Showing posts with label industry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label industry. Show all posts

Thursday, June 11, 2015

Financing capital goods: Keeping the grease

THE headlines focused on the fact that GE, a big industrial conglomerate, is beginning to sell off its $500 billion finance arm in small chunks. This week it put a $40 billion portfolio of corporate loans up for sale. But not all of GE Capital will end up on the block: GE is keeping the $90 billion division that finances purchases of medical equipment, power-generation gear and aeroplanes, or leases them to users. In part, that is because those fields are critical to GE: it makes all or part of the products being financed or leased. But it is also because the financing of old-fashioned capital goods is a booming business.

 
 
The gear GE sells is expensive; would-be buyers often lack the capital to buy it outright. For GE, therefore, the financial engineering that underpins the use of its wares is as important as the mechanical engineering that created them. Many hospitals, for instance, do not buy expensive scanners from GE, but lease them instead. When it develops improved versions, it helps the hospitals swap the new generation for the old, by passing the outmoded gear to another, thriftier institution, and so on down a long chain. By the same token, the sale of a plane that appears to be from Boeing to an airline may in fact be a sale to GE and a lease to the airline. In 85% of these cases, the plane will have engines made by GE or a joint venture.
Manufacturers have financed purchases of their own products for a long time, with mixed results. General Motors started its own finance operation, General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), in 1919, which helped it to expand its customer base and thus boosted its profits for decades. Eventually, and disastrously, GMAC expanded into mortgages. Just before the crisis, GM sold half of GMAC to raise money. Its subsequent collapse and nationalisation contributed to GM’s own bankruptcy in 2009.
Yet in 2010, shortly after GM had emerged from bankruptcy and while it was still under government control, it spent $3.5 billion in cash—a vast amount given its straitened circumstances—to purchase AmeriCredit, a Texan subprime auto lender. The company has since been renamed GM Financial. Its assets have grown from $11 billion to $49 billion in five years, an astonishing rate for a financial institution in recent years. China, where car-buyers are beginning to rely more on credit instead of buying with cash, is one area where it is growing fast.
Toyota continues to own a bank in America to help customers finance car purchases. BMW does as well. Car loans, after all, proved much more resilient during the crash than other forms of credit. For companies that do not have such financing arms, often because they use all the capital they can raise cheaply in their core business, a relationship with a finance firm is vital. This is all the more true, says Vincent Caintic of Macquarie, a bank, as ever stricter regulation makes it increasingly expensive for banks to offer car loans and the like.
Element Financial, a Canadian firm, has carved out a lucrative niche financing specific items, such as the railcars produced by Trinity Industries, an American conglomerate, and the small diggers made by Bobcat, part of a South Korean one. It went public in 2011 and its shares are up fourfold since (see chart). Over the same period, the S&P index of North American firms in financial services has not even doubled.

Tuesday, January 31, 2012

Sany Heavy: China digs in

China flexes its muscles yet again, this time towards the global market for construction machinery. Sany Heavy, the country's biggest maker of cool-sounding machines such as concrete pumps, excavators and cranes, is to buy 90 per cent of German concrete pump-maker Putzmeister for EUR360m. Putzmeister is small fry, with only a 10th of the revenues of Sany. But the deal is significant because it is Sany's first overseas acquisition and will quadruple its foreign sales overnight.

Just 4 per cent of Sany's revenues came from outside China in the first half of last year. By contrast, over four-fifths of Putzmeister's sales come from countries outside of China, Morgan Stanley estimates. Sany gets access to Putzmeister's global distribution and after-sales service channels and there are potential synergies to supply its parts to Putzmeister's assembly plants. With a listing in Shanghai and just a third of its shares freely floating, it is tricky for investors to cash in on Sany's global ambitions yet (it is mulling a Hong Kong listing). Instead, they should worry more about potential damage to market leaders Caterpillar and Komatsu.

A slowdown in construction growth in China has only sharpened Sany's need for overseas growth. It has already built plants in the US, Brazil, India and Germany. And Chinese heavy equipment makers such as Zoomlion, XCMG and LiuGong have been boosting sales in Brazil, in particular. Caterpillar's revenues may be seven times that of Sany's at $60bn last year, but three quarters of them come from outside Asia. With cheaper manufacturing costs at home, Sany benefits from operating margins double those of Caterpillar's. It can afford to be aggressive in growing its share abroad. The construction machinery land-grab is on.

Source: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3/76ea7780-4b50-11e1-88a3-00144feabdc0.html

Monday, November 7, 2011

Another oil shock?

It’s been a while since the world has been truly preoccupied with the threat of sustained high oil prices. The global economic recovery has been muted, and a double-dip recession remains possible.

But that dour prospect shouldn’t make executives sanguine about the risk of another oil shock. Emerging markets are still in the midst of a historic transition toward greater energy consumption. When global economic performance becomes more robust, oil demand is likely to grow faster than supply capacity can. As that happens, at some point before too long supply and demand could collide—gently or ferociously.

The case for the benign scenario rests on a steady evolution away from oil consumption in areas such as transportation, chemical production, power, and home heating. Moves by many major economies to impose tougher automotive fuel efficiency standards are a step in this direction. However, fully achieving the needed transition will take more stringent regulation, such as the abolition of fuel subsidies in oil-producing countries, Asia, and elsewhere, as well as widespread consumer behavior changes. And historically, governments, companies, and consumers have been disinclined to tackle tough policy choices or make big changes until their backs are against the wall.

This inertia suggests another scenario—one that’s sufficiently plausible and underappreciated that we think it’s worth exploring: the prospect that within this decade, the world could experience a period of significant volatility, with oil prices leaping upward and oscillating between $125 and $175 a barrel (or higher) for some time. The resulting economic pain would be significant. Economic modeling by our colleagues suggests that by 2020, global GDP would be about $1.5 trillion smaller than expected, if oil prices spiked and stayed high for several years.

But like any difficult transition, this one also would create major opportunities—for consumers of energy to differentiate their cost structures from competitors that aren’t prepared and for a host of energy innovators to create substitutes for oil and tap into new sources of supply. Furthermore, if we endured a period of high and volatile prices that lasted for two or three years, by 2020 or so oil could face real competition from other energy sources.

To paint a clearer picture for senior executives of what such a world would mean for them—and how to prepare now—we asked several colleagues to join us in a thought experiment about the impact of a prolonged oil price spike. Russell Hensley and Andreas Zielke, from McKinsey’s automotive practice, explain how intensified regulation already is leading a transition toward greater fuel economy, as well as the potential for higher oil prices to reinforce that momentum (see sidebar “The automotive sector’s road to greater fuel efficiency”). Jonathan Ablett, Lowell Bryan, and Sven Smit, from McKinsey’s strategy practice, assess the global economic impact of an oil price spike and the strategic implications of a slower-growth environment (see sidebar “Anticipating economic headwinds”). Finally, Knut Alicke and Tobias Meyer, from McKinsey’s operations practice, describe energy-efficient supply chain strategies that some companies are already undertaking (see sidebar “Building a supply chain that can withstand high oil prices”).


A delicate balance

The world is very far from running out of oil. By most estimates, at least a trillion barrels oconventional oil still reside beneath the earth’s surface, not to mention several trillion more barrels of oil or gas that could be extracted through unconventional sources, such as oil sands.

More relevant for prices, though, is how much spare oil production capacity exists in the world. Three million or four million barrels a day typically represents a comfortable buffer when the global economy is healthy. If that buffer shrinks, and markets expect strong demand growth to continue, prices can rise—sometimes dramatically. That’s what happened prior to the 2008–09 financial crisis as surging emerging-market demand strained production capacity and prices approached $150 a barrel. This fly-up was short lived because the ensuing deep recession wiped out between three million and four million barrels a day of demand, sending oil prices sharply down.

During the sluggish recovery that followed, the global supply cushion shrank again, punctuated in the first half of 2011 by Libya’s civil war, which disrupted supplies from that country and knocked off a million barrels a day of global capacity. That tightness set the stage for price fly-ups to $120 a barrel in the first half of this year and underscores the strength of the pre-2008 fundamentals.

Going forward, barring prolonged economic stagnation, demand growth for liquids1 is likely to chug ahead at around 1.5 percent a year. The pace would be even faster without the steady improvements in energy efficiency that we and other energy analysts foresee, particularly for cars and trucks as a result of technology improvements and stiffening regulatory standards that are already on the books.

Could supply growth accelerate to keep pace? Many industry analysts and our own supply model suggest that it won’t be easy. Despite high oil prices for much of the past decade and surging investment outlays by many major private and national oil companies alike, capacity has risen by only slightly more than 1 percent a year during that time. The logistics, supply systems, and political alignment needed to extract new oil supplies make that a complex, expensive, and time-consuming business. And coaxing more output out of existing oil fields, which typically have high production-decline rates, also is costly and challenging.

Our current projections suggest that in a “business as usual” scenario,2 the world could reach a realistic supply capacity of around 100 million barrels a day by 2020, up from 91 million or 92 million today. That, however, would barely suffice to meet the roughly 100 million barrels of liquids the world would consume each day in such a scenario, up from 88 million or 89 million today.

When supply and demand collide

Simple math suggests that at some point, something has to give. And when it does, the world will have to start taking steps away from today’s oil dependence. The question is how rapid and volatile that transition will be.

The case for a gentle collision

This critical shift could happen in an orderly fashion, without price spikes, if governments, companies, and consumers worked together to accelerate the adoption of measures that reduce demand. Indeed, a common denominator of current forecasts by industry analysts (including ourselves) is a gradual transition in most regions toward lower oil intensity in transportation, power, and residential heating. But according to our analysis, it would take more than current trends in oil conservation (spurred by existing legislation) for supply to meet demand if robust economic growth returned.

A few examples illustrate the scale and scope of the task facing the world if we are to realize a gentle transition. Governments would need to raise auto fuel efficiency standards further, and consumers would need to place greater emphasis on fuel economy when they bought new cars. Policy makers in several developing countries would need to abolish fuel subsidies so that consumers felt the real price of oil. Around the world, we’d need to see deeper reductions in the use of oil for heating, power generation, and chemical manufacturing. Some transport by ships and heavy trucks would need to start shifting toward more reliance on natural gas as a fuel.

Changes like these could push oil supply and demand roughly into balance. However, they would require new policies and significant changes in how consumers and businesses behave. What’s more, they would need to start now because it will take years before the changes required to constrain oil consumption begin to take effect. If we do not succeed in implementing these changes in a farsighted way, the system faces a risk of falling out of balance.

Why the adjustment could be violent

That brings us to a second scenario: it’s possible to imagine global supply and demand for oil colliding faster, and more ferociously, resulting in a price spike as the global capacity buffer melted away. As we’ve said, anticipated economic growth alone could cause demand to expand faster than supply. Another possible trigger: supply disruption, which does happen from time to time. The possibilities include an exceptionally severe hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico, violence in the Niger Delta, instability in Venezuela, and further tension in the Middle East.

If this new price spike took place, it could have a more significant impact on global consumption patterns than most executives expect (for audio commentary by Occo Roelofsen, see the interactive, “How might a sustained oil price spike affect demand?”). For starters, it would hit global growth, which in turn would immediately knock down oil demand. In addition, there would be some rapid behavioral effects, such as a reduction in car, air, and sea travel. If the spike lasted longer, it could cause several more structural shifts, such as prompting individuals to use different modes of transport or even to look for work closer to home, encouraging companies to reverse offshoring trends and bring supply chains closer to home, accelerating the substitution of videoconferences for air travel, and pushing the freight transport industry to adopt less oil-intensive modes.

How might a sustained oil price spike affect demand?
Occo Roelofsen discusses demand during a sustained oil price spike, from both a general and sector-specific perspective.

Because such shifts would take time, a high-price environment could last for years, not months, accelerating several other ongoing trends that, when combined, could lead to even further demand reductions. In other words, a sustained price spike could scare consumers, companies, and governments into more drastic responses—accelerating the transition to a less oil-dependent economy. A price spike of one to three years could be long enough to make governments raise standards for fuel efficiency at an accelerated pace and prompt automakers, reacting to regulatory changes, to modify their product-development road maps. Ultimately, all this would lead to more rapid efficiency gains and potentially to faster electric-vehicle penetration.

A prolonged price spike also could prompt investments in infrastructure needed to support the use of electric vehicles or other alternatives (such as natural gas and hydrogen) to traditional fuel sources. Such investments could have an impact on oil demand for trucking, light vehicles, and shipping. What’s more, very high oil prices would intensify energy efficiency efforts up and down the supply chain and reduce the amount of plastics used in packaging, thus shrinking demand for oil in chemicals. Additional government action, in the form of either more stringent regulation on the use of plastics or subsidized financing that reduced the up-front cost to consumers of switching away from fuel oil in residential heating, could play an important role in this transition.

All along the way, of course, these reactions, plus slower global growth, would do their part to exert some downward pressure on oil prices. Expanded supply would also play a role. From now to 2020, OPEC3 could increase its capacity by, say, two million barrels a day above currently assumed increases, and new investments in mature assets could slow decline rates, leading to an additional one million to two million barrels of daily production. Furthermore, additional investments in unconventional oil sources, such as oil sands, could increase supply by, say, one million to two million barrels a day. Biofuels, too, would have room to grow. But given the time it would take to pursue some of the available opportunities—and the danger that they could quickly become uneconomic once oil prices fell—the supply response is likely to be slower and more muted than that of demand.

In the end, once all the efficiency gains and supply expansions described above kicked in, the world could again wind up in balance and with significant excess capacity, so that eventually—perhaps by 2020, perhaps later—prices fell below the $80 to $100 range. Until then, however, given how slowly many of the demand changes would unfold, it’s only prudent to imagine the possibility that the world could experience a prolonged period of both significant volatility and generally much higher prices.

Preparing for the unexpected

If the shock scenario outlined above unfolded, sustained high oil prices would challenge the top and bottom lines of many companies. However, high prices also could create opportunities for companies to differentiate themselves from competitors whose cost structures and operating approaches were ill suited to the new environment. And for companies on the front lines of the resource productivity revolution, a prolonged oil price increase would be beneficial. Providers of a range of new technologies—from car batteries for electric vehicles, to horizontal drilling and other tools for unconventional oil extraction, to biofuel production techniques, to electricity cogeneration equipment for manufacturers—would see their businesses grow, faster, than they would in a world of lower oil prices.

In many cases, these companies would be supplying or partnering with more established firms: oil companies in need of unconventional extraction technologies, auto manufacturers trying to create the winning vehicle of the future, and chemical companies hoping to take advantage of new feedstock sources, for example. From a strategic perspective, the interesting question is who would grab the most profitable positions in the new energy ecosystem.

No less fascinating are the managerial implications of the second-order and feedback effects that would occur as this ferocious collision played itself out. For example, our analysis suggests that even if prices subsequently fell, companies that pursued strategies for reducing their dependence on oil would be unlikely to regret it. One reason is that many strategies are already “in the money” at today’s prices. If prices got high enough, they would concentrate the attention of consumers, businesses, and governments sufficiently to promote many positive-return investments that haven’t been implemented so far, because of behavioral inertia. This development would accelerate the changes in our capital stock, while leaving them economically viable even if prices fell again.

Furthermore, many technologies could become significantly cheaper as demand for them increased and their providers went down learning curves. Examples include batteries for vehicles, highly efficient internal-combustion engines, and certain biofuel technologies, such as those that are cellulosic or perhaps even based on algae. In a high-price environment, more capital would flow into these technologies, enabling them to scale up. The time needed for them to become economically attractive would fall by five or even ten years compared with the time frame if oil prices stayed at lower levels, potentially making these technologies economically viable even if oil prices subsequently fell.

Indeed, a striking and often-underestimated feature of energy price shocks is the nonlinearity of their impact. Take electric vehicles. The market for car batteries would likely be about five or ten times larger if oil prices stayed for a considerable period at $150 a barrel than it would be at $100 a barrel. Few corporate-planning processes, however, place sufficient emphasis on extremes like this—even though these are precisely the scenarios that produce many of the most interesting opportunities and powerful threats for a business. Building corporate processes and skills that enable thoughtful reflection on a wider, more volatile range of outcomes could be a significant competitive differentiator in the years to come.

In the long run, these structural changes could well be a positive development for the world—resulting in more predictable and sustainable energy supplies and prices. But navigating the transition would be challenging and would reward the well prepared. The time is now for companies to start planning for the possibility of another price shock and a powerful market response.

Source: https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Another_oil_shock_2873

Thursday, September 29, 2011

The fashion industry: The glossy posse

THE shows are almost over. Next week the glossy posse, bleached weary from their month’s sprint to the world’s four fashion capitals—New York, London, Milan and finally Paris—will forsake the bright plumage of the catwalks for the mundane headaches of balance-sheets and supply chains.

Everyone now knows what will be in discerning wardrobes next spring: blocks of colour, bold prints and dainty “lingerie for feet” (formerly known as nice shoes). But the fashion industry’s financial future is much murkier. A confusion of trends preoccupies the major brands: the rapid shift east of their customer base, a generational switch, as high earners get younger, and the challenge of making luxurious clothing accessible to new markets, including digital ones, while retaining the sense of exclusivity that makes people want to pay for them in the first place.

First the good news. Luxury brands are coping well despite global economic gloom. This is because the number of “extreme net-worth individuals” (industry jargon for people with so much money that an $8,000 handbag seems a bargain) keeps growing, especially in Asia. Claudia D’Arpizio of Bain & Co, a consultancy, predicts sales will grow by 8% this year, to €185 billion ($252 billion).

Some firms are generating such a huge heap of cash that they need platform boots to see the top of it. LVMH, a French group which owns 60 brands, including Louis Vuitton and Christian Dior, various lucrative champagnes and Bulgari, an upmarket jeweller, boasts that its sales have risen by 13% in the first half of this year, to €10.3 billion ($14.4 billion). Analysts reckon that LVMH’s profit margins for its luxury brands are a healthy 40% or so—twice as high as some of its rivals.

The various fashion weeks are a snapshot of the industry’s strengths and weaknesses. Milan and Paris are the main events: they bring together the big names from across the globe. New York is run more for the benefit of the buyers, especially American department stores. London prides itself on its “edgy” feel, showcasing designers fresh out of fashion colleges, alongside some big names such as Tom Ford.

One of the main conundrums for the fashion industry concerns what Angela Ahrendts, the boss of Burberry, calls “democratic luxury”. Firms want to sell more kit, to make more money. But the more they sell, the harder it is to convince customers that they are buying something “exclusive”: ie, something that hardly anyone else has.

Burberry, a British firm that makes pricey raincoats, got a fright a few years ago when its distinctive brown checks became associated with “chavs”—a white working-class group at whom snobs poke cruel fun. (For example: What do you call a chav in a suit? The defendant.) It protected its brand by making those checks quieter and costlier, and boosted its sales by expanding into China, where no one tells chav jokes. Its global sales were up by 27% for the year to March 31st 2011, to £1.5 billion ($2.3 billion).

All of the major companies are vying to expand into emerging markets. China is Burberry’s prime target, though South Korea is also growing fast and Brazil looks promising. Several houses are opening stores in Saudi Arabia. Louis Vuitton sells bags in mineral-rich Mongolia. “There’s a lot of money there,” explains Antonio Belloni, LVMH’s group managing director.

But will snooty shoppers in the West want to own what thousands of Chinese people are wearing? “You have to constantly stretch the brand upwards and make it more luxurious at the top end,” Mr Belloni says. He points out that Dior and Vuitton are making more bespoke goods for their wealthiest clients, who want a say in what the final product looks like. Even ready-to-wear shoes in Dior’s flagship stores can retail for well over €1,000.

All this fabulousness depends on creative spirits, who can be erratic. Dior urgently needs to replace John Galliano, its creative designer, who was dismissed after an anti-Semitic outburst in a Paris bar earlier this year. The value of top creative talent is high. Negotiations between Dior and Marc Jacobs, an American designer currently at Louis Vuitton, are said to have become “complex”, with Mr Jacobs rumoured to want between $8m and $10m a year. The new favourite to replace Mr Galliano, a young American called Alexander Wang, is less well-known but surely cheaper.

Outside the top trio of LVMH, the Gucci Group and Burberry, many independent designers have had a tougher time growing. Paule Ka, a French clothes brand with a turnover of €40m and a staunch following among stylish French women, recently allowed Change Capital Partners, a London-based private-equity company, to take over 70% of the business.

It’s founder, Serge Cajfinger, admits that recent times have been precarious. “When the crisis hit in 2008, we were a bit stuck,” he recalls. Many stockists lost their credit insurance, forcing him to cancel orders. To maintain sales, he shaved prices. He also wooed investors with the promise of a push into Asia and America. (America is still regarded as the hardest market for European brands to conquer.)

Companies which trade in Zeitgeist and aspiration, as top fashion brands do, have to hold on to customers whom Mr Belloni tactfully describes as “active semi-retired” (ie, ageing baby-boomers), while simultaneously seducing the young. It is a tricky balance to strike.

Ms Ahrendts cautions that the “millennial customer” is a different creature from the 20th-century luxury-lover. “For a start, the high-net-worth customers are often about 15 years younger than they were,” she notes. She has rapidly made Burberry’s marketing more digital. Its shows are live-streamed on Facebook, and sometimes use 3D and holograms.

Recently, Ms Ahrendts booked Keane, a rock band, to fly to Beijing and turn a Burberry store launch into a gig. One of the band’s most popular songs is called “Everybody’s Changing.” Which is true, if the queues outside Asian dressing rooms are anything to go by.

Source: http://www.economist.com/node/21530989