The economics of bluffing

WILL Greece default on its debts and leave the euro? Will Britain decide to leave the European Union? Politicians in the two countries have threatened, implicitly or explicitly, to take these drastic steps if their European colleagues do not offer them inducements to stay.

Many people regard these threats as a bluff. They think that Greece does not really want to leave the euro, and that David Cameron, Britain’s prime minister, does not want his country to exit the EU. When push comes to shove, Greece will do a deal (see article) and Mr Cameron will persuade British voters to stay in the EU in his planned referendum. But there are risks that neither outcome will turn out as planned. In both cases, political leaders are making a risky bet.

The financial analogy is with writing (selling) an option. In the markets, an option is the right to buy (a call) or sell (a put) an asset at a given price; say shares of Apple at $130. In return for granting the buyer of the option this right, the writer receives a payment called a premium, rather like an insurance company receives a premium for protecting a homeowner against fire or theft. But if Apple shares do rise above $130, the buyer of a call option is likely to exercise it, to the writer’s cost; if they fall below it, the holder of a put option is likely to cash in.

Political leaders in Greece and Britain have in effect written an option on exit. The premium they receive is political popularity—for opposing the demands of international creditors, in the case of Greece, or for asserting Britain’s sovereignty, in Mr Cameron’s.

But in the financial markets, option-writing is a very risky strategy, unless the position is properly hedged. A lot of small profits can be earned from the option premia, only for all the gains to be wiped out when an option is exercised at an unfavourable time. Of course, the buyer of an option is most likely to exercise it when the cost to the writer is greatest.

For the political leaders of Greece and Britain, the difficulty is that they do not get to decide whether the option gets exercised. The other nations within the euro zone and the EU may decide to call Greece or Britain’s bluff. In Britain, the electorate also has the right to exercise the option of exit—which they might use in the referendum to protest against government policies in general rather than voting on the merits of EU membership in particular.

This leads to some complex calculations. Unlike Apple’s shares, the price of Grexit or Brexit at any moment is highly uncertain; political leaders cannot be sure what the costs and benefits will be. So this is rather like an option on one of the complex securities that proliferated before 2007—a collateralised debt obligation based on subprime mortgages, for example. The uncertainty makes it less likely that Europe will exercise the option and risk the departure of Britain or Greece.

If that gives the bluffing states an advantage, they also face a difficult trade-off. The more intransigent their demands, the more they may please their electorates (ie, the greater the “option premium”). However, such intransigence may make it more likely that the option will be exercised. European leaders may feel that making too many concessions to Greece or Britain will simply encourage other countries to make similar demands, and thus destroy the European project. In Britain, there may be a huge gap between the expectations fostered during the negotiating process and the reforms that emerge. This may create the impression that the government has failed, making the public more inclined to vote for exit.

This discrepancy between the high-flying nature of political promises and the mundane reality of policy outcomes lies at the heart of recent voter discontent. Promises may result in short-term electoral success but at the cost of increasing disillusionment in the long term. The most significant short-term influences on growth—the oil price, Federal Reserve policy, China’s success in managing its economic growth—are outside the control of European politicians. National leaders are, in effect, bluffing when they say their own policies can make much difference.

Europe’s failure to generate much in the way of economic or wage growth over the past decade means that voters are not just turning against the parties in power—they have lost faith with the mainstream opposition as well. The effect can be seen everywhere, from the rise of Marine Le Pen in France to the emergence of brand new parties like the Five Star Movement in Italy and Podemos in Spain. Years of short-term gains for the mainstream parties have resulted in a long-term loss.

Source: http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21652362-when-political-leaders-turn-option-writers-economics-bluffing

Money for old folk: The relationship between ageing and inflation is not as simple as economists assume

WHEN it comes to the economic impact of demography, Japan is the wizened canary in the world’s coal mine. It has become older faster than any other big country: its median age went from 34 in 1980 to 46 today, and will continue rising for decades. But it will soon have plenty of greying company, from wealthy countries such as Finland and South Korea to developing giants, including China and Russia. Economists generally agree that the ageing of populations leads to slower growth, because a country’s potential output tends to fall as its labour force shrinks. They also expect heavier fiscal burdens, with governments providing for more pensioners from a smaller tax base.

Until recently, though, there had been little research into how demography affects inflation. The Japanese example of persistent deflation over the past two decades was seen as evidence enough that prices fall when countries age and their growth slows. Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, has sought to disprove that, espousing massive monetary easing to get prices rising. With inflation slumping far below the Bank of Japan’s 2% target in recent months, it is tempting to conclude that ageing is too powerful a force to overturn. But a new body of research* gives advocates of Abenomics a bit of support, at least on the demographic front. It shows that deflation is not the preordained outcome of ageing.

The problem lies not in identifying the possible links between ageing and prices, but in working out which way they cut. Consider the factors of production. When growth slows businesses rein in investment, so the cost of capital may decline. Yet wages ought to rise when the supply of workers falls. In the realm of fiscal policy, some indebted governments may make painful cuts as pensioners multiply, leading to slow growth and sluggish inflation. But others may opt to monetise their debt, pushing inflation up. (Some suspect this is the ultimate aim of Abenomics.)

How to disentangle these possibilities? In a recent working paper, Mitsuru Katagiri of the Bank of Japan and Hideki Konishi and Kozo Ueda of Waseda University distinguish between the ageing caused by a falling birth rate and that brought on by increased longevity. The main effect of fewer births would be a shrinking tax base; that might prompt the government to embrace inflation to erode its debts and thus stay solvent. But longer lives would cause the ranks of pensioners to swell; their increased political influence, in turn, would augur for tighter monetary policy to prevent inflation eating into savings.

In the case of Japan the authors estimate that the ageing process has led to deflation of about 0.6 percentage points a year over the past 40 years—a huge cumulative impact. That, they believe, is because the big surprise in Japanese demography has been ever-increasing longevity. Fertility rates are close to the levels projected in 2002, but the government has steadily revised up its estimates of lifespans. It is unexpected longevity, not simply ageing, that has been deflationary in Japan.

What about the impact of ageing on financial assets? Economic theory—“the life-cycle hypothesis”—holds that people smooth their consumption over their lifetimes, going into debt when young, buying assets when their earnings peak and selling them to pay for retirement. That, in theory, should lead to lower asset values as countries enter their dotage, but the empirical record is mixed: house prices often fall, but stocks sometimes rise.

An important variable is whether assets sold by pensioners are domestic or foreign. Derek Anderson, Dennis Botman and Ben Hunt of the International Monetary Fund looked at the decrease in Japan’s net savings rate from some 15% of disposable income in the early 1990s to about zero in 2011. What stands out is that many of the liquidated savings had been invested in foreign assets. When Japanese pensioners sold stocks and bonds abroad and repatriated the funds, they fuelled an appreciation in the yen—a consistent problem until 2012. This in turn contributed to deflationary pressure, by lowering the cost of imports. But the researchers also reckon that strong monetary easing combined with a credible commitment to an inflation target would have been sufficient to negate the effect of ageing. In other words, they believe Japan needed Abenomics long before it got it.

Greyflation

A recent paper by Mikael Juselius and Elod Takats for the Bank for International Settlements offers a very different take on how ageing affects inflation, suggesting that Japan may not be typical after all. They look at 22 advanced economies from 1955 to 2010. Japan is, after all, not the only country to have experienced deflation. Sure enough, they find a steady correlation between deflation and demography, but just the opposite of what is commonly assumed. A larger share of dependents—both young and old—is associated with higher inflation, whereas having more people of working age is linked to lower inflation. Their explanation, albeit tentative, is straightforward. Countries with more people consuming goods and services than producing them are liable to have excess demand and thus inflationary tendencies. Those with more producers than consumers will, by contrast, have excess supply and a deflationary bias.

That raises the question of why prices in Japan have fallen for so many years, given its rapidly ageing population. There are several potential culprits: the damaged balance-sheets left by the popping of the asset bubble of the 1980s, say, or the hesitant monetary policy before Mr Abe. But if the paper’s thesis holds true, an ageing population could yet lead to rising prices in the coming years. As the Bank of Japan seeks to vanquish deflation, demography may turn out to be friend, not foe.

Source: http://www.economist.com/ageing15

QE and ultra-low interest rates: Distributional effects and risks

There is widespread consensus that the conventional and unconventional monetary policies that world’s major central banks implemented in response to the global financial crisis prevented a deeper recession and higher unemployment than there otherwise would have been. These measures, along with a lack of demand for credit as a result of the recession, contributed to a decline in real and nominal interest rates to ultra-low levels that have been sustained over the past five years.

 

MGI’s Richard Dobbs and Susan Lund discuss the economic impact of QE and ultra-low interest rates and the problems that may arise, depending on future conditions.

A new report from the McKinsey Global Institute examines the distributional effects of these ultra-low rates. It finds that there have been significant effects on different sectors in the economy in terms of income interest and expense. From 2007 to 2012, governments in the eurozone, the United Kingdom, and the United States collectively benefited by $1.6 trillion both through reduced debt-service costs and increased profits remitted from central banks (exhibit). Nonfinancial corporations—large borrowers such as governments—benefited by $710 billion as the interest rates on debt fell. Although ultra-low interest rates boosted corporate profits in the United Kingdom and the United States by 5 percent in 2012, this has not translated into higher investment, possibly as a result of uncertainty about the strength of the economic recovery, as well as tighter lending standards. Meanwhile, households in these countries together lost $630 billion in net interest income, although the impact varies across groups. Younger households that are net borrowers have benefited, while older households with significant interest-bearing assets have lost income.

 

Ultra-low interest rates have had distributional effects on interest income and expenses.

 

The impact that ultra-low interest rates have had on banks has been mixed. They have eroded the profitability of eurozone banks, resulting in a cumulative loss of net interest income of $230 billion between 2007 and 2012. But banks in the United States experienced an increase in effective net interest margins and a cumulative increase in net interest income of $150 billion. The experience of UK banks falls between these two extremes.

Life-insurance companies, particularly in several European countries, are being squeezed by ultra-low interest rates, so much so that if this environment were to continue many of these insurers would find their survival threatened.

Theoretically, ultra-low interest rates may have resulted in higher asset prices, and this effect may have offset lost interest income for households and other investors. But we find a mixed picture.
Rising bond prices are the flip side of declining yields, and the value of sovereign and corporate bonds in the eurozone, the United Kingdom, and the United States increased by $16 trillion between 2007 and 2012. Investors that mark the value of their assets to market have therefore seen a significant gain on their fixed income investments, at least on paper.

Ultra-low interest rates are likely to have bolstered housing prices by lowering the cost of mortgage credit. This effect is most clearly seen in the United Kingdom, where the majority of mortgages have variable interest rates that have automatically adjusted downward. The impact is less clear in the United States, where the recovery in housing prices has been dampened by an oversupply of housing, high levels of foreclosures, a predominance of fixed-rate mortgages, tightened credit standards, and the prevalence of homes with negative equity whose mortgages cannot be refinanced.

We found little evidence that ultra-low interest rates have boosted equity markets. We cannot discern a large-scale shift into equities as part of a search for yield by investors, and price-earnings ratios and price-book ratios in stock markets are no higher than long-term averages. Although stock prices do react to announcements by central banks, these are transitory effects that do not persist.

If one accepts that housing prices and bond prices are higher today than they otherwise would have been as a result of ultra-low interest rates, then the increase in household wealth and the possible additional consumption it has enabled would far outweigh the income lost to households. But we are skeptical about whether increases in wealth have translated into higher consumption in today’s environment, given that housing prices in the United States remain far below their peak. Moreover, it is more difficult for today’s households to borrow against any increase in wealth because of tighter credit standards.

Ultra-low interest rates do appear to have prompted additional capital flows to emerging markets, particularly into their bond markets. Purchases of emerging-market bonds by foreign investors totaled just $92 billion in 2007 but had jumped to $264 billion in 2012. Emerging markets that have a high share of foreign ownership of their bonds and large current account deficits will be most vulnerable to capital outflows if and when central banks begin tapering current policies.

There are likely to be risks ahead whether asset purchases are tapered and interest rates rise or, alternatively, if current monetary policies continue and interest rates remain low. In the first scenario, the benefits gained or losses incurred could be reversed. Government interest payments on debt, for instance, could rise up to 20 percent. Amid anecdotal evidence that some investors have increased their leverage to amplify returns in some markets, rising interest rates could lead to a collapse in leveraged trades and could pose a threat to some financial institutions. Capital flows to emerging markets could reverse. Investors in bond markets forced by accounting rules to mark to market could face large write-downs. Eurozone countries could be caught in a crosswind if rates increase in the United States before they do in Europe, leading to a shift in foreign capital from Europe to the United States. In the second scenario, life insurers and banks in Europe would experience continued erosion in their profitability. A continuation in ultra-low interest rates could also prompt higher leverage and the return of asset-price bubbles in some sectors, especially real estate.

Source: http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic_studies/qe_and_ultra_low_interest_rates_distributional_effects_and_risks

End of QE will test diversification faith

Diversification, the great free lunch of investing, is often taken for granted by investors. Bonds and equities have acted as effective portfolio diversifiers for much of the new millennium because of their different return and volatility patterns. Two of the three main assets in a typical portfolio, cash being the third, moved in opposite directions during financial crises such as 2001 and 2008.

Indeed, portfolio management has become accustomed to this trend and now treats it as an article of faith. But does this faith represent a dangerous cocktail of overconfidence and extrapolation?

The mantra that monetary policy is driving market returns is well rehearsed. Less obvious is the idea that policy is driving the relationship between bond and equity returns.

This year gave a flavour of things to come: a period of high turbulence in May and June as markets took on board the possibility the global liquidity flood was about to abate. Bonds fell sharply and equities stumbled as investors fretted about an end to the Federal Reserve’s emergency asset-buying. Price volatility rose in both mainstream asset classes. Using US equities and 10-year bonds as proxies, the correlation was negative from 2009 to the middle of this year and positive thereafter.

Shock absorbers

Next year could mark a turning point as policy makers exiting the triage phase of recovery from the Great Financial Crisis move away from a material reliance on monetary activism into the potentially more volatile territory of forward guidance.

What does this mean for fixed income? Suppose there is one dominant, price-insensitive buyer (the Fed). Now suppose this buyer has a progressively smaller wallet. All other things being equal, the volatility of prices rises as buyer and seller strive to match each other. Add in another group of (reasonably) price-insensitive buyers (China and the like) downsizing their spending due to slowing growth in foreign exchange reserves, and this risk expands.

Of course, there are shock absorbers. First, the developed world’s ageing populations and their agents (think insurers) have a structural bid for yield. Second, the Bank of Japan is expanding its monetary easing . Some of governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s largesse eventually will pass through Narita Airport as growing shortages of domestic bonds force local institutions to shake off some of their home bias. The conclusion? Do not expect a fixed income bloodbath in 2014 – but brace for more volatile returns.

How about equities? 2013 will probably be known as the Year of Equity. The problem: the numerator of the price to earnings ratio (price) has been driving returns in most markets this year, rather than the denominator (earnings). Higher pricing of the final claim on corporate cash flows – equity – has been aided by the tightest debt spreads on record, insatiable demand from yield-hungry investors, and the ability to refinance and extend fixed obligations at low cost. This works well for a while, but at some point earnings need to come through.

Theory has it the discount rate partially connects bonds (fixed coupons discounted by an interest rate) and equities (fluctuating cash flows discounted by this interest rate plus some variable risk premia). Here is the rub: arithmetically, the lower the real interest rate, the greater the volatility triggered by small changes. If the major driver of returns (policy) becomes more volatile, so do the assets that have benefited from that support.

QE tide turns

Clearly the unprecedented monetary stimulus tide will not last forever. When it dwindles, what will become an effective diversifier of portfolio risk? Bonds or equities? Not entirely; see the drawbacks described above. Cash? Perhaps, but if rates rise for longer-dated bonds and remain anchored by policy for short-dated issues, the diversification benefit of a near zero return is limited.

Challenging the assumptions of the past at a time of regime change is vital in financial markets. This means rethinking fixed income to seek out relative value between bonds, capitalising on rises in volatility and harvesting risk premia. In other words, taking an unconstrained approach. It means a focus on alternative strategies that do not start with the discount rate. Examples are infrastructure and real estate debt, opportunistic acquisition of long duration assets chased off bank balance sheets by regulation and market neutral long-short strategies.

Any reversal in the policy tide involves uncharted territory. A reversal in the 30-year downward trend of rates must, however, involve some different results. 2014 may very well become known as the year in which unwary investors ask: “Who stole my diversifier?”

Source: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0687562c-5e7f-11e3-8621-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2nwa2gnpW

France in Fed taper line of fire

When France’s weak economy and public finances are panned by international critics, its politicians have an easy riposte: just look at our bond yields.

Paris can borrow at lower costs than London, and the spread between French over German 10-year bonds has remained remarkably stable over the past year. Standard & Poor’s early morning announcement two weeks ago of another downgrade – this time to double A – failed to cause markets to choke on their croissants. Investing in French assets cannot be so awful.

Could that change as the US Federal Reserve starts to wind back its exceptional stimulus measures? Among investors I have spoken to recently, a school of thought is developing that it might.

During the global “taper turmoil” earlier this year – the weeks after May 22, when Ben Bernanke, Fed chairman, first hinted at his plans to taper, or scale back Fed asset purchases – eurozone bond markets remained surprisingly tranquil, even as emerging markets sold off sharply.

But while global policy makers and economists still struggle to understand the interlinkages between Fed actions and global markets, it seems implausible that Europe can escape unscathed when tapering becomes real, perhaps as early as December. After all, “global QE” – quantitative easing by the Bank of Japan as well as the Fed – drove European bond prices higher and yields lower; taper turmoil showed the potential for disruption when it goes into reverse.

Stabilising factors

If there will be European fallout, where will the effects be worst? Intuitively, the weaker eurozone “periphery” economies seem most at risk of a market correction as global QE ebbs, especially if fresh taper turmoil increases investors’ risk aversion.

In fact, countries such as Spain, Italy and Ireland have benefited from four stabilising factors this year.

First has been their transition – thanks to the European Central Bank acting as a backstop – from existential crises to something nearer normal economic conditions. Growth is low and unemployment alarmingly high, but the danger of imminent ejection from the euro has gone.
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Second, at least Irish and Spanish bonds have benefited as turnround stories, with tangible evidence of structural reforms improving competitiveness and growth prospects.

Third has been the “re-domestication” of Spanish and Italian bond markets – fickle foreign investors have fled.

Fourth, eurozone periphery countries have moved decisively from current account deficits to surpluses; they no longer rely on capital from overseas.

All four supporting factors will remain in place even as the Fed tapers. None, however, apply to France. Instead other reasons explain the impressive performance of France’s bond market this year – and why it might now be vulnerable.

Higher bond yields

When the Fed was ramping up its asset purchases and US Treasury yields were falling, global investors looking for higher returns were attracted by France’s large and liquid bond markets. Until June this year, French 10-year yields were higher than US equivalents.

France was considered part of the eurozone’s safe, northern core, which made it attractive to investors for whom German Bund yields were simply too low. The Swiss central bank was an avid buyer of French bonds, as were Japanese banks.

"Whatever the risks posed by Fed tapering, it is hard right now to see what might trigger another big sell off"

The case against France is that if the Fed slows its asset purchases and US Treasury yields rise, those inflows could start to reverse and French bonds would sell off – perhaps sharply.

Eric Chaney, chief economist at Axa, points out the very different debt profile between France and Germany. As a share of GDP, French public sector debt will soon be 20 percentage points higher than Germany’s. Without action to alter France’s debt dynamics, the spread between French and German bonds could widen by 50 or 100 basis points, warns Mr Chaney.

French politicians probably need not worry just yet. Investors shorting French bonds have often lost their berets.

When French yields have hit instability in the past, it has been because of obvious systemic risks – the exposure of its banks to the eurozone “periphery” economies in 2011, for example. Whatever the risks posed by Fed tapering, it is hard right now to see what might trigger another big sell off. As the eurozone crisis has lost intensity, eurozone bonds have performed more like “rates” markets, with yields linked to growth and inflation prospects, rather than default risks. France’s economy is contracting, which will curb any uptick in yields.

Still, as Fed tapering draws near, markets may make life less comfortable for French politicians – and limit their bond yield bragging possibilities.

Source: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d1742d9e-5149-11e3-b499-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2lIoVJMpj

Weighing Down Heinz With Debt

Warren E. Buffett deployed his avuncular charm on Thursday when talking about Berkshire Hathaway’s proposed acquisition of H.J. Heinz. The food company’s chief executive, William R. Johnson, said the deal was a natural next step that wouldn’t lead to big upheavals any time soon.

But for all the reassurances, the deal will turn Heinz into a much riskier company. It will have to operate with a much larger amount of debt on its books, significantly reducing the margin of error for its new owners.
Berkshire will be one of those new owners, taking a 50 percent stake. The other half will belong to 3G Capital Management, a Brazilian-backed investment firm that has stakes in other food and beverage companies including Burger King.

Berkshire and 3G are taking Heinz private in a $23 billion cash deal, which means its shares will come off the stock market. The deal will mean Heinz will also be liable for the debt used to pay for the deal. After the deal, Heinz could have well over $10 billion of debt, compared with $5 billion now.

One of the effects of the deal is that Heinz’s credit rating will almost certainly be slashed into junk territory. Before the deal was announced, Moody’s Investors Service rated the company two notches above junk.
Defenders of debt-laden deals like this say that they can work with the right owners.

Mr. Buffett said on CNBC on Thursday that 3G would have operational responsibilities. He thinks highly of 3G, whose principal owner is a billionaire named Jorge Paulo Lemann. “I don’t think I’ve ever seen a better developed management group than the one Jorge Paulo Lemann has developed over the years in Brazil,” Mr. Buffett said. “He has been incredible.”

3G has a majority stake in Burger King, which it brought back onto the stock market last year after taking it private in 2010. It appears that 3G and Berkshire may want to use Heinz as a vehicle to make other acquisitions.

But that may turn into an uphill journey. Not only is there all the new debt to pay, Heinz is being bought at a high valuation, roughly 20 times its earnings. When companies are bought at a lofty multiple to earnings, it’s theoretically harder for the acquirers to achieve their investment return targets. To hit those targets, management may decide to cut costs, leading to job losses. Or, conversely, the company may spend a lot of money in new initiatives in an effort to increase revenue.

And there is an element to the deal that shows Mr. Buffett is well aware of its risks.
In addition to common equity, Berkshire is getting $8 billion of preferred shares. These will pay Berkshire a 9 percent return, according to a person familiar with the deal’s terms. That’s a hefty return from a company in a relatively stable industry. Berkshire got only slightly higher — 10 percent – on preferred shares in Goldman Sachs that it purchased at the height of the financial crisis.

More important, the preferred income gives Berkshire significant protection if the value of its common shares falls below expectations. “There aren’t many entities that could do this deal; Berkshire is making sure it’s getting paid for it,” said Meyer Shields, an analyst who covers Berkshire Hathaway for Stifel Nicolaus.
One mystery is why Mr. Buffett didn’t just buy common stock of Heinz on the open market. Berkshire often does that, and currently holds sizable stakes in companies as diverse as I.B.M. and Coca-Cola.

Perhaps he wanted to own more than a small minority stake, but purchasing the whole of Heinz may have been too big a deal, even for Berkshire Hathaway. Indeed, one day, 3G may decide to sell its stake to Berkshire, giving it full ownership. And in the meantime, Berkshire would have earned a solid return on its preferred shares and its common shares.

“‘Buy commodities, sell brands’ has long been a formula for business success,” Mr. Buffett wrote in a recent annual report. Heinz certainly fits that mold today. The big question is whether it still will once its balance sheet has been loaded up with debt.

Source: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/weighing-down-heinz-with-debt/

Why the Bailout in Spain Won’t Work

It was not enough. And it may never be enough.

The euro zone’s offer of $125 billion to bail out Spanish banks over the weekend was hailed by finance ministers and officials across Europe as a masterstroke. Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, suggested no further bailouts would be needed, saying, “Spain is on the right track.” On Sunday, some analysts and investors even applauded, with David R. Kotok, co-founder and chief investment officer of Cumberland Advisors, proclaiming: “Euro zone leaders rose to the occasion.” How wrong they were.
By now, it should be apparent that the bailout has failed — or is at least on its way to failing.

After a brief rally Monday morning, stock markets in Spain swooned. The 10-year Spanish bond — perhaps the greatest indicator of confidence, or in this case a lack of confidence — jumped higher, to about 6.5 percent, demonstrating that investors were now even more anxious about the country’s ability to pay back its debts than they were the day before the bailout was announced. Seven percent was the threshold that preceded the government bailouts for Greece, Ireland and Portugal in 2010 and 2011. The cost on Monday of buying credit-default swaps — or insurance — on Spanish debt spiked, too.

Indeed, it now appears that the bailout could make things in Spain worse, not better. And market indicators for the next domino in line for a bailout, Italy, point in the wrong direction.

This was bound to happen. That’s because bailing out the banks in each European country individually is a fool’s errand.

Experts often note — wrongly — that TARP, the Troubled Asset Relief Program that pumped $700 billion into the banking system in the United States, arrested the financial crisis in 2008. TARP, to some degree, has become the model for Europe.

But we forget history: TARP was only one component of the bailout. Perhaps more important — consider it the unsung hero of ending the crisis — was the government’s unilateral move to raise the amount of money the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation could insure, increasing the account limit to $250,000 from $100,000 and fully backstopping the entire money-market industry.

Investors and bank customers who were considering taking their deposits and running in 2008 no longer had reason to do so once deposits and money-market funds had been guaranteed. Keeping your money at Citigroup or Bank of America was relatively indistinguishable from a safety standpoint.

That is not the case in Europe. Customers of Spanish banks still have reason to worry about the solvency of their banks — and their country — making it reasonable for them to take their money from Spanish banks and send it to banks in safer countries like Germany. Indeed, the bailout makes it less likely Spain can pay back its debts because the new loan of up to $125 billion was just added to its huge debt pile. Worse, Spanish banks had been the biggest buyers of Spanish debt (a farce of a way to prop up the economy) and that most likely won’t continue.

As a result, it could be argued that it would be irresponsible for an individual or company, which has a fiduciary duty to its shareholders, not to move its money out of Spanish banks. Of course, money leaving the banks can become a self-fulfilling vicious cycle that virtually no amount of bank bailouts can plug. (By the way, countries like Spain have their own version of F.D.I.C., but it is all but worthless if you believe the country could collapse under its own debt.)

Ultimately, the only real way to begin to ensure the safety of the banks in Spain — and all of Europe — is to create a euro zone deposit guarantee system so that there would be no reason for a depositor to withdraw money. European leaders are expected to address the idea, along with regional banking regulation and a way to recapitalize ailing euro zone institutions, at a summit meeting at the end of the month. Oddly enough, such a deposit guarantee would probably be pretty cheap. The psychological effect of such a guarantee would most likely ensure the solvency of more banks than the guarantee would ever have to pay out. That was the experience in the United States.

Of course, there’s a catch. A euro zone deposit guarantee would require agreement from all the countries that use the euro, which is something that the leaders there seem incapable of reaching because ultimately it would mean tighter integration and, yes, a loss of sovereignty.

And here’s another problem with a euro zone deposit guarantee: Unless you believe the euro is going to remain the standard — that countries like Greece or Spain won’t be forced out or secede from the currency — even the guarantee might not be enough, unless the guarantee holds for all currencies. For example, if a Spanish bank customer is worried that his euros might one day turn into pesetas — even with a deposit guarantee in place — he may well move his money.

In the meantime, this piecemeal approach is bound to fail. Kicking the can down the road, to use again an overused phrase, at some point will fail — and that’s what may have just happened.

Source: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/why-the-bailout-in-spain-wont-work/

Some European Companies Try Bonds to Raise Cash

Among the midsize, family-owned companies that power the German economy, it has long been an article of faith: credit comes from the friendly local banker, not from cold and distant capital markets.

Andreas Dombret, a member of the executive board of the Bundesbank, said the sale of debt by companies was “limited in scope” but a “welcome response” to tighter lending by banks.

 

So Peter H. Leibold was breaking from the norm last year when he decided to finance the expansion of his company, which makes wood pellets for heating and energy generation, by selling corporate bonds. The company, German Pellets, raised more than 80 million euros ($102 million).

Now he is a convert. 

“The advantage of a bond is that you can raise a large amount from a completely different group of investors,” said Mr. Leibold, the founder and chief executive of the company, which is based in Wismar, on the coast in northern Germany. 

Corporate bonds — essentially, interest-bearing i.o.u.’s that companies sell to whomever is willing to buy — have long been an essential borrowing tool for companies in the United States. 

But in Europe, borrowing from banks, whether local ones or big multinationals, has traditionally been the preferred way to raise money. Just 9 percent of corporate credit in the euro zone comes from debt markets, according to the Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, compared with 64 percent in the United States.

But as the euro zone’s financial crisis has forced many banks to hoard cash and curtail lending, more European companies are turning to bond markets. If the trend continues, it could not only begin reversing the Continent’s longstanding preference for bank credit, but also make the region less prone to banking crises.

There might be resistance, however, from European regulators, who regard such borrowing as a form of shadow banking that they cannot control. In addition, bank lobbyists might fight what they see as competition. 

“People are afraid of a financial system not based on what they know, which is financial intermediation by banks,” said Nicolas Véron, a senior fellow at Bruegel, a research group in Brussels. 

The fears are not unfounded. The propensity of banks in the United States to turn loans into securities that can be sold to investors arguably helped create the subprime mortgage crisis. 

But later on, there was an upside: the practice meant that the fates of companies in the United States were less coupled to those of banks. Not so in Europe, where the problems of credit institutions remain a grave threat to the rest of the economy. 

“Euro-area firms are particularly vulnerable to reduction in bank credit because of their greater reliance on banks for funding,” the International Monetary Fund said in a report last month. 

Companies’ tapping of euro zone bond markets has surged this year, more than doubling to $107 billion in the first quarter, according to Dealogic, a data provider. For the first time since 2009, bond issues surpassed syndicated bank loans as a source of financing for larger companies. 

When even large European banks are cutting back on risk, bond issues enable companies to raise money from investors outside the euro zone who are less affected by the crisis. 

It remains unclear, though, to what extent debt markets can fill the vacuum left by troubled European banks. Bond markets might not help the thousands of smaller companies that form the backbone of the euro zone economy but are too small to attract investors’ attention. 

“The corporate sector in Europe still comprises mostly small- and medium-sized enterprises that will continue to rely on bank loans,” Andreas Dombret, a member of the executive board of the Bundesbank, said in an e-mail. 

The countries that need credit most desperately are also the ones with the highest proportion of small firms least able to gain access to debt markets. Companies with 50 employees or fewer employ 68 percent of the work force in Italy and 62 percent in Spain, according to Goldman Sachs. Those figures compare with 40 percent in Germany. 

“For smaller firms in particular, the fixed costs can simply be too high, rendering a bond issuance uneconomical under all circumstances,” Dirk Schumacher, an economist at Goldman Sachs in Frankfurt, wrote in a report last month. 

But the experience of German Pellets, which had sales of 275 million euros ($350 million) last year and has 500 employees, suggests that bonds could be an alternative for at least some midsize companies.

Mr. Leibold said that it initially had taken some effort to explain to investors why wood pellets were an interesting business. The pellets are a source of renewable energy and are cheaper than oil or natural gas, he told them. 

Mr. Leibold, who founded the company in 2005 after he saw wood pellets being made by small operations in Sweden and realized there was an opening for a mass producer, says his sales are rising — even in Greece — as people and companies look to cut costs. 

Eventually, investors came around. The company used the money it raised to make several acquisitions and build new manufacturing plants, including one in Woodville, Tex., that is to employ 250 people when it is completed later this year. 

German Pellets also continues to draw on traditional bank financing, Mr. Leibold said. But the bond market provides a diversity of fund sources, without the drawbacks of a stock listing. Like many European entrepreneurs, Mr. Leibold expresses an aversion to going public. 

The company reflects his spirit and that of his colleagues, he said. 

“If German Pellets was listed on an exchange, it would change the company from that day on,” he said.

While there has been no broad effort to curtail debt issues, regulators at the European and national levels are now scrutinizing so-called shadow banking. That is a broad category that includes hedge funds and other activities outside the traditional banking system, as well as corporate bond issuance. 

In practice, corporate debt is typically handled within the banking system, with banks earning hefty fees for marketing the bonds. But because the business is dominated by large investment banks, the concern by some regulators is that smaller institutions have trouble competing in that market and could lose revenue as a result. 

Mr. Véron of Bruegel said central bankers might also worry that a shift from traditional banking could make it harder to control interest rates — their main policy tool. 

“The European Central Bank sees a need for more credit,” he said. “At the same time they are concerned about losing the monetary policy transmission channel.” 

For all that, though, officials do not seem to be terribly concerned. 

Mr. Dombret of the Bundesbank said that the sale of debt by companies was “limited in scope” and a “rational and welcome response” by companies to tighter lending by banks in many parts of the euro zone. 

Risks that banks will be bypassed “seem to be rather low at this stage,” he said, but he added that the Bundesbank would “continue to monitor this area.” 

Mr. Leibold of German Pellets, for his part, said he was happy with his bond experience and planned to tap debt markets again. But he was not sure bonds would work for all companies. “You need a story for investors,” he said. 

Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/19/business/global/credit-flows-through-a-new-channel-for-europe.html?_r=1&ref=global

Vì sao Elliott hết kiện Vinashin?

Giải quyết dứt điểm món nợ nước ngoài của Vinashin sẽ là chất xúc tác cho việc xếp hạng tín nhiệm quốc gia, mở đường cho các doanh nghiệp đặt chân vào thị trường vốn quốc tế.

Quỹ đầu tư Elliott Advisors đã từ bỏ vụ kiện tập đoàn Công nghiệp Tàu thủy (Vinashin) lên tòa Thượng thẩm London và ông Nguyễn Ngọc Sự, Chủ tịch Hội đồng thành viên Vinashin, cho biết điều này đã được thông báo trong một bức thư gửi đề ngày 16-3-2012 - đây là thông tin nổi bật trong tháng cuối cùng của quí 1-2012 được các hãng tin nước ngoài đăng tải. Nguyên nhân nào đã khiến Elliott Advisors từ bỏ vụ kiện sau gần bốn tháng miệt mài theo đuổi?

Trước khi đệ đơn kiện vào đầu tháng 11 năm ngoái, Elliott Advisors và các chủ nợ khác đã được Vinashin chào mời phương án trả ngay lập tức bằng tiền toàn bộ số nợ với mức bằng 35% mệnh giá ban đầu, tương đương 210 triệu đô la Mỹ.

Vinashin không có tiền, nhưng một ngân hàng lớn đứng phía sau sẵn sàng mua lại nợ với giá đó. Elliott Advisors và các chủ nợ đã từ chối vì cho rằng giá quá thấp, không thể chấp nhận.

Từ sau đó, một tập đoàn đa ngành nội địa vào cuộc, cũng đưa ra mức giá mua tương tự nhưng cách thức trả nợ đa dạng và linh hoạt. Mối quan hệ rộng với giới tài chính quốc tế, đặc biệt là với các quỹ đầu tư tầm cỡ, đã giúp tập đoàn này tiếp cận các chủ nợ dễ dàng.

Có hai yếu tố khiến các chủ nợ đồng ý ngồi vào bàn đàm phán lần này. Thứ nhất họ có thể thu hồi ngay một phần nợ bằng tiền (nếu muốn) và phần còn lại sẽ nhận bằng những công cụ nợ khác có khả năng chuyển đổi thành tiền sau một thời gian nhất định. Họ cũng có thể chuyển thành công cụ nợ khác toàn bộ phần nợ. Các công cụ nợ ở đây bao gồm nhiều loại hạn mức, kỳ hạn khác nhau. Như vậy, khả năng thu hồi nợ cao hơn 35% giá gốc ban đầu tỏ ra thực tế. Chưa kể nếu chấp nhận các công cụ nợ kỳ hạn dài, chẳng hạn 5-10 năm, biết đâu các chủ nợ có thể thu hồi 100% số vốn ban đầu và thậm chí có lãi một khi các công cụ nợ sinh lời.

Việc chấp nhận các công cụ nợ kéo dài 5-10 năm không phải quá khó đối với các chủ nợ. Còn nhớ trong quá trình thương thảo với Vinashin vào năm 2011, các chủ nợ đã từng đưa phương án: hoán đổi hợp đồng cũ thành hợp đồng vay mới kỳ hạn 15 năm với lãi suất Libor cộng 150 điểm phần trăm/năm. Lãi suất sẽ tăng thêm 50 điểm phần trăm nữa từ năm thứ 11 đến năm thứ 15. Họ sẵn sàng đồng ý 15 năm cho hợp đồng hoán đổi mới với Vinashin, thì 5-10 năm cho công cụ nợ là khả năng có thể xem xét.

Thứ hai tập đoàn mua lại nợ của Vinashin thực sự có tiềm lực tài chính mạnh, hiện có trong tay hàng trăm triệu đô la Mỹ, có thể trả ngay lập tức toàn bộ nợ của Vinashin với giá gốc, chứ chưa nói giá thương lượng. Hơn nữa đây là doanh nghiệp có quản trị tốt, mức tăng trưởng lợi nhuận và doanh thu hàng năm tương đối cao. Trở thành đối tác của tập đoàn này là một khả năng có thể tính đến với các chủ nợ. Chuyển tiền từ khoản cho vay thương mại sang khoản đầu tư, các ngân hàng chủ nợ sẽ tránh được việc trích lập dự phòng rủi ro tín dụng và hạch toán mất vốn.

Cánh cửa tháo gỡ món nợ 600 triệu đô la Mỹ nước ngoài của Vinashin bắt đầu mở! Không phải ngẫu nhiên nó lại trùng lắp với thời điểm Bộ Tài chính tiếp xúc nhiều hơn với các hãng xếp hạng tín nhiệm quốc tế. Cơ quan ngân khố quốc gia mới đây còn thuê thêm một tổ chức tài chính tư vấn sau khi làm việc với những tên tuổi như Moody’s, S&P. Đây được xem như bước chuẩn bị của các cơ quan quản lý nhà nước tạo điều kiện cho doanh nghiệp trong nước phát hành trái phiếu ra nước ngoài, đáp ứng đòi hỏi nhu cầu vốn đang rất lớn của nền kinh tế. Một mức xếp hạng tín nhiệm tốt sẽ giúp các doanh nghiệp phát hành trái phiếu quốc tế với lãi suất hợp lý mà không cần có sự bảo lãnh của Chính phủ.

Giải quyết dứt điểm món nợ nước ngoài của Vinashin sẽ là chất xúc tác cho việc xếp hạng tín nhiệm quốc gia, mở đường cho các doanh nghiệp đặt chân vào thị trường vốn quốc tế.

Ngân hàng Công thương (Vietinbank) đã bắt đầu chuyến tiếp thị phát hành 500 triệu đô la Mỹ trái phiếu quốc tế sau khi được Chính phủ cho phép. Ngân hàng Ngoại thương (Vietcombank) vừa xin ý kiến cổ đông phát hành 1 tỉ đô la Mỹ trái phiếu quốc tế trong năm nay. Theo như thông báo của Vietcombank, thời hạn tối đa của trái phiếu có thể tới 10 năm. Nếu được cổ đông đồng ý, Vietcombank còn cần phải được sự chấp thuận của Ngân hàng Nhà nước và số lượng phát hành nằm trong hạn mức vay thương mại của quốc gia do Chính phủ phê duyệt.

Việc phát hành trái phiếu quốc tế thành công với Vietcombank có ý nghĩa quyết định. Một mặt nó giúp ngân hàng có nguồn ngoại tệ để thỏa mãn nhu cầu tín dụng bằng đô la Mỹ trong nước. Việc đặt trần tiền gửi ngoại tệ 2%/năm và sự lên giá của đồng Việt Nam thời gian qua đã làm cho vốn huy động ngoại tệ của Vietcombank nói riêng, các ngân hàng nói chung, gặp khó khăn. Mặt khác, sự có mặt của trái phiếu Vietcombank trên thị trường vốn thế giới là chứng thực cho sự vươn ra quốc tế của ngân hàng sau khi có được đối tác chiến lược - cổ đông Mizohu (Nhật Bản).

Nguồn tin từ BIDV nói với TBKTSG, ngân hàng này cũng chuẩn bị kế hoạch phát hành trái phiếu quốc tế. Giống như tập đoàn Điện lực, Dầu khí, Than - Khoáng sản… những năm trước BIDV đã thông báo phát hành 500 triệu đô la Mỹ trái phiếu quốc tế. Tuy nhiên sau đó BIDV hoãn lại do tình hình kinh tế vĩ mô trong nước và quốc tế không thuận lợi.

Không thể không thấy rằng việc duy trì lãi suất thấp của FED đang tạo điều kiện thuận lợi cho việc huy động vốn quốc tế hiện nay. Thế nhưng với Việt Nam, việc vay vốn bên ngoài vẫn đang phải chịu lãi suất cao do các tổ chức cho vay cộng thêm phí rủi ro, thông thường khoảng 2,5-3 điểm phần trăm/năm. Chính vì thế giải quyết dứt điểm món nợ nước ngoài của Vinashin sẽ là chất xúc tác cho việc xếp hạng tín nhiệm quốc gia, mở đường cho các doanh nghiệp đặt chân vào thị trường vốn quốc tế. Quan trọng bây giờ là các doanh nghiệp, ngân hàng Việt Nam phát hành được trái phiếu quốc tế với lãi suất thích hợp, rồi sau đó có thể lãi suất và chi phí phát hành sẽ giảm dần theo uy tín quốc gia.

Source: http://www.thesaigontimes.vn/Home/diendan/sotay/74358/Vi-sao-Elliott-het-kien-Vinashin?.html

The Lessons Learned From Diamond’s Pringles Fiasco

With Kellogg’s deal to acquire Procter & Gamble’s Pringles brand for $2.695 billion in cash, Diamond Foods is left with nothing. Proctor & Gamble’s announcement of the deal was accompanied by a terse statement that the consumer products company had terminated its prior agreement to sell Pringles to Diamond Foods.

It is a staggering reversal of fortune for Diamond and its now-suspended chief executive and chairman, Michael J. Mendes.

So it is time to see what we have learned from the twists and turns of this failed deal. Once again, some of these lessons seem rather basic, even cliché, but worth repeating. Frankly, deal makers tend to repeatedly ignore them. The masters of the universe need the reminder.

Don’t Run Before You Can Walk

Diamond Food was leveraging up to buy Pringles, assuming $850 million in debt. This was also a deal in which a minnow would be swallowing a whale. At the time the deal was announced, 2011 revenue at Pringles was estimated to be about $1.4 billion. Diamond’s 2011 estimated revenue was a third lower, at about $950 million.

Because Diamond could not afford to pay cash for Pringles, Diamond intended to issue $1.5 billion in its common stock in connection with the transaction. Because Pringles was so much bigger, Diamond shareholders would have only owned 43 percent of the combined company. P.&G. shareholders would have owned the rest, a majority of Diamond’s shares.

Diamond made this acquisition as part of a strategy to move away from its longtime focus on selling nuts. It had previously been a consortium formed by almond growers. But Mr. Mendes wanted more. He had already bought the Pop Secret brand, and the Pringles acquisition was Diamond’s chance to transform itself into a more consumer-oriented snack food company.

Mr. Mendes’s strategy was too much too soon. Like the 2008 deal in which Finish Line attempted to acquire the much larger Genesco, this also ended badly.

Mr. Mendes treated the nut business as an orphan child he appeared to want to abandon. This left that business increasingly vulnerable and weak. And that weakness came back to haunt Diamond as the nut business deteriorated. It now appears that the decline was made up through possible accounting manipulation. Mr. Mendes would have been better off keeping a focus on his nut business and growing more slowly, rather than searching for a world-changing acquisition.

Expect Scrutiny

Diamond’s acquisition announcement was fun for the company in the first few days as it celebrated the deal and expansion, but it also led short-sellers to focus on Diamond. The announcement also appears to have spurred frustrated growers to emerge and raise issues with Diamond’s business. This type of scrutiny is not unusual in acquisition deals. But companies often do not expect it, instead treating the acquisition announcement as the end of the matter.

This is anything but the case. Companies should perform their own internal due diligence before announcing a big transaction. In addition, a company should be prepared with both an investor and public relations strategy from the get-go. Diamond failed here. Miserably.

Agreements Matter

P.&G. got lucky. Diamond’s special board committee gave P.&G. an easy out of the agreement by finding that Diamond’s accounting statements had to be materially restated and suspending Mr. Mendes and the company’s chief financial officer, Steven M. Neil. The accounting restatement and suspensions provided P.&G. with grounds to assert a material adverse change claim in order to terminate the deal.

But P.&G. might have been stuck if Diamond’s committee had found differently. If Diamond was able to get its financial statements through the Securities and Exchange Commission, then P.&G. would have had few grounds to exit the deal. This would be despite the fact that significant uncertainty remained about Diamond and its stock price could have remained in the cellar.

P.&G. could have solved this problem by negotiating a common right in acquisition agreements that gives the seller the right to terminate a deal if the target’s stock drops below a certain level. In the future, sellers and buyers in similar situations may want to think more seriously about this right.

Sellers Need to Be Wary

Remember when AOL acquired Time Warner in 2000? It was a great deal for AOL, which swapped highly inflated bubble stock for Time Warner’s more stable shares. But the deal did not work out so well for Time Warner shareholders. The combined company subsequently lost hundreds of billions of dollars in market value.

Sellers still have not learned that when you are selling a business and receiving stock in exchange, it is really an investment in the buyer. P.&G. certainly didn’t. P.&G. was essentially making a $1 billion-plus investment in Diamond, but failed to do the due diligence that the short-sellers did. Instead, P.&G. appeared to rely excessively on the managerial talents of one person, conditioning the deal on Mr. Mendes staying in place at Diamond before the acquisition completed.

Not only that, P.&G. was too clever by half, as Breakingviews has noted. By going for a more complex transaction that saved on taxes, it almost lost out on a much simpler deal. Complexity increases deal risk and the ability to successfully complete transactions.

Short-Sellers Have a Purpose

No one likes the person at the craps table betting the Don’t Come bet. It is no fun for the rest of us that he or she is betting we will all lose. This is a simplistic but partly valid reason why short-sellers often come in for negative criticism. Some of this criticism may be legitimate when market manipulation is found. The short-sellers’ initial claims of accounting problems at Diamond also froze this deal in its tracks.

Once accounting fraud claims emerge, it is hard for a company to move forward, since it must investigate and clear the charge. Accounting claims, even if untrue, can throw a deal seriously off track, and this may be a problem in the future as short-sellers raise unwarranted claims.

But in this case there appears to have been truth. The Diamond deal shows the value of short-sellers. The problems at Diamond were first spotted by the short-sellers and brought to light. They served a valuable market purpose.

With Time, There May Be Another Buyer

The whisper on the street was that P.&G. was stuck with Diamond because there was no other buyer. But sure enough, not only has one emerged, but Kellogg is paying $350 million more than Diamond would. This is anecdotal proof that buyer assessments of the market and ability to pay are constantly in flux. What was once a barren market may prove to be fertile (with time).

The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same

Take a look at the Kellogg’s slide deck for its investor presentation on the Pringles acquisition. It looks remarkably similar to the hopeful one Diamond issued back when it announced its Pringles deal in April 2011. Hopefully, Kellogg will have better luck.

C.E.O. Hubris Can Kill a Company

Enough said.

Source: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/lessons-learned-from-diamonds-pringle-debacle/

Working out of debt

The deleveraging process that began in 2008 is proving to be long and painful. Historical experience, particularly post–World War II debt reduction episodes, which the McKinsey Global Institute reviewed in a report two years ago, suggested this would be the case.¹ And the eurozone’s debt crisis is just the latest demonstration of how toxic the consequences can be when countries have too much debt and too little growth.

We recently took another look forward and back—at the relevant lessons from history about how governments can support economic recovery amid deleveraging and at the signposts business leaders can watch to see where economies are in that process. We reviewed the experience of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain in depth, but the signals should be relevant for any country that’s deleveraging.

Deleveraging: Where are we now?

The financial crisis highlighted the danger of too much debt, a message that has only been reinforced by Europe’s recent sovereign-debt challenges. And new McKinsey Global Institute research shows that the unwinding of debt—or deleveraging—has barely begun. Since 2008, debt ratios have grown rapidly in France, Japan, and Spain and have edged downward only in Australia, South Korea, and the United States. Overall, the ratio of debt to GDP has grown in the world’s ten largest economies.

Overall, the deleveraging process has only just begun. During the past two and a half years, the ratio of debt to GDP, driven by rising government debt, has actually grown in the aggregate in the world’s ten largest developed economies (for more, see sidebar, “Deleveraging: Where are we now?”). Private-sector debt has fallen, however, which is in line with historical experience: overextended households and corporations typically lead the deleveraging process; governments begin to reduce their debts later, once they have supported the economy into recovery.

Different countries, different paths

In the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain, all of which experienced significant credit bubbles before the financial crisis of 2008, households have been reducing their debt at different speeds. The most significant reduction occurred among US households. Let’s review each country in turn.

The United States: Light at the end of the tunnel

Household debt outstanding has fallen by $584 billion (4 percent) from the end of 2008 through the second quarter of 2011 in the United States. Defaults account for about 70 and 80 percent of the decrease in mortgage debt and consumer credit, respectively. A majority of the defaults reflect financial distress: overextended homeowners who lost jobs during the recession or faced medical emergencies found that they could not afford to keep up with debt payments. It is estimated that up to 35 percent of the defaults resulted from strategic decisions by households to walk away from their homes, since they owed far more than their properties were worth. This option is more available in the United States than in other countries, because in 11 of the 50 states—including hard-hit Arizona and California—mortgages are nonrecourse loans, so lenders cannot pursue the other assets or income of borrowers who default. Even in recourse states, US banks historically have rarely pursued borrowers.

Historical precedent suggests that US households could be up to halfway through the deleveraging process, with one to two years of further debt reduction ahead. We base this estimate partly on the long-term trend line for the ratio of household debt to disposable income. Americans have constantly increased their debt levels over the past 60 years, reflecting the development of mortgage markets, consumer credit, student loans, and other forms of credit. But after 2000, the ratio of household debt to income soared, exceeding the trend line by about 30 percentage points at the peak (Exhibit 1). As of the second quarter of 2011, this ratio had fallen by 11 percent from the peak; at the current rate of deleveraging, it would return to trend by mid-2013. Faster growth of disposable income would, of course, speed this process.

We came to a similar conclusion when we compared the experiences of US households with those of households in Sweden and Finland in the 1990s. During that decade, these Nordic countries endured similar banking crises, recessions, and deleveraging. In both, the ratio of household debt to income declined by roughly 30 percent from its peak. As Exhibit 2 indicates, the United States is closely tracking the Swedish experience, and the picture looks even better considering that clearing the backlog of mortgages already in the foreclosure pipeline could reduce US household debt ratios by an additional six percentage points.

As for the debt service ratio of US households, it’s now down to 11.5 percent—well below the peak of 14.0 percent, in the third quarter of 2007, and lower than it was even at the start of the bubble, in 2000. Given current low interest rates, this metric may overstate the sustainability of current US household debt levels, but it provides another indication that they are moving in the right direction.

Nonetheless, after US consumers finish deleveraging, they probably won’t be as powerful an engine of global growth as they were before the crisis. That’s because home equity loans and cash-out refinancing, which from 2003 to 2007 let US consumers extract $2.2 trillion of equity from their homes—an amount more than twice the size of the US fiscal-stimulus package—will not be available. The refinancing era is over: housing prices have declined, the equity in residential real estate has fallen severely, and lending standards are tighter. Excluding the impact of home equity extraction, real consumption growth in the pre-crisis years would have been around 2 percent per annum—similar to the annualized rate in the third quarter of 2011.

The United Kingdom: Debt has only just begun to fall

Three years after the start of the financial crisis, UK households have deleveraged only slightly, with the ratio of debt to disposable income falling from 156 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008 to 146 percent in second quarter of 2011. This ratio remains significantly higher than that of US households at the bubble’s peak. Moreover, the outstanding stock of household debt has fallen by less than 1 percent. Residential mortgages have continued to grow in the United Kingdom, albeit at a much slower pace than they did before 2008, and this has offset some of the £25 billion decline in consumer credit.

Still, many UK residential mortgages may be in trouble. The Bank of England estimates that up to 12 percent of them may be in some kind of forbearance process, and an additional 2 percent are delinquent— similar to the 14 percent of US mortgages that are in arrears, have been restructured, or are now in the foreclosure pipeline (Exhibit 3). This process of quiet forbearance in the United Kingdom, combined with record-low interest rates, may be masking significant dangers ahead. Some 23 percent of UK households report that they are already “somewhat” or “heavily” burdened in paying off unsecured debt.² Indeed, the debt payments of UK households are one-third higher than those of their US counterparts—and 10 percent higher than they were in 2000, before the bubble. This statistic is particularly problematic because at least two-thirds of UK mortgages have variable interest rates, which expose borrowers to the potential for soaring debt payments should interest rates rise.

Given the minimal amount of deleveraging among UK households, they do not appear to be following Sweden or Finland on the path of significant, rapid deleveraging. Extrapolating the recent pace of UK household deleveraging, we find that the ratio of household debt to disposable income would not return to its long-term trend until 2020. Alternatively, it’s possible that developments in UK home prices, interest rates, and GDP growth will cause households to reduce debt slowly over the next several years, to levels that are more sustainable but still higher than historic trends. Overall, the United Kingdom needs to steer a difficult course that reduces household debt steadily, but at a pace that doesn’t stifle growth in consumption, which remains the critical driver of UK GDP.

Spain: The long unwinding road

Since the credit crisis first broke, Spain’s ratio of household debt to disposable income has fallen by 4 percent and the outstanding stock of household debt by just 1 percent. As in the United Kingdom, home mortgages and other forms of credit have continued to grow while consumer credit has fallen sharply.

Spain’s mortgage default rate climbed following the crisis but remains relatively low, at approximately 2.5 percent, thanks to low interest rates. The number of mortgages in forbearance has also risen since the crisis broke, however. And more trouble may lie ahead. Almost half of the households in the lowest-income quintile face debt payments representing more than 40 percent of their income, compared with slightly less than 20 percent for low-income US households. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate in Spain is now 21.5 percent, up from 9 percent in 2006. For now, households continue to make payments to avoid the country’s conservative recourse laws, which allow lenders to go after borrowers’ assets and income for a long period.

In Spain, unlike most other developed economies, the corporate sector’s debt levels have risen sharply over the past decade. A significant drop in interest rates after the country joined the eurozone, in 1999, unleashed a run-up in real-estate spending and an enormous expansion in corporate debt. Today, Spanish corporations hold twice as much debt relative to national output as do US companies, and six times as much as German companies. Debt reduction in the corporate sector may weigh on growth in the years to come.

Signposts for recovery

Paring debt and laying a foundation for sustainable long-term growth should take place simultaneously, difficult as that may seem. For economies facing this dual challenge today, a review of history offers key lessons. Three historical episodes of deleveraging are particularly relevant: those of Finland and Sweden in the 1990s and of South Korea after the 1997 financial crisis. All these countries followed a similar path: bank deregulation (or lax regulation) led to a credit boom, which in turn fueled real-estate and other asset bubbles. When they collapsed, these economies fell into deep recession, and debt levels fell.

In all three countries, growth was essential for completing a five- to seven-year-long deleveraging process. Although the private sector may start to reduce debt even as GDP contracts, significant public-sector deleveraging, absent a sovereign default, typically occurs only when GDP growth rebounds, in the later years of deleveraging (Exhibit 4). That’s true because the primary factor causing public deficits to rise after a banking crisis is declining tax revenue, followed by an increase in automatic stabilizer payments, such as unemployment benefits.³ A rebound of economic growth in most deleveraging episodes allows countries to grow out of their debts, as the rate of GDP growth exceeds the rate of credit growth.

No two deleveraging economies are the same, of course. As relatively small economies deleveraging in times of strong global economic expansion, Finland, South Korea, and Sweden could rely on exports to make a substantial contribution to growth. Today’s deleveraging economies are larger and face more difficult circumstances. Still, historical experience suggests five questions that business and government leaders should consider as they evaluate where today’s deleveraging economies are heading and what policy priorities to emphasize.

1. Is the banking system stable?

In Finland and Sweden, banks were recapitalized and some were nationalized. In South Korea, some banks were merged and some were shuttered, and foreign investors for the first time got the right to become majority investors in financial institutions. The decisive resolution of bad loans was critical to kick-start lending in the economic- rebound phase of deleveraging.

The financial sectors in today’s deleveraging economies began to deleverage significantly in 2009, and US banks have accomplished the most in that effort. Even so, banks will generally need to raise significant amounts of additional capital in the years ahead to comply with Basel III and national regulations. In most European countries, business demand for credit has fallen amid slow growth. The supply of credit, to date, has not been severely constrained. A continuation of the eurozone crisis, however, poses a risk of a significant credit contraction in 2012 if banks are forced to reduce lending in the face of funding constraints. Such a forced deleveraging would significantly damage the region’s ability to escape recession.

2. Are structural reforms in place?

In the 1990s, each of the crisis countries embarked on a program of structural reform. For Finland and Sweden, accession to the European Union led to greater economies of scale and higher direct investment. Deregulation in specific industry sectors—for example, retailing—also played an important role.⁴ South Korea followed a remarkably similar course as it restructured its large corporate conglomerates, or chaebol, and opened its economy wider to foreign investment. These reforms unleashed growth by increasing competition within the economy and pushing companies to raise their productivity.

Today’s troubled economies need reforms tailored to the circumstances of each country. The United States, for instance, ought to streamline and accelerate regulatory approvals for business investment, particularly by foreign companies. The United Kingdom should revise its planning and zoning rules to enable the expansion of successful high-growth cities and to accelerate home building. Spain should drastically simplify business regulations to ease the formation of new companies, help improve productivity by promoting the creation of larger ones, and reform labor laws.⁵ Such structural changes are particularly important for Spain because the fiscal constraints now buffeting the European Union mean that the country cannot continue to boost its public debt to stimulate the economy. Moreover, as part of the eurozone, Spain does not have the option of currency depreciation to stimulate export growth.

3. Have exports surged?

In Sweden and Finland, exports grew by 10 and 9.4 percent a year, respectively, between 1994 and 1998, when growth rebounded in the later years of deleveraging. This boom was aided by strong export-oriented companies and the significant currency devaluations that occurred during the crisis (34 percent in Sweden from 1991 to 1993). South Korea’s 50 percent devaluation of the won, in 1997, helped the nation boost its share of exports in electronics and automobiles.

Even if exports alone cannot spur a broad recovery, they will be important contributors to economic growth in today’s deleveraging economies. In this fragile environment, policy makers must resist protectionism. Bilateral trade agreements, such as those recently passed by the United States, can help. Salvaging what we can from the Doha round of trade talks will be important. Service exports, including the “hidden” ones that foreign students and tourists generate, can be a key component of export growth in the United Kingdom and the United States.

4. Is private investment rising?

Another important factor that boosted growth in Finland, South Korea, and Sweden was the rapid expansion of investment. In Sweden, it rose by 9.7 percent annually during the economic rebound that began in 1994. Accession to the European Union was part of the impetus. Something similar happened in South Korea after 1998 as barriers to foreign direct investment fell. These soaring inflows helped offset slower private-consumption growth as households deleveraged.

Given the current very low interest rates in the United Kingdom and the United States, there is no better time to embark upon investments. Those for infrastructure represent an important enabler, and today there are ample opportunities to renew the aging energy and transportation networks in those countries. With public funding limited, the private sector can play an important role in providing equity capital, if pricing and regulatory structures enable companies to earn a fair return.

5. Has the housing market stabilized?

During the three historical episodes discussed here, the housing market stabilized and began to expand again as the economy rebounded. In the Nordic countries, equity markets also rebounded strongly at the start of the recovery. This development provided additional support for a sustainable rate of consumption growth by further increasing the “wealth effect” on household balance sheets.

In the United States, new housing starts remain at roughly one-third of their long-term average levels, and home prices have continued to decline in many parts of the country through 2011. Without price stabilization and an uptick in housing starts, a stronger recovery of GDP will be difficult,⁶ since residential real-estate construction alone contributed 4 to 5 percent of GDP in the United States before the housing bubble. Housing also spurs consumer demand for durable goods such as appliances and furnishings and therefore boosts the sale and manufacture of these products.

At a time when the economic recovery is sputtering, the eurozone crisis threatens to accelerate, and trust in business and the financial sector is at a low point, it may be tempting for senior executives to hunker down and wait out macroeconomic conditions that seem beyond anyone’s control. That approach would be a mistake. Business leaders who understand the signposts, and support government leaders trying to establish the preconditions for growth, can make a difference to their own and the global economy.

Source: https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Working_out_of_debt_2914