence on the banks. The hope is that as confidence returns, so will fixed investment and job creation, followed in turn by an improvement in public finances. Policymakers should be doing all they can to bring corporates back from a world dominated by uncertainty and into a world where investment plans can be made and risks managed.

But what if the shift in corporate behaviour is structural?

After all, it is rare to have a capital expenditure cycle without a credit cycle. And where is the next credit cycle going to come from if the banks are condemned to multi-year de-leveraging? Besides, if there is any capital expenditure to be done, it is most likely that this will take place in the emerging-market economies rather than in the developed world.

Against this backdrop, it must be tempting for company managements to run the company for cash, with an aggressive share buy-back programme that will help management’s stock options to vest, a growing dividend to keep equity-income fund managers happy, and a compensation committee that makes sure the right people are paid. The kerfuffle over executive pay and rising levels of inequality is not happening in a vacuum; it could be symptomatic of ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour by corporates.

If global business leaders feel there is a growing gulf between the business agenda and the political agenda, it is because corporates are in rude financial health while governments are under the cosh. With politicians at the limit of what they can impose on their electorate, do not be surprised if they turn to those that have the cash. Trailing earnings (in US dollars) of the global quoted corporates are now back to pre-crash levels, while capital expenditure, employment and tax receipts are not, leaving corporates on the defensive. As US presidential hopeful Mitt Romney put it: “Don’t attack the private sector. Don’t attack risk-takers. Don’t attack profit. Profit, by the way, is what allows businesses to hire people and grow.” Many are now questioning whether that is still the case.

In the Reagan-Thatcher era, politicians cut taxes so that companies would come to their country, invest, create jobs … so that those politicians could, in turn, be re-elected. It does not work like that anymore; globalisation has seen to that. The reality is that public services used by the ‘99 per cent’ are taking the strain, while attractive corporate tax regimes are protected. Just as the trade-union barons of the 70s failed to see the writing on the wall, so the global captains of industry may suffer a similar fate unless they put their cash to work in the countries in which they are domiciled.

Source: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bf2b5e92-50be-11e1-8cdb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1mYi1Q0j0

Thursday, November 17, 2011

Japan’s economy: Whose lost decade?

THE Japanese say they suffer from an economic disease called “structural pessimism”. Overseas too, there is a tendency to see Japan as a harbinger of all that is doomed in the economies of the euro zone and America—even though figures released on November 14th show its economy grew by an annualised 6% in the third quarter, rebounding quickly from the March tsunami and nuclear disaster.

Look dispassionately at Japan’s economic performance over the past ten years, though, and “the second lost decade”, if not the first, is a misnomer. Much of what tarnishes Japan’s image is the result of demography—more than half its population is over 45—as well as its poor policy in dealing with it. Even so, most Japanese have grown richer over the decade.

In aggregate, Japan’s economy grew at half the pace of America’s between 2001 and 2010. Yet if judged by growth in GDP per person over the same period, then Japan has outperformed America and the euro zone (see chart 1). In part this is because its population has shrunk whereas America’s population has increased.

Though growth in labour productivity fell slightly short of America’s from 2000 to 2008, total factor productivity, a measure of how a country uses capital and labour, grew faster, according to the Tokyo-based Asian Productivity Organisation. Japan’s unemployment rate is higher than in 2000, yet it remains about half the level of America and Europe (see chart 2).

Besides supposed stagnation, the two other curses of the Japanese economy are debt and deflation. Yet these also partly reflect demography and can be overstated. People often think of Japan as an indebted country. In fact, it is the world’s biggest creditor nation, boasting ¥253 trillion ($3.3 trillion) in net foreign assets.

To be sure, its government is a large debtor; its net debt as a share of GDP is one of the highest in the OECD. However, the public debt has been accrued not primarily through wasteful spending or “bridges to nowhere”, but because of ageing, says the IMF. Social-security expenditure doubled as a share of GDP between 1990 and 2010 to pay rising pensions and health-care costs. Over the same period tax revenues have shrunk.

Falling tax revenues are a problem. The flip side, though, is that Japan has the lowest tax take of any country in the OECD, at just 17% of GDP. That gives it plenty of room to manoeuvre. Takatoshi Ito, an economist at the University of Tokyo, says increasing the consumption tax by 20 percentage points from its current 5%—putting it at the level of a high-tax European country—would raise ¥50 trillion and immediately wipe out Japan’s fiscal deficit.

That sounds draconian. But here again, demography plays a role. Officials say the elderly resist higher taxes or benefit cuts, and the young, who are in a minority, do not have the political power to push for what is in their long-term interest. David Weinstein, professor of Japanese economy at Columbia University in New York, says the elderly would rather give money to their children than pay it in taxes. Ultimately that may mean that benefits may shrink in the future. “If you want benefits to grow in line with income, as they are now, you need a massive increase in taxes of about 10% of GDP,” he says.

Demography helps explain Japan’s stubborn deflation, too, he says. After all, falling prices give savers—most of whom are elderly—positive real yields even when nominal interest rates are close to zero. Up until now, holding government bonds has been a good bet. Domestic savers remain willing to roll them over, which enables the government to fund its deficits. Yet this comes at a cost to the rest of the economy.

In short, Japan’s economy works better for those middle-aged and older than it does for the young. But it is not yet in crisis, and economists say there is plenty it could do to raise its potential growth rate, as well as to lower its debt burden.

Last weekend Yoshihiko Noda, the prime minister, took a brave shot at promoting reform when he said Japan planned to start consultations towards joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This is an American-backed free-trade zone that could lead to a lowering of tariffs on a huge swath of goods and services. Predictably it is elderly farmers, doctors and small businessmen who are most against it.

Reforms to other areas, such as the tax and benefit system, might be easier if the government could tell the Japanese a different story: not that their economy is mired in stagnation, but that its performance reflects the ups and downs of an ageing society, and that the old as well as the young need to make sacrifices.

The trouble is that the downbeat narrative is deeply ingrained. The current crop of leading Japanese politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen are themselves well past middle age. Many think they have sacrificed enough since the glory days of the 1980s, when Japan’s economy seemed unstoppable. Mr Weinstein says they suffer from “diminished-giant syndrome”, nervously watching the economic rise of China. If they compared themselves instead with America and Europe, they might feel heartened enough to make some of the tough choices needed.

Source: http://www.economist.com/node/21538745